

# Henry Murray's 'Dyadic Session #12' with Ted Kaczynski

Henry Murray, Ted Kaczynski, etc.

March 14, 1960

Transcribed September 20 1996 from tapes.  
*Dyadic Session #12*  
(Tape #1)

Dr. W:

Response:

Dr. W.

Sounds of comments about the bright light, people walking around.

Well the boys in the back room are doing ...[humming] ... in their underhanded kind of way, and uh, I think Dr. W. has spoken to you, has he spoken to you, too, about this? So let me go over this so you'll know the details. Just to get a few things clear. There will be three five-minute periods of discussion, and uh, . . . [humming] ... to Mr. Shea, but between each of these periods, there will be a 3 or 4 minute interval, which the film will be changed. I think he may have told you that.

Yeah, he mentioned that.

Good, good. During that time, the boys in the back room don't want any conversation, because they want to get everything on film. You know how they are, so ... [humming] ... Please begin your discussion when you hear the buzzer sound. Alright? Thank you very much, gentlemen. After I leave the room, in a moment or so, the buzzer will sound and you can begin the discussion.

Incidentally, Doctor, what yellow light?

Yeah, thank you very much. ... [humming] ...

Walking around room, furniture being moved, sounds of comments.

Q.

This is Monday evening, March 14, 1960. Dyadic #12 is about to begin between Mr. Shea and Mr. Kaczynski. We are now testing for the level of the hum. [Humming] We are now testing for the level of the hum. [Humming] We are testing again for the level of the hum. [Humming] The dial is now set at 3.5. Thank you very much.

Thank you Doctor.

You're very welcome.

3

What year are you in Mr. Kaczynski?

END OF TAPE

NOTE : Dyadic Sessions #12 between Mr. Quin Cherry and Mr. John Kaczynski.

*Dyadic Session #12*

Lawful

2 S. Well, first of all, one, point in which I differ with you is this-

3 A: Excuse me, just a second. Do you think we ought to decide how we're going to go about it or, I mean, I'm not sure what to do.

4 S: It's supposed to be a spontaneous discussion. Um.

5 A: Well, this session or-

6 S: The whole thing.

7 A: *Yuh. But I- does that mean we just sort of-* well I don't know. How do

8 S: Well, they just said that the a- during the first session we're supposed to develop our own viewpoints and differ-

9 A: Well I realize that. I was just wondering if we ought to split the thing up or how you think we ought to-

10 S: Well, I mean I assume that we should just *go ahead* and discuss-

11 A: a) Well, I'm not sure that's the best way, but if you want to I guess we could, c) I had a couple of questions to say that I had, I mean, that I'm not quite clear on. I think that would be helpful to me if I I could get them from you and the first one was you toward the beginning of your philosophy you said. You went off onto this non-objective *reality* from my point of view, well talking about. You just made the statement in fact although you weren't you didn't make it as a flat statement. You said, in fact, all life may be just hallucination or something like that, yuh, then in your summary you put down that we can know nothing for certain. Now I can understand these two, but then just up above that you made the remark that what you said at *the beginning about* shoulds and oughts doesn't hold for the effect of your logical processes such as what you think will be the outcome of the world or something like that. I, I I'm sure it's not a contradiction but I can't quite understand the line.

12 S. Well, here's here's what, I mean what I say about the shoulds and oughts being, well these these the shoulds and oughts are what, are *the things* that I have a pleasantly emotional reaction to. If I, if I react favorably to this, I say it should. On the other hand, the the rational results of my thought processes shall we say are things that I I believe to be true, assuming sense data are correct, I mean, there's really no other basis you can go on, but I do maintain that it is conceivable, I mean, there is, *there's* no logical way of proving that our sense data are true and in case ht should not be true then well we can really know nothing and we can't be positive that they are true.

13 A: Well, the then a, then this logical process is objective with the understanding that its premises *may be* unreal.

14 S: Yes suh.

15 A: But given the subjective premises, then then the then the logic or the reasoning process can go ahead. Is that what you?

16 S: Yes suh.

17 A: All right. You see, I wasn't I wasn't quite sure on that- we're limited by by space and time and inclination and everything else. J-^eal-ly-helped-'- ^you. Was there anything in mine that wasn't particularly clear to you or 18,19 and a that you'd *want to*

18 S: Well

19 A: make clear?

20 S: a lot of things. )

21 A: Don't go gunning at me now. That comes later.

22 S: b) There were a lot of things in your philosophy I didn't understand. )

Um. (pause) d) Well, you say, for example, I think you said society is a, 'well first of all, you say, you said at the very beginning, I believe an individual should exist as an *individual*, / RightJZ Well, if you take that literally it's just a tautology but what did you mean there?y

23 A: Oh well, I I hoped that, what I intended that as one of those well here in any philosophy I think you have to have start with a central concept which is purely idealistic and almost, in a sense purely *theoretical* and then around this central core, or this overriding premise, you then set up a framework of values and of practical objects the way you'd act and that sort of thing which might even apparently not be consistent with this if you view both literally, but if you look at the proper schemework, the proper framework, I think it is but my, *all I was saying there* was that my philosophy is an individualistic philosophy in the sense that this is the core, and someone else might have set up his philosophy as God oriented, or another person might set it up family oriented or society- Do you see what, see what I'm still driving at, and in any case since it's a personal philosophy you'd have to say that an individual should exist as a servant of God. as a *member of society*, *I just say as an individual*.

24 S: You say the individual should exist in a sense as a servant of

- BREAK -

25 A: a) Well, I think this time I'm supposed to sort of press and you're supposed to repel or something like that, c) I ought to warn you before I start this that I did not have a very favorable impression of you as a result of reading your philosophy in spite of the fact that on some of the, just value judgments, bald value judgments I might tend to agree with you, though you perhaps are younger and state them more in black and white terms than I would do so. But let me just take off a few preliminaries and then we'll get off to what I really didn't like. First, I mean, in spite of the fact that you've explained this subjective reality, I mean e)^I think this is essentially an assinine point of view/^md you, well this sense is non-^ think if you took the trouble to have the, I don't know, intellectual honesty or something to go and read a book on epistemology, you'd perhaps see why where your logical processes have *broken down* completely.^ And a second preliminary that I don't discuss too much, you made one

flat statement, the individual owes nothing to society, (if this is true, then by any logical process society owes nothing to the individual and /~true\_7 this is an insipid remark because I don't think that you can intelligently conceive of society and in a man living in society without such *things as* police protection, fire protection, unless, of course, what you want is to reduce man to the level of an animal^^Now if this is what you desire, then I would say this is equally insipid and very well I guess immature would be the only way I could I could put it g^One thing I did get though which I thought was more essential to *you was the* fact that although you did a great deal of breast beating a la Tarzan, about strength and individuality, I've sensed an overriding sense of a, I don't know really whether I'd call it weakness or fear^^ (Pause). J^And this is something that is very hard to grasp because it just sort of permeates your *entire philosophy*, and I can understand it sitting here talking with you, but you don't seem to me to have the courage of your convictions, and this is apparent in many instances in your in your philosophy and on the other hand where, where you do, then your convictions tend to be all wetj but a- *Go ahead*.

26,27 S: Well, I mean you get some a«n&e of- defense there. I mean, well you say-  
27 A: you're defending yourself\_/\_

28 S: Yuh, well you,

29 A: I mean, if able.

30 S: Well you you say that my business about the fact that sense data can't be proven is all wet. Well, can you prove that sense data are true?

31 A: I say read a book on epistemology and then ask me the question.

32 3: Yah, well-

33 A: This can be proved

34 S: I mean

35 A: (logically by this reasoning *process*, I mean, and if a person is as egocentric, conceited to almost although I hate to use words and emotional terms in a discussion, as you are, it would seem to me that you should prize intellectual honesty although I didn't see very much of it in your philosophy.

36 S: Well, what do you mean by intellectual honesty?

37 A: Well, I mean the avoidance of preconception^ of prejudices.C I mean if you feel you're weak that you shouldn't project the *necessity of being* strong, i.e., to override other people and everything else, which I think is exactly what you've done and I think you've taken your own shortcomings and attempted to compensate for them^

38 S: Well, you're j^t saying...

39 A: The psychological experience I...

40 S: All through this...

41 A: That probably would be difficult for you if you had to be objective about it.

42 S: Yeah, well, all through this thing you've been saying, well this and that but you haven't given rae any arguments *or reasons*.) You say that fl-

43 A: Well, let's see I've just formed an opinion of you, not particularly favorable. I I don't, I don't

44 S: The point is you-

45 A: On this, on this, don't interrupt me, please. On this avoiding of society, or of this society is a bad thing. Is that what you're trying to build up here?

46 S: No.

47 A: I mean are you conforming with the non-conformists.

43 S: No, I'm not conforming with the non-conformists.

49 A: *Well* (simultaneous speech, inaudible)

50 S: If I were conforming with the non-conformists, I mean really this isn't really a beard yet/)

51 A: You're dam right it's not.

52 S: I'm well aware of that. But now you've been just applying a lot of labels in attacking me. You have not given any logical reasoning. You have not

53 A: Oh, Mr. Lawful, I don't know if you've been following it or not, but I think they've been quite apparent.

54 S: No, you've just been applying labels.

55 A: For anyone who *wasn't a*

56 S: You haven't really criticized my views except in that you've applied labels. You have not analyzed them in any way and attacked them logically.

57 A: Sure well, there isn't too much to analyze, Mr. Lawful, a lot of garbage. If that's another label, then make the most of it but that's just about what I think that your philosophy is and the paper that it\* s written on it suggests an equally pragmatic use for it.

58 S: Well, you're just descending to personalities now^

59 A: I'm not descending to personalities, Mr. Lawful.

60 S: Well I'm not *criticising* the paper it's written on.

61 A: I think it was fine paper before you put your philosophy on it. I'm sure it was high-grade Bond.

62 S: Well, I mean, right now you're getting completely out of the logical or intellectual tone of discussion. You're merely-

63 A: What's the mutter, can't you defend yourself?

64 S: If you had attacked me logically, yes, but you're just applying labels'.

-BREAK -

65 A: Tell us that you're a sophomore and interested in philosophy.

66 S: Well, all right.

67 A: Fine, fine anyway.

68 S: But anyway well if you're going to apply labels, then I'll apply labels.

I don't think your philosophy is anything but a lot of wishful thinking. I think the reason one of the reasons you attacked my philosophy so vigorously is that if you don't want to believe it, and in your philosophy *you a-* I think \ the way you laugh is an indication of that, too. /

A: Do you really?

69 S: Yes I do.

70 A: All right, (simultaneous inaudible)

71 S: But then, I'm not a psychologist, but-

73 A: Oh I'm no psychologist, Mr. Lawful.

74 S: But anyway, for example, you say I believe in a God. You didn't present **any** logical evidence for it. You did not, you just said, I believe and that's what you said all through it, I believe, I think I feel. JUfou did in no case did you give any *reason* and most of your statements were, furthermore, vague. They probably had meaning to you, but to the reader they were just — like an individual should exist in an individual. I mean, true, it had meaning to you but through your whole philosophy you used phrases like that which were vague and had very little meaning /"to an outsider, so to speaky

75,76 <A: You couldn't have read it all through

And furthermore//

A: with any care, then. S:b)l did too.

Q: I mean for example you said, if I can *remember the* statement, but there was one one statement that was senseless itself. The very grammatical construction of the sentence was illogical, I mean, you, well it al no st went into contradiction within the sentence.

79 A: Really?

80 S: Yuh, I can't remember- (Pause.) Well uh. Can you present-

81 A: Well, if you've read my philosophy, you should be able to remember what I said.

82 S: Not word for word. Can you present any-

83 A: Well, *about the concept*.

84 S: Please present your evidence for the existence of God, if you believe in him, I mean- ' /

85 A: To when? To you? That's a natter of faith, Mr. Lawful.

86 S: To believe in God is a natter of faith.

87 A: I don't think it was any central issue in cy philosophy.

88,89 S: Wishful thinking in other words

A: What difference does it natter to you?

90 S: Well it doesn't matter to me, really. We are supposed to discuss the philosophy.

91 A: Well, do you think that was the central aspect of *my philosophy*?

92 S: Well, I don't know.

93 ^A: If you'd read my philosophy with any care, you'd know what was the central aspect-)

94 ^S: I read it several times with care. The thing is your statements were sc entirely vague, you don't know what the central aspect yourself is, is yourself I mean. You just made a lot of statements K V\*

95 A: I don't think you-know..- (inaudible) If you're going to discuss it on that level, I mean there's not much-

96 S: Well I'm discussing it cn cn a higher level than you discussed mine. )

97 A: Oh.



98 S: You *just resorted* to labels. I'm at least asking for some support of your- All I'm doing is asking for support of your views, for example, the existence of God. Can you (Pause)^(or if you can't support that, can you provide evidence to support the view that, well, any of your views, for example, that man should exist as an individual. An individual should exist as an individual. *Why?*^

99 A: I explained that to you very carefully at the beginning.

100 S: You did not say why. You said khat you meant. But you did not say why you believe it. You did not present any reason for it.

101 A: Well, I think the reasons for it were perfectly clear in the philosophy, Mr. Lawful, I can't.

102 S: You didn't give any reasons at all. All you made were statements of belief and feeling. '

103 A: Oh, I don't think that's a fair statement at all.

104 S: Well, it's true.

105 A: Why is it true?

106 S: Well, where give me— where *did you* support your eh a your views? Give reason for them.

107 A: I think throughout the philosophy.

108 S: You didn't.

109 A: Well, it's a point of view.

110 S: Well, give me give me tell me specifically.

111 A: Well, I'll be specific if you'll ask me a specific question.

112 S: I did. For example, give evidence for your belief in God.

113 A: I believe in God.

114 S: In other words just faith. Wishful thinking in other words.J

115 A: Well if you call it, if you want to degenerate to that level, call it *wishful thinking*.

116 S: Well, I'm not degenerating any lower than- Freud, for example, did he said the same thing, in essence, that belief in God-

117 A: You sure you feel you're in good company-

118,119 S: I don't see how I can be asked to discuss your philosophy.

A: Don't you remember anything else about my philosophy?

120 S: Yes, we- ah ah several things. For example, society is a minimal thing.

What do you mean by that and what, *how do you* support it? For another example?

121 A: I did. Did I say society was a minimal thing?

122 S: Yes

123 A: Oh, I don't think so

124 S: Yes you did, ' I mean-]]

125 A: Didn't I say it should be?]]

126 S: I think you said it was. It's conceivable you said it should be, but *I* doubt it.

127 Ai Well, one would be correct and the other would be incorrect.

128 S: Well, okay, then even granting you say it should be, support that. Why?

129 A: *Well, if I* had to quote authority, I could quote you.

130 S: Well, all right, but I'm not asking for authority, I mean. I just because I have the same belief doesn't mean my reasons are the same.

131 A: I should hope not, Mr. Lawful.

132 S: Well, you can't, you're just, you're not even discussing your philosophy, you're not giving reasons, you're not even. I mean this isn't even a discussion^

133 A: *Well, I'm inclined* to agree with you. Well, I don't know.

134 S: Look it, I'm asking you to give full support of your views which are and any view is erroneous which is not supported. For example, you say, I believe in Ged on the basis of faith).

135 A: All right.

136 S: And, well, so I mean that's just- Well, the thing is...

END

A critique of his ideas & actions.



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