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\title{Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life}
\date{1982}
\author{'The Academy of Sciences of the USSR' \& Leonid I. Brezhnev}
\subtitle{}






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\chapter{Title Page}


LEONID I. BREZHNEV


Pages From His Life


\emph{with a foreword by}


LEONID I. BREZHNEV


WRITIEN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF


THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR


PERGAMON PRESS


OXFORD • NEW YORK • TORONTO • SYDNEY • PARIS • FRANKFURT

\chapter{Publisher Details}


U.K. - Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 OBW, England


U.S.A. - Pergamon Press Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, New York 10523. U.S.A.


CANADA - Pergamon Press Canada Ltd., Suite 104, 150 Consumers Road, Willowdale, Ontario M2J 1P9, Canada


AUSTRALIA - Pergamon Press \{Aust.) Pty. Ltd., P.O. Box 544, Potts Point, N.S.W. 2011, Australia


FRANCE - Pergamon Press SARL, 24 rue des Ecoles, 75240 Paris, Cai.lex 05, France


FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - Pergamon Press GmbH, 6242 Kronberg-Taunus, Hammerweg 6, Federal Republic of Germany


1982 by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and Pergamon Press Ltd.


Part of the material reprinted with permission of Simon \& Schuster, publisher


First edition 1982


Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data


Main entry under title:


Leonid I. Brezhnev: pages from his life.


1. Brezhnev, Leonid ll'ich, 1906-


2. Soviet Union-Presidents-Biography.


3. Heads of state-Soviet Union-Biography.


I. Akademiia nauk SSSR. DK275.B7L44 1981 947.085'092'4 13868 AACR2


British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data


LI. Brezhnev: Pages from his life.


1. Brezhnev, LI.


2. StatesmanRussia-Biography


I. Akademiia nauk SSR. 947.085'3'0924 DK275.B7


ISBN 0-08-028150-8 \{Hardcover)


ISBN 0-08-028151-6 \{Flexicover)


\emph{Printed in Great Britain by A. Wheaton} \& \emph{Co. ltd., Exeter}

\part{To the British Reader}


The time when the shaping of world politics was the exclusive domain of politicians has passed. The peoples living ever closer together on this planet want to assume responsibility for its future. It is therefore a matter of special urgency for us to know each other better and to be able to judge matters in an objective, unprejudiced way on the basis of first-hand information.


This book is about my life. But since my life is a part of the life of the Soviet people, I hope this biography will help British readers to gain a truer picture of Soviet realities and a better understanding of the Soviet people's views and aspirations.


Despite the differences in their histories and present social systems, our two countries have for long been linked by traditions of exchange and intercourse. With the development of these traditions one naturally associates such great names as Shakespeare, Newton, Dickens, Faraday, Rutherford, Lomonosov, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Mendeleyev, Pavlov and many others. Today also, the Soviet and British peoples have a deep respect for and interest in the contribution that each country has made to the spiritual wealth of humankind.


We remember the time when our countries were allies in the struggle against the common enemy, when they fought shoulder to shoulder to rid Europe of fascism. People of my generation who took part in the Second World War recall the sword that was forged in war-ravaged Coventry and presented to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad. We fully acknowledge the bravery of the British sailors who manned the convoys that broke through to Murmansk, defying the nazi submarine blockade.


In those days the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were linked not only by a state treaty. This was a fighting alliance of the peoples. It was an historical example of their ability to unite their efforts in the face of great peril.


This example has lost none of its significance. On the contrary. Just think how much good could be done today if Britain and the Soviet Union were more often able to find a common language, especially over the problem of armaments. It is vitally important to stop the arms race in order to relax tension and avert the grave danger that threatens all countries.


The USSR has always duly appreciated Great Britain's role and place in world affairs and regarded relations with her as an important component of world politics.


At one time Britain was our leading trade partner. A higher degree of co-operation between the USSR and the United Kingdom in the political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields would undou btedly benefit both countries.


For this it is essential to overcome prejudice and achieve mu tual understanding and trust.


Of all the reflections that this book may evoke it seems to me that the subject of peace is of particular importance. Thoughts of peace are always uppermost with Soviet people. It could not be otherwise in a country where there is virtually no family that did not lose close relatives in the past war. That is why our people can feel only indignation and bitterness when they hear talk of the "Soviet military threat".


As Chairman of the Defence Council of the USSR, I know, perhaps better than anyone else, our military strategic doctrine and actual military potential. And I can affirm with full responsibility that both are designed exclusively for defence. Our permanent aim is to stop preparations for war and achieve lasting peace. We hold out the hand of friendship to all those who are ready to work for peace. I am convinced that the common sense inherent in the British people must suggest that in this age of nuclear missiles peace, \emph{detente} and curbing the arms race are the primary and common concern of both our countries.


May 1981 L. BREZHNEV

\part{Chapter 1. Among Workers}


On February 2, 1935, the tabloid newspaper of the Dzerzhinsky steel mill in the town of Kamenskoye, the Ukraine, ran a report that sixty-eight engineers had been graduated from the Arsenichev Metallurgical Institute. It carried the photographs of the four top graduates. The name of one of them was Leonid Brezhnev.


The author of the report wrote the following about Brezhnev: "I cannot imagine where this man gets so much energy and capacity for work. The son of a worker, he has himself worked at the factory as a stoker and a fitter. . . . From the factory he was sent to party-economic work. He had a tight and difficult schedule. This same man studied at our institu te. He was our best party group organiser. . . . And he was at the top of his class, receiving the highest marks for his diploma project . . . . As he goes into industry, this young engineer has the makings for achieving much . . . . I'm certain he will achieve it. . . . I say this because he is made of tough material."


These words were spoken of Brezhnev in those distant days when he could never have expected that he would eventually be an outstanding political leader and statesman of the Soviet Union.


He was born of strong working-class stock. The working-class environment from which he came and with which he never lost contact powerfully influenced his views, world outlook and character.

\chapter{1. Childhood in Kamenskoye}


From what Leonid Brezhnev relates of his childhood we get a vivid picture of that period of his life.


The village of Kamenskoyea typical village of tsarist Russia-with its small, one-story houses lining the streets, its decrepit buildings and unpaved lanes, stood near the gubernia capital, Yekaterinoslav, in a southern bend of the majestic Dnieper River. It would have been no different from similar villages in tsarist Russia had not a steel mill of the South Russia Dnieper Metallurgical Company been built in those parts. It was there, in Kamenskoye, that a centre of the Ukraine's metallurgical industry emerged.


Yakov Brezhnev and his family his wife and son Ilya were among the thousands who came to Kamenskoye from Kursk Gubernia in search of employment. As was true of many others, he found work at the steel mill. As soon as Ilya was big enough, his father took him to the mill. Ilya quickly became a member of the family of steelworkers and found his place among people of his own age. There he met a girl, Natalya, daughter of a worker at the same factory, and he married her. They soon had a daughter, and in 1906 their son Leonid was born. Subsequently Leonid went to work in the mill's steel-smelting department, representing the third generation of steelworkers in a family whose life was associated entirely with the mill. The steelworkers called the Brezhnevs a mill dynasty.


Leonid grew up in the same conditions as all the other children of working-class families in pre-revolutionary times. Early in life he came to know the massive shape of the mill looming above the village. He usually ran to the mill gates to take his father lunch tied in a kerchief.


Young Leonid played in the dusty village streets, and on hot summer days he would race with the other boys to swim in the wide, deep Dnieper. At home he listened attentively to the talk of his elders. The talk was always about the mill, its owners, the hard work, the low wages, the daily frustrations and cares. An idea of the working conditions at the mill is given in a leaflet circulated in those days by the Bolsheviks:


One will hardly find more unbearable conditions than at the Kamenskoye mill. Work continues all year round without any holidays. People work twelve and sometimes even eighteen hours running! The profit they are getting from our labour is evidently not enough for these bloodsuckers, and they use every pretext to impose fines on us. . . . Is it conceivable for one to prevent hunger at a monthly 13 to 30 roubles? . . . While it robs us, the management humiliates us practically every minute of the day with curses and sometimes even blows from the foremen and the engineers. Our human dignity is trampled at every step.


We work day and night and live in squalor only in order to keep the purses of the bosses full and our bellies empty. . . .


The leaflet was read and passed from hand to hand among the outraged and indignant workers.


Like all the other lads in the village, Leonid soon learned that he belonged to the class at the lowest rung of the social ladder, to those disinherited people whose only possession was their work-hardened hands. Like all the other children, he knew that there was another class of people who did not know the meaning of work and lived off the labour of his family and the families of his friends.


In Kamenskoye these people of the other class lived as far as possible from the tiny wretched dwellings near the factory. They lived in the part known as the Upper Colony, in shining, freshly painted brick houses with orchards of apple and plum trees. Leonid learned early that workers were not welcome there. Nor were they allowed into the club, with its richly decorated hall from whose ornate ceiling hung brilliant chandeliers that cast a glitter on the glossy parquet floors. The strains of music often came from the Upper Colony, signalling that a ball was being held for the management and the technical elite of the mill. Sometimes, perching on the wall, children of steelworkers watched as the masters played tennis or croquet.


The village began to grow rapidly when the new-built tracks of a railway linked Yekaterinoslav with the nearby Krivoi Rog area, which was rich in iron ore. Polish businessmen, along with their Belgian and French partners, invested considerable capital in the South Russia Dnieper Metallurgical Company. The peasants, squeezed out of their land by developing capitalism, trooped there in search of work. People of the many nationalities that constitu ted Russia came to the mill. Particularly large numbers came from the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Central Russia.


Leonid played with children whose parents spoke the different tongues of the huge country. All had a common language, howeverthe language of poverty.


At the turn of the century Russia abounded in deep-seated social and political contradictions. The mass of the people, denied the most elementary rights, lived a life of poverty, hunger and disease. The landowners and capitalists, both local and foreign, relied on the despotic regime. They kept the people "in order" by means of the police and the gendarmerie. The unrestricted power of the authorities was used for universal oppression of the masses. Custodians of the national conscience, as they were called at the time-writers like Gorky, Tolstoy and Chekhov-wrote eloquently and passionately of the tragic condition of the people. The seething discontent, stirring deep among the masses, led to a storm, the revolution of 1905. Lenin called it the dress rehearsal of the October Revolution that came in 1917.


This was the period when the working class grew numerically and organisationally and already showed much political experience. The Communist Party, formed by Lenin at the turn of the century, was the mainspring of working-class revolutionary thought and activity.


It was in the year 1917, as a new revolution was gathering momentum, that the boy Leonid Brezhnev began to mature. His life inevitably became interwoven with the life of his contemporaries.


The Bolsheviks did not spare themselves in the struggle against tsarist despotism. They suffered penal servitude and imprisonment for the sake of the truth they were bringing the working class. Their tireless work was felt in Kamenskoye too.


Leonid always met his father at the mill gate at the end of the shift. On the way home his father would often tell him of things he was to remember all his life. He told him of the strike in December 1903, when the imperial double-headed eagle emblem was torn from the mill gate and trampled in the mud. He told him of the events of 1905 and 1906, when red flags were flown in the streets of Kamenskoye in the face of bullets. The flags challenging the autocracy were flown in every street, for there was no street where the inhabitants were not involved in the strike that lasted for days.


In 1915, when several strikes were staged at the mill, Leonid was almost nine. Like the other children, he sensed the determination of the workers and their exultation when they managed to wrest concessions from the millowners.


One such powerful action was the strike of the Kamenskoye steelworkers in April 1916, which was the most significant working-class action in Yekaterinoslav Gubernia during the First World War. It began on April 1, after the mill-owners rejected the workers' demand for a higher wage and an 8-hour working day. The boiler operatives, 450 of them, were the first to down their tools. The management took steps against them, announcing that they were discharged. Insolidarity with the boiler operatives, work was halted in the blast furnace, the new and old open-hearth furnaces, and other departments. The strike spread to the entire mill, involving more than 7,000 workers. Only two of the five blast furnaces were kept going, served by war prisoners who had the threat of being shot hanging over their heads. The steelworkers, their ranks solid, continued to press their demands, adding a new demand: the reinstatement of the boiler operatives.


It was rumoured that troops were being brought up to the town.


Police and military reinforcements soon did arrive in Kamenskoye. The mill manager dismissed all the strikers, with all the conseq uences that this entailed in wartime. Scores of workers were arrested, and more than 360 steelworkers were impressed into the tsarist army and sent to the trenches. But the strikers held firm. They resumed work only when the management agreed to raise the pay in many categories.


Leonid and the other children waited with bated breath for the outcome of this grim drama of their fathers. Sharp class battles unfolded before Leonid's eyes.


Many years later Leonid Brezhnev said, "My own perception of life was shaped largely by factory life, by the thoughts and aspirations of the workingman, by his approach to life. The lessons of those years have never been forgotten."


At the age of 8 the boy heard the word "war". He understood its terrible significance when he saw the frightened eyes of women and the tears of girls bidding farewell to their menfolk going to the front, when he heard the sobbing in the neighbouring houses where families soon began receiving notifications of the death of their sons and husbands.


Leonid's father sent him to the local school. The boy was an industrious pupil. How else could he have approached his studies when, in a class of forty-five, he and six other working-class lads were allowed to attend as charity pu pils? The seven poorly clad boys banded together and did not let the others bully them. "We all helped each other, bu t the going was tough because the children of the local elite got together in the afternoons and received additional tutoring from their teachers," one of Leonid's classmates, Sergei Alimov, recalls.


Then came the year 1917, and with it the February Revolu tion. After 1905 this was the second important stage in Russia's fundamental transformation. The February Revolu tion overthrew tsarism and destroyed the autocracy. Nonetheless, the major deep-seated aspirations and hopes of the working people were not fulfilled. The February Revolu tion did not give the people true power, and it did not abolish exploitation and oppression. That could be achieved only by the socialist revolu tion that came in October, led by the Bolsheviks with Lenin at their head. Tempestuous events were taking place in and around the steel mill on the Dnieper. The Bolsheviks were calling on the working people to give decisive battle to the remnants of the autocracy. The workers of Kamenskoye deposed the tsarist authorities, disarmed the police and elected the Kamenskoye Soviet of Workers' Depu ties. In addition, they formed combat detachments, which were reorganised into a unit of the Red Guards in May and June 1917. This unit was formed of volunteers bu t was composed of only the most reliable, tested fighters in the ranks of the workers, the finest representatives of the working class.


Childhood impressions are usually the most lasting. Brezhnev, then 11, never forgot how the October Revolu tion reached the banks of the Dnieper, how the Civil War began in his hometown, where the supporters of the Soviet power had to fight both the German invaders and the local counter-revolu tion. The social and political sympathies of the Brezhnevs, a poor working-class family, lay with the revolu tion that was asserting a new principle of life, echoed in the words of the "Internationale": "We have been naught, we shall be all."

\chapter{2. School Years}


Soviet power won across Russia. For this victory and in defence of the gains of the revolu tion, thousands of courageous fighters laid down their lives.


The Soviet Repu blic, beating off the savage onslaught of its enemies at home as well as that of the foreign interventionists, began to build a new society and to launch economic and social changes.


This was complicated by the fact that the country lay in ruins as a result of the Civil War and the intervention and had to advance along new, unexplored roads. To use Lenin's figure of speech, when the bourgeoisie came to power it had a "tested vehicle, a well-prepared road and previously tested appliances"; the proletariat, who won power, had "no vehicle, no road, absolutely nothing that had been tested beforehand".


The English author H. G. Wells wrote a book at the time with the title \emph{Russia in the Shadows.} Many people in the West imagined that Russia was in the shadows and that its creative efforts were no more than a "Bolshevik experiment", senseless and doomed to failure.


These prophets did not take into account the people's inexhaustible creative energy, which had been awakened by the revolu tion, the mighty creative potential of the generation of the October Revolu tion, spurred on by unparalleled enthusiasm.


Victory will be on the side of the exploited, Lenin wrote in December 1917, "for on their side is life, numerical strength, the strength of the mass, the strength of the inexhaustible sources of all that is selfless, dedicated and honest, all that is surging forward and awakening to the building of the new, all the vast reserves of energy and talent latent in the so-called 'common people', the workers and peasants."


Economically the country was in an extremely difficult situation. The national economy had been laid waste. The output of pig iron, for instance, dropped to 3 percent of the prewar level. The annual per capita output of cotton fabric was less than one metre. There was a shortage of bread and of the ordinary needs oflife. Then there emerged Lenin's New Economic Policy strategy, the course towards industrialisation, the GOELRO Plan ( the plan for the electrification of Russia), and, simultaneously, the plan for creating co-operatives in the countryside, in which the accuracy of scientific analysis was combined with profound knowledge of the peasant mentality.


Lenin's work in theory and practice in the early 1920s was of colossal significance. He worked out and pu t into effect a scientifically substantiated, coherent system of socialist construction.


In Kamenskoye the Soviet authorities faced innumerable problems, each more complicated than the next. The mill was standing idle, the furnaces had gone out, and the workshops were empty. In the village, which had grown to the size of a town, there were piles of broken brick and gutted houses everywhere.


Leonid Brezhnev would later recall this period: "I remember my school years, my own and those oflads of my age. Soviet Russia had been ravaged by the World War and then by the Civil War against the landowners, capitalists, and foreign interventionists, who tried to stamp out our revolution. There was unprecedented dislocation and starvation. In those trying days, when we had to economise on practically everything, Lenin, the Communists, and the Soviet power were doing all they could to feed and clothe the children and teach them to read and write."


In 1921 the young Soviet Republic was hit by a fearful calamitydrought and famine. The centre of this catastrophe was the Volga area, bu t other parts of the country, including the Dnieper region, were also affected. Kamenskoye was experiencing a very bad time, compounded by the postwar dislocation. The mill continued to remain idle. Some workers left for the surrounding countryside; others made their way to their native villages far away. Ilya Brezhnev moved to Kursk with his wife and children. A new period opened in the life of Leonid, who had turned 15 and had finished school.


Boys matured early in those years. Leonid got work as a stevedore, for he was already big and strong, but his thirst for knowledge led him to enrol at a land reclamation and surveying technical college in Kursk. Important in itself, land organisation and surveying acquired a special significance in those years. It meant not merely surveying and demarcating but also defining the most rational use ofland, which had become the property of the people. The young Soviet state had nationalised the estates of the rural gentry and was turning over many millions of acres to the peasants. The land surveyor and organiser had an important role in allocating land to the peasants and in charting roads and building enterprises.


Having received training as a land surveyor, Brezhnev began to gain experience as an organiser and leader.


After graduation from the technical college he worked as a land surveyor in Byelorussia, Kursk Gubernia and the Urals. In the Sverdlovsk region he was elected to the Bisert District Soviet of Working People's Deputies. He headed the land department and was eventually named deputy chairman of the District Executive Committee.


Brezhnev was a good mixer and sought the company of people of his own age, especially those who were bold, energetic and eager and considered the building of the new world something close to their hearts. Leonid became acquainted and made friends with members of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) . In those years there were relatively few Komsomols-just over 300,000 throughout the vast country. At the factories and offices and in the villages the Komsomols were usually no more than a tiny handful, but they were noted for their enthusiasm, revolutionary passion and courage.


In 1923, at 17, Leonid joined the Komsomol. Later he was to say, "For me the Komsomol was a fine school. My world outlook and my attitude to the policy of our government and party stem from it."


He wanted more knowledge, and this urge coincided with the tasks the country was working on. He was also strongly influenced by the family tradition of working in the metallurgical industry. The immense economic and cultural transformations taking place in the country demanded a steadily growing number of new specialists, particularly metallurgists with a scientific training. In the young republic the training of personnel was treated as a matter of nationwide importance. In 1931 Leonid Brezhnev went back to Kamenskoye, where his father had already returned, and resumed work at the factory. With him came his wife, Victoria, and their baby daughter, and they moved into a small two-room flat. Later a son would be born. That same year Leonid enrolled in the newly opened evening metallurgical institute.


The country, and Kamenskoye with it, was changing.


Everything that was being done in the country-industrialisation, collectivisation of agriculture, and the cultural revolution-was mirrored in the developments in the Dnieper region and, of course, in Kamenskoye. The mill, which had stopped work during the years of dislocation and famine, resumed production in I925.


The mill, now modernised, grew quickly. Alongside it arose electric power stations and new factories-a railway car works, a coking chemical plant and a nitrogen fertiliser plant.


Recalling this period, Leonid Brezhnev said, "In those years we had to economise on everything. But the party and the government allocated resources for promoting education, science, and culture with a generosity that even the richest capitalist nations could envy. If the world is now amazed at the Soviet Union's achievements in science and culture, the foundations of those achievements were laid in the period when the Land of Soviets began to build a dense network of schools and libraries, workers' faculties and technical colleges, and higher education and research institutions."


Kamenskoye, now Dneprodzerzhinsk, offers a vivid example of Soviet policy in education. A technical college was set up in I920, a difficult year. Ten years later it was converted into an evening metallu rgical institute. Its classes met in the evening because all its students worked in industry. There were also a technical college and a workers' faculty. Many who grad uated from the latter enrolled in the institute. Today this institute, with a student body of 5,000, is an academic and scientific centre with many departments, well known throughou t the country. Leading scientists, statesmen and business executives are among its graduates.


In the early 1930s the metallurgical institute at Kamenskoye offered training in a number of specialties, and its student body consisted of about 600 young men and women. Another 300 were studying at the factory's crash courses in higher engineering in specific metallu rgical fields: blast-furnace operatives, steel smelters and steel rollers. The students took a very serious attitude to their studies. They included many talented young people, a fact noted by prominent academic metallurgists who studied their grad uation projects. The best of these were applied at the mill.


During the first year as a student Brezhnev continued to hold his job at the mill. At first he was a boiler stoker, then an oiler of steam-driven machines, after which he quickly learned the trade of fitter. He worked with enthusiasm and efficiency, would not tolerate idleness, and did his best to learn from veteran workers. His friends rejoiced when, together with other foremost people in production, he was admitted to the metallurgical institute (later renamed the Industrial Institu te) . Veteran workers recall that "he was a good fitter and an even better gas purification machine operative. He was respected by the other workers." Mikhail Filichkin, who was foreman in the gas shop, recalls: "Leonid Brezhnev worked on my team. Among his ingrained qualities were honesty and application in the performance of his du ties, initiative, a flair for organisation, and active involvement in anything that was going forward. The workers found him a fine and considerate comrade, always ready to offer businesslike and comradely assistance."

\chapter{3. Worker and Engineer}


Leonid Brezhnev joined the Communist Party in 1931, having been admitted as a candidate member 2 years earlier. This was a natural step dictated by his you th as a worker and student. The logic oflife brought Leonid into the vanguard of the builders of the new society.


From examples of Communists he knew that membership in the party gave no privileges; on the contrary, it entailed important duties.


A party meeting discussed the question of boosting labour prod uctivity in the gas shop. It was a stormy affair. Some argued that there could be no question of raising productivitythe equipment was old and run-down, and it had to be replaced before they could decide what to do next.


Fitter Leonid Brezhnev took the floor. The country, he said, was in need of more pig iron, steel and rolled stock, bu t it could spare no money now to renew equipment. It was the duty of the workers to help their country. He spoke calmly and knowledgeably, going into the details of which parts could be made at the mill, which could be restored from written-off equipment consigned to the scrap heap, and what should be done to prevent the gas shop from being a drag on the operatives of the blast and open-hearth furnaces.


The meeting agreed with the young Communist. The shop soon reached a higher level of prod uctivity.


Disaster struck unexpectedly. The floodwaters of the Dnieper spread to the foundation pits of a projected thermal power station. Machinery, stores and material goods were in danger of being flooded.


It was Sunday evening, and the young people were in the park. Brezhnev ran to them. He signalled to the band to stop playing, appealed to the young people who were dancing, and persuaded them to leave the park and run to the building site, which was threatened by the Dnieper's waters.


The battle lasted for several days. In response to an appeal by the town's Emergency Flood-Control Commission, which Brezhnev headed, all the students joined to fight the rising waters. After filling sacks with earth, they erected a dike, and the building site was saved.


Brezhnev's subsequent years as a student were equally eventful. He was always among the people, in the thick of life. His comrades and fellow townspeople esteemed him for his resourcefulness, quick thinking and abilities as an organizer.


He was elected chairman of the trade union committee and then secretary of the party organisation at the institu te. From 1933 through 1935 he was director of the Metallurgical Workers' Faculty. It was reorganised into a technical college under his direction in 1935. The workers' faculty is a form of education unknown in most countries. It sprang from the Soviet state's acute need of trained personnel. Those who enrolled in these faculties were mostly men and women of mature years with experience of life and work, bu t lacki:r.J.g the prerequisite education to enrol in a technical college or institu te.


Brezhnev was actively involved in the work of the institu te's research sector, which had been formed by the mill to solve some of its many prod uction problems.


A good organiser is judged by his ability to inspire and lead people. Brezhnev organised a student building group, and the young people worked enthusiastically as they added two stories to the institute building and provided premises for an operating blast furnace that was used for training, a rolling mill and a department for the thermal treatment of metal.


A buoyant personality, Brezhnev found the time tojoin in singing and dancing. He was an organiser everywhere and always among people.


This was a period when the entire country was a gigantic construction site. The First Five-Year Plan for the development of the Soviet economy was fulfilled ahead of schedule, in 4 years and 3 months.


Soviet large-scale industry was turning out more than three times as much annually as it had in tsarist Russia. The Five-Year Plan had not been easy to fulfil: the people still lacked knowledge and experience; there was a shortage of many materials. But the intensive labour effort fired by the revolu tionary enthusiasm of millions did wonders and changed the face of the country.


The map-makers were unable to keep up with the builders. New factories were built and new towns sprang up around them. During the 5 years, 1,500 industrial enterprises were put in operation thousands of miles apart in a land that comprises one-sixth of the earth's land surface. Take a few examples: the tractor factories in Chelyabinsk and Kharkov; the car and machine-tool factories in Gorky; the oil refineries in Baku and Grozny; a h uge power station under construction on the Dnieper. The first blast furnaces were started at the steel mills in Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk. Unparalleled rates of industrial development were registered during the 5-year period. The Kharkov tractor plant was built in 15 months, the Gorky car factory in 17.


Under the heading "New Industries" the newspaper \emph{Izvestia} gave a list of fifteen, including aircraft, machine tools, harvester combines, synthetic rubber and watch and clock manufacturing. By the end of the first 5-year period 13 million peasant households had been united in collective farms.


In that 5-year period 100,000 engineers and technicians, representing the new technological intelligentsia which had sprung from the October Revolu tion, went to work in industry.


One of these highly skilled professionals was the you ng engineer Leonid Brezhnev.


After graduating from the institu te, Brezhnev took ajob at the mill as chief of a shift in the shop where he had worked as a fitter.


Today he says of the life of people of his own age in those years, "Their ardent desire to study and become active builders of the new world made them real specialists, whose knowledge and labour effort had a great part to play in turning our country into an advanced and mighty socialist industrialised state." It is his own life, too, that he is describing. With his usual energy he immersed himself in practical work. Not yet 30, he alread y showed commitment to principle, firmness in upholding his convictions, efficiency and patience. Above all, he respected his comrades.


This is his essential quality. When his colleagues recall their work with the young engineer Brezhnev, they say that a respect for people was the main trait of his character. With his inherent humanity he was a man of the new socialist system.


He frequently spoke to workers, explaining the policy of the party and the government to them and telling them what was happening abroad. His friendly advice encouraged people. He influenced many to study and develop themselves. Many of his associates say they are indebted to him for subseq uently becoming highly skilled specialists.


In November 1935 Leonid Brezhnev was drafted into the Soviet Army, where he served in a tank unit. He did his tour of duty in the Trans-Baikal Military District. He served for only one year, bu t an atmosphere of war was already developing in Europe, under the crawling shadow of the nazi swastika. The realisation grew that the world's first socialist state would soon have to fight grimly for its right to exist. Once in uniform, Brezhnev got down to mastering military skills with the same energy he had pu t into learning his trade of fitter and then his profession as engineer. His unit's command repeatedly mentioned his name as a disciplined and dedicated soldier.


In the late autumn of 1936, suntanned, fit and energetic as always, Brezhnev came back to his native Dneprodzerzhinsk.


He did not return to the mill, for he was appointed director of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Technical College. But his ties with the mill, where his grandfather, father, brother, sister and he himself had worked for an aggregate period of several decades, became even stronger. The technical college trained expert operatives for the blast furnace, steel-smelting and rolling shops, needed most at the mill. Constantly in contact with the mill's management, engineers and foremen, he knew what to concentrate on in the study process and was able to determine where graduates would work. This made it possible to red uce to a minimum the time new men needed to get into the rhythm of the work. Brezhnev did not confine his activity to the "technical college-mill" framework. He associated with Komsomol mem bers working on urban improvement and arranged for students to meet with the mill's veterans, who told them of conditions under the tsarist regime. He spoke frequently at meetings of the town's party activists.


With characteristic vigour he plunged into the affairs of his town in 1937 and was elected deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Town Soviet of Working People's Depu ties.


An engineer had become deputy mayor. He became concerned with problems and needs of the townspeople, with the town's modernisation. One of his first acts was to help extend the tramway to the township of Bagley, which made it easier for the workers to get to the mill. New schools, nursery schools and day-care centres were built. A House of Engineers and Technicians appeared where dilapidated hu ts once stood. Many streets and squares were paved. The town became cleaner and more modern.


Look at our Dneprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev saidjoyfully at a meeting with workers of the railway car plant. "In it you will see the grandeur of our growth as in a mirror. The former village of Kamenskoye is becoming a flourishing industrial town with unparalleled speed."


The door of the deputy mayor's office was always open to the people, who went to him with the most diverse requests, big and small: to help get an electric line extended to an area set aside for the construction of individ ually owned cottages, to look into housing problems, to ascertain why the building of a hostel had fallen behind schedule, or to talk to individ uals who had neglected the education of their children. No req uest was ever ignored.


In May 1938 Brezhnev, then 32, was appointed to a responsible post in the Regional Party Committee. Eyewitnesses recall that he was always in the midst of the people, always in the centre of events. He was soon elected a secretary of the Regional Party Committee.


His intimate knowledge of the people and the life and his purposefulness enabled him to cope with the duties of secretary of the party committee of one of the country's largest regions.


This region, almost 40,000 square kilometres in area, had a population of 2,273,000 at the time. Before the Second World War it had been making a significant contribu tion to the nation's economy. It accounted for 19.7 percent of the nation's output of pig iron, 16.5 percent of steel, 18.2 percent of rolled stock, 28.2 percent of pipes, 15 percent of coking coal, 33 percent of manganese ore and 61.4 percent of iron ore. It produced a considerable portion of the country's grain. Education-secondary, specialised and higher-was developing rapidly. The many palaces of culture, the hundreds of clubs and libraries were always crowded with people eager for knowledge and culture.


The Regional Committee's propaganda secretary never ignored any area of life, whether it was industry, agriculture, science, culture or public health. He took an interest in everything that concerned the welfare of the people. At the factories he told the workers of the assignments of the Third Five-Year Plan. The workers would listen attentively and ponder his words. When everybody knew what the goal was, the way to it was shorter and easier.


He had frequent meetings with Communists from the countryside and listened intently to their problems. He inquired into everything, even the smallest details, including how many amateur art circles there were at the palaces of culture and clubs. However busy he was, he would ask the charwoman at the Regional Committee about the health of her grandson, inquire of an official of the Regional Committee about the news from his son in the armed forces, or congratulate a girl from the typists' pool on her marriage.


He had the knack of hearing people out, and this encouraged them to tell him of their joys and worries. They saw in him a warmhearted, considerate man.


He had a keen memory and took an intense interest in people, remembering hundreds of names, facts and figures. He gave his associates useful advice and learned from them.


Having an exceptional sense of responsibility himself, he encouraged his subordinates to adopt a similar attitude to their work. Slipshod work ran against his grain.


In the autumn of 1940 Leonid Brezhnev was agriculture secretary of the Regional Party Committee. Many collective farmers in the Dnepropetrovsk region were decorated with orders and medals for successes in work. The region was listed as a participant in the Soviet Agricultural Exhibition on the strength of its achievements.


Brezhnev travelled a great deal in the countryside, meeting with collective farmers and listening to the recommendations of agronomists. He ascertained the advantages of one crop variety over another, asked collective farmers what they thought about the work methods of collective-farm chairmen, and in general went into the smallest details.


His range of knowledge widened through his constant contact with people and his painstaking work with them. Although he was in charge of agriculture, he was also well informed on the state of affairs in industry, so much so that his colleagues in the Regional Party Committee Bureau often came to him for advice.


It was due to the tireless efforts of men like him that the Soviet people were able to make rapid economic and social progress. The Soviet Union's achievements attracted attention everywhere. The world saw the seething energy and dedication of the Soviet people, who had turned backward Russia into an industrialised nation within only two decades.


The French writer Romain Rolland noted: "The faith reigning in the USSR is an ardent and indestructible faith in social happiness. Maxim Gorky, who was born and bred in old Russia's atmosphere of pessimism, spoke of Lenin with admiration, saying that he believed this beautiful vision of the future happiness of all men would come true. . . . Among the millions reborn by the revolu tion over the past 18years this faith is so strong that it is capable of moving mountains . . . . It is impossible to withstand this tide ofjoy and energy generated by the heroic optimism of an advancing world . . . ."


This faith in social progress and the people's unity around the Communist Party and devotion to the revolu tion enabled the Soviet Union to build the material and technical basis of socialism and then to win the war against the fascist aggressors.


Aware that nazi Germany was preparing to start a war against the Soviet Union, the country took steps to increase its defence capability. In the Dnepropetrovsk region some plants were switched to the prod uction of armaments. In this situation a plenary meeting of the Regional Party Committee elected Brezhnev secretary for the defence industry. To him now fell the burden of the preparations in the region to repulse the fascist aggressors.

\part{Chapter 2. In the Fire of Struggle Aga inst Fascism}

\chapter{1. First Months of the War}


Leonid Brezhnev recalls how the war began: Saturday night ofjune 21, 1941, the last peacetime night before the war, appeared no different from earlier Saturdays. Brass bands played in the gardens and parks. Festive crowds strolled along the streets of Dnepropetrovsk, enjoying the fragrance of acacia trees. The people were taking their weekend rest and planning how best to spend Sunday.


At the Regional Party Committee, however, the lights burned late that Saturday night. A very important matter, that of nominating Communists for political work in the Red Army, was being discussed by the committee's bureau. This meeting was the logical sequel to the committee's work over the preceding months, when, in line with the decision of the party's Central Committee and the Soviet government, vigorous action was being taken in every sphere to strengthen the country's defence might. For that very reason the post of secretary of the Regional Party Committee for the defence industry had been institu ted in the Dnepropetrovsk region, which had a considerable industrial and economic potential. This important sector of work, as already noted, was headed by Brezhnev.


To ensure the uninterrupted operation of the plants in the event of war, it was necessary to have, above all, a good knowledge of the potentialities of each of them. It was necessary to determine the minimum time it would take to switch them to war production and to plan the retraining of skilled workers to meet the requirements of the armed forces. It was necessary to work out the mobilisation plans, to decide in advance how replacements were to be secured immediately for the skilled personnel going into the armed forces and who precisely was to replace them. The construction of defence installations also required unremitting attention.


At about 2 a.m., after everyone had left the Regional Party Committee premises, Brezhnev ordered a car and drove to an airfield under construction to see for himself that work on this important project continued without stop on Sunday. By 6 a.m. he was back at the Regional Party Committee. That morning, June 22, 1941, nazi Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. The fascists were already bombing Brest, Riga, Vilnius, Grod no, Bobruisk, Sevastopol, Kiev and other cities. Heavily equipped armies, which no West European state had been able to stop, were hurled against the Soviet Union. They invaded Soviet territory, sowing death and destruction. On the peaceful Soviet soil, houses burst into flames, cities were reduced to ashes, villages and orchards were destroyed, factories collapsed under the rain of bombs and long lines of refugees-women, children and the aged-moved along the roads, seeking safety from the enemy. They were attacked by diving fascist aircraft, which strafed civilians, killing thousands.


The news that Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union was flashed across the world. All the newspapers carried banner headlines: "Hitler Invades Russia." In the West the Soviet Union was still called Russia. But this was no longer the old Russia-it was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a country which, in addition to Russians, had more than 100 different nationalities united in a close-knit family, the Soviet people, who had built the world's first new socialist society. Hitler had attacked not merely Russia bu t also the land of socialism.


Later there were to be innumerable testimonies by Western statesmen and the military extolling the courage and heroism of the Soviet people and recognising their decisive contribu tion to the destruction of Hitlerite fascism.


In these testimonies and admissions, however, one important fact is frequently omitted: the Soviet people not only defended their homeland bu t fought for their socialist homeland, for the socialist way oflife. It was not a war of Russians against Germans, but a war of the Soviet people against the nazis, who were obsessed with ideas of world supremacy and even planned to cross the ocean and invade the United States of America after a victorious blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union.


Calamity had struck the family of all the nations of the Soviet Union.


It had come suddenly, bringing deep pain. But it did not cause panic.


On the contrary, millions rose to fight the enemy. For these men and women this was the beginning of the Great Patriotic War against the fascist invaders, the commencement of a selfless struggle to defend the cause and ideals of socialism and the freedom and independence of other peoples and countries.


As soon as the Red Army was ordered to repulse fascist aggression, bitter fighting broke out along a vast front extending from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. No other country would have withstood such a sudden strike as was delivered by fascist Germany against the Soviet Union. But the Soviet state held firm. The Soviet people believed in the invincibility of the Soviet socialist system, in the Communist Party, in its ability to organise resistance to the aggressor and crush him. The Communist Party roused and organised the Soviet people for the Great Patriotic War. It appealed to the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the Soviet intelligentsia with the summons "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!"


Hitler had grossly miscalculated. Like some reactionaries in the Western countries, the fascists could not imagine that the people of a workers' and peasants' country could rise to such levels of courage, patriotism and self-sacrifice as were demonstrated during the Great Patriotic War.


As everywhere else in the country, meetings were held in those days at the factories, offices, educational institu tions and collective and state farms of the Dnepropetrovsk region. At these meetings the people declared their resolve to wage a merciless struggle against the enemy, who had encroached on their happiness. Every person who took the floor spoke of his deep faith in victory, in the triumph of the just cause. The Soviet people carried this faith in victory through all their grim trials. It inspired the soldiers at the front, the partisans and underground fighters in occupied territory, and the Soviet people working in the rear. Like all the other officials of the Regional Party Committee, Brezhnev donned his uniform. On the eve of the war he had been promoted to the rank of regimental commissar. During the first days of the war this young, vigorous officer was to be seen in many towns and townships of the region, at factories and defence installations and in the city and district party committees. He gave encouragement and valuable advice. It required a tremendous collective effort by the Communist Party, the Soviet government, management bodies and all the working people to place the economy and, in fact, the country's whole life on a wartime footing. Industrial enterprises were successfully switched to work in two shifts and were geared to military prod uction. New sources of primary and other materials were found for industry because the war had disrupted the old economic ties. The manpower problem became acute during the very first days of the war: people had to be found to operate machine tools in place of those who had gone to the front. Throughout the country the number of factory and office workers dropped from 31,500,000 at the beginning of 1941 to 18,500,000 at the close of the year. The Dnepropetrovsk region sent 14,000 Commu nists, upwards of 80,000 Komsomol members, and many thousands of non-party people to the armed forces. Workers' trades were quickly mastered by housewives, boys too young to join the army, women who had worked in offices and men exempted from military service because of their health. The countryside was emptied of men. Tractors and harvester combines were driven by the wives, sisters, younger brothers and sons of those who had gone to fight for their country.


What seemed to be impossible was accomplished thanks to the patriotism of Soviet people and the vast organisational and educational work to which Brezhnev and his comrades were dedicated. The region, which had sent many thousands of working people to the front, continued to live and work u nder the slogan "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!" This became the motto of every person in the region and throughout the country.


The firing lines were still far from Dnepropetrovsk. Many in the region thought Hitler's armies would never reach them. But those who headed the region did not conceal the truth from the people. They explained the mortal danger hanging over the country during those critical days. In July the enemy approached Leningrad and began shelling the city-the bombardment lasted for 900 days and nights. Enemy troops were advancing in the Ukraine, in the south, and fighting their way towards Moscow. The unvarnished tru th about the situation at the front, where the life and death of the Soviet state were being decided, made the people more conscious of what was taking place around them and awakened fresh strength in them.


Then, one day in July, nazi aircraft raided Dnepropetrovsk for the first time. Bombs fell on residential areas.


The regional, town, and district committees of the Commu nist Party of the Ukraine did everything to ensure the evacuation of industrial enterprises, the population, and the property of the machine-and-tractor stations, the state and collective farms, and the offices in the region, Brezhnev related subsequently. "Most of the factories and enterprises in the region were evacuated, together with the industrial and office workers, engineers and technicians, and their families. The state farms were evacuated with the tractors and other property of the machineand-tractor stations. Many collective farms were evacuated with all their property into the interior of the country. A total of 99,000 railway cars of equipment and other freight belonging to state enterprises and offices were evacuated. The railwaymen drove away all the rolling stock and the locomotives."


Behind the statistics-99,000 railway cars of equipment and other freight-lay tremendous organisational work by party and government agencies, the bitterness of parting with hearth and home, and the firm determination to return.


Brezhnev prepared the dispatch and personally saw off many trains going to the east. Many went to the east after he left for the front.


He felt he could not remain in the rear, although there was nothing to distinguish this rear from the front. As soon as the radio brought to the Dnepropetrovsk region the terrible news of the invasion by nazi Germany, he decided to go to the front. He pressed the party to allow him to join the army in the field. During the first days of the war many ranking party officials, members and alternate members of the Central Committee had been sent to the armed forces by the party's Central Committee. Nearly one-third of the members of the party's Central Committee and many secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Repu blics and of the territorial and regional committees went on active service. Brezhnev waited for his reply. At last, in July 1941, he received the permission of the party's Central Committee. As he recalled later, he "left for the front, hardly having time to run home and say goodbye to the family." In October of the same year he was appointed deputy chief of the Political Administration of the Southern Front. But even in this post he telephoned Dnepropetrovsk regularly to ascertain how the evacuation was proceeding, how the factories were working, and how the people were taking it all.


During these days the Soviet people carried a heavy load in their hearts. The news from the front became worse and worse. Under the onslaught of numerically superior enemy forces, for whom the entire industrial apparatus of Western Europe was working, the Soviet troops, fighting selflessly for every inch of ground, were compelled to leave one city after another. The enemy suffered heavy losses, bu t the number of those who fell in battle, blocking the enemy advance, was also immense. Defeats and setbacks were a bitter cup to drink, but it had not been drained-the Soviet people still had much to bear and much to accomplish.


The Southern Front HQwas then in a small town on the boundary of


\textbf{PFHL} - D the Donetsk region. From there Brezhnev kept the leaders of the Dnepropetrovsk region informed of the situation at the front by telephone. The staff of the Regional Party Committee knew his code name and frequently telephoned him at the front's Political Administration. But it was difficult to reach him at the office; even in peacetime he had never been an armchair executive. It was easier to find him in the army units.


Yet he found the time to visit Dnepropetrovsk. Early in the morning of August 7 he went to the Regional Party Committee with a special assignment from the Front Military Council. Konstantin Grushevoy, secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee, recalls that he found Brezhnev as energetic as always. "Tanned, looking a little thin, but vigorous as ever, constantly smoothing back his unruly black hair from his high forehead, Brezhnev smiled at meeting his old comrades, shaking hands and embracing them. Only the dark circles under his eyes and his tense look showed that behind his outward serenity there was a sense of concern and anxiety."


Indeed, there was good cause for anxiety. Brezhnev showed the secretaries of the Regional Committee a map of the combat situation with blue arrows converging on the Dnepropetrovsk region. He briefed them on what was happening, telling them of the intended lines ofretreat for the troops of the Southern Front, and hurriedly left the building.


After a visit to the Dnieper, where pontoon bridges were under construction, to the Petrovsky plant, and then to Dneprodzerzhinsk, Brezhnev returned to Dnepropetrovskan hour's drive. He passed columns of troops heading for the front. The men were hopefully watched by people from the nearby villages who had already started leaving their homes for the east. Here and there smoke was rising from ruins, and there were burned-out trucks along the roadside.


Messerschmitts appeared in the sky; this meant that the front was getting closer and that these villages might very soon be occupied. The eyes of the 34-year-old commissar acquired a sterner look. Within a few hours he was to report to the Southern Front Military Council about everything he had seen, about his meetings with people and the words of encouragement they said to the troops on their way to the front and the pain he saw in the eyes of the women as they led children into the unknown only to be out of danger. . . .


Brezhnev was back in Dnepropetrovsk on August 19, 1941, the most bitter period for the city. The Germans were already shelling the streets. Waves of fascist bombers flew over the city, dropping thousands of tons of bombs. It seemed that no living being would survive the flames and the suffocating smoke. But the city continued to live and fight. Workers of the Petrovsky plant completed their assembling of an armoured train under heavy artillery fire. The train left directly from the shop floor for the battle lines.


The railwaymen repaired rolling stock on the way as they strove to get the last trains out to the east. Students, now being trained at an artillery school, were pu tting up a defence that was as staunch as that of regular troops. The personnel of civilian and military hospitals worked under pressure, for now they were also tending wounded men brought in from the front. Telephone and telegraph operators stayed at their posts around the clock to ensure uninterrupted communication.


The heavy fighting for Dnepropetrovsk continued for five days and nights. Soldiers of the 230th, 255th and 275th infantry divisions, the 28th Cavalry Division, the 12th and 8th Armoured Divisions, and the 11th Infantry Brigade fought gallantly, bearing the brunt of the defence of the city. But the forces were unequally matched. At 6 a.m. on August 28 the troops were ordered to withd raw and dig in on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Within a few hours nazi units had entered Dnepropetrovsk. Brezhnev has never forgotten those five days and nights. He treasures the memory of the men's determination to defend the city on the Dnieper to the death. He remembers the faces of many commanders with whom he spoke at the time. Some of them were wounded and had no strength to rise from the ground, bu t they continued to command their troops, inspiring them with valour by their own example. He has never forgotten his pain at the thought that the city had to be abandoned despite the huge losses.


The front moved eastward under pressure from numerically superior enemy forces.


When the offensive started along the entire front, the German command announced to the world that this blitzkrieg against the Soviets would end very soon, with the seizure of Moscow. At the close of September the Germans launched a general offensive on Moscow. A huge battle, involving millions of troops on both sides, commenced. The situation was dangerous. A state of siege was declared in the capital on October 19. The Soviet people were determined not to surrender Moscow. And Moscow was not abandoned.


A meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People's Depu ties with party and public organisations to commemorate the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was held on November 6, when the enemy was at the city's approaches. The traditional military parade was held in Red Square in front of the Lenin Mausoleum on November


7. The troops marched to the front directly from the parade.


In mid-November the enemy launched another offensive on Moscow. The fighting was more bitter than ever. This was an historic battle in which the Soviet people and their Red Army performed miracles. The fascist armies were not only stopped but defeated and driven back from the capital. The defeat of the nazi forces at Moscow was the decisive military and political development of the first year of the Patriotic War and the first major defeat of the nazis in the Second World War. The blitzkrieg plan was finally disrupted, and the myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled. It was shown that the nazis had miscalculated by believing that the Soviet social and state systems and the Soviet rear were unstable.


Fierce fighting for Kiev, the Donetsk Basin and Rostov-on-Don lasted through the last months of 1941. Now and then the Soviet Army succeeded in halting the enemy and even mounting an offensive. This was the case, for instance, at Rostov, where the Soviet troops retook the city from the enemy.


The fighting for Rostov in the au tumn of 1941, Brezhnev said many years later, on May 9, 1972, the day on which a memorial to heroic artillery men was u nveiled in that city, "was historic: there our Red Army went over from the defensive to the offensive. The memorial you have erected will remind coming generations of the Soviet people of the sublime heroism of their fathers and grandfathers, who responded to the call of the Leninist party, coming from all the fraternal nations of our country to defend the Motherland. Their feat of arms, which was of tremendous importance for our country and for all mankind, will never fade from the memory of the people."


In March 1942 Brezhnev was decora ted with the Order of the Red Banner for his part in the fighting at Barvenkovo. Men who fought in this battle recall that he was at the front of an infantry regiment. When he was asked for the details, he confined himself to the words "It was hard".

\chapter{2. In the Novorossiisk Area}


The fascist forces, which had suffered a crushing defeat at Moscow and were unable to make any headway towards Leningrad, continued to advance towards the south. Savage fighting for the Caucasus began in the summer of 1942 simultaneously with the historic battle for Stalingrad, which had been reached by the German forces at the close ofJune. Having concentrated more than fifty divisions (upwards of a million men) at Stalingrad, the nazis moved twenty-six picked divisions in the direction of the Caucasus; eight were spearheaded at the Black Sea coast. They mounted their offensive in several directions, including Tuapse and Novorossiisk. To organise the defence of these areas, the Soviet command formed a special group of Black Sea troops within the Transcaucasian Front. It included the armies and units fighting in the Tuapse and Novorossiisk areas, as well as the Black Sea Fleet. Brezhnev was promoted to the rank of brigade commissar and appointed first deputy chief of the Political Administration of the Black Sea group of armies.


In September 1942 Novorossiisk was garrisoned by the 47th Army. Before leaving for the army, Mikhail Kalashnik, who had been appointed chief of its Political Department, was received by Brezhnev, who knew the situation there. This is what Kalashnik relates:


"Brezhnev took me to a modestly furnished room and got down to business at once, describing in detail the situation in the Novorossiisk area, the condition of the troops of the 47th Army, and giving me thumbnail sketches of some of the commanders and commissars.


I'm not going to console you,' Brezhnev said, frowning. 'The situation there is difficult.'"


"From Brezhnev I learned that since September 8 the army had been under the command of Major General And rei Grechko. Regimental Commissar Evdokim Maltsev had been appointed in place of Brigade Commissar Osip Abramov, a member of the army's Military Council, who had been killed in action. Major General Alexander Yermolayev, the Chief of Staff, was also a new man in the army; he had taken over only a week earlier. The units were not up to full strength, and reinforcements were coming in slowly. Some units were short of weapons, and there were many problems with the supply of ammu nition and food. Signs that the troops were fatigued multiplied.


That's the situation in a nu tshell, Kharitonych,' Brezhnev said, calling me by my patronymic, 'There's a lot that will have to be done. The principal task is to have the men show more staunchness, to repulse the enemy, to grind down his strength in the mou ntains and prevent him from gaining the Transcaucasus.'"


"Brezhnev gave me a smile of encouragement and pu t his hand on my shoulder.


I know what you are thinking. You think it will be hard. Am I right? There'll be difficulties enough, there is no doubt abou t that, but I expect that in the end everything will turn out right. The men of the 47th are good fighters, well tried in battle. They are men who can be depended upon; they will move mou ntains if the need arises. One can only envy" their courage, endurance and staunchness. The marines have been fighting especially well. They're heroes, every one of them.'


"He told me about the fighting in the area of Glebovka, Moldavanskoye, and the Volchyi Vorota pass. For 24 hours, with the support of an artillery battery commanded by Senior Lieu tenant Pyotr Lavrentyev, the 83rd Marine Infantry Brigade and the 16th Marine Battalion had held back an enemy force that was several times superior in strength.


The men and officers of the 103rd Infantry Brigade did yeoman service in the fighting for the village of Verkhne-Bakanskaya. They were surrounded by the enemy, but they fought for 3 days, diverting large enemy forces and enabling the other units to withdraw in good time to the inner defence lines of Novorossiisk."


"The brigade then broke through the enemy ring and took up new positions in good order in the vicinity of Mount Dolgaya.


Every man must be made to realise,' Brezhnev said, 'that further retreat is impossible. He must realise with his mind and heart that this is a matter of the life and death of the Soviet state, of the life and death of the people of our country. It is time we put a stop to the empty talk about the enemy's being exhausted and ceasing the offensive. The nazi troops must be stopped \emph{now,} before it is too late. It is equally important to pu t the men in the mood to advance, to prepare them for a decisive offensive, to drive the nazi scum from our land. The time for this will eventually come in the Caucasus, as it has come at Moscow.'"


"Brezhnev paced the room.


That, I think, is about all. There's a lot of work to do. And now it is time for you to go. When you get there, call me after you have been briefed on the situation and have got to know the men.' """


The situation was deteriorating not just in the Novorossiisk area. The nazis attempted to break through to another Black Sea portTuapse. They planned to capture Tuapse, cut off the entire group of Soviet forces at Novorossiisk, eliminate the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, and reach the Transcaucasus through Tuapse, Sochi and Sukhumi. As Hitler planned it, this would have enabled Germany to link up with Turkey and carry out the further strategic aim of seizing the Middle East and then marching on to India.


This prospect worried British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. That was why he asked Joseph Stalin if the Russians would hold firm in the North Caucasus. Stalin replied that the Germans would not cross the Caucasus.


There was heavy fighting in the Tuapse area. To break the resistance of the Soviet troops, the nazis threw into this area huge numbers of forces specially trained for mountain fighting. That was when Brigade Commissar Brezhnev threw in all his energy.


In order to stop the nazi onslaught on Tuapse, it was necessary not only to concentrate the entire system of party-political work on raising the morale of the troops defending the area bu t also to organise special units consisting of Communists who would stand fast at the approaches to Tuapse. Several such assault units were formed under Brezhnev's direction. Each consisted of 500 Communists and Komsomol members, and they occupied the key hills along the main lines of the enemy offensive.


In addition to carrying out this task, Brezhnev, with his customary energy, worked on another important assignment among the troops, often appearing in the front line of the Tuapse defences.


Alexei Kopenkin, the commissar of a mortar battalion of the l 07th Infantry Brigade, recalls that at the time when the brigade was bitterly resisting the enemy's main thrust, cutting the railway and highway to Tuapse, when the Pshish River was becoming red with the blood of those who were fighting on its banks, Brigade Commissar Brezhnev spent two days in the forward lines of this brigade, setting a personal example of courage and military duty.


A fierce battle, time and again developing into savage hand-to-hand fighting, raged at Tuapse. However, all of the enemy's three desperate attempts to break through to the city failed. All three "decisive", to quote the nazis, offensives were repulsed.


Meanwhile, after 6 months' fighting the Red Army crushed the nazi hordes at Stalingrad in early February I 943. This was one of the major military and political events of the Second World War. It marked the beginning of a fundamental turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II.


The defeat of the nazi forces at Stalingrad was the starting-point for the subsequent crushing blows dealt the enemy and laid the foundation for the Red Army's powerful offensive of the winter of 1942-43 along almost the entire length of the front. The mass expulsion of the enemy from Soviet territory was started. This was the time when preparations for the decisive battles for Novorossiisk were also under way.


A naval task force under Major Caesar Kunikov landed in the vicinity of Myskhako, near Novorossiisk, in February 1943. The operation was successful, and the task force was soon reinforced by a marine infantry brigade and other infantry units, making up two corps. This section with an area of some 30 square kilometres was called the Little Land. The enemy was held at bay for 225 days with incredible dogged ness. This battle has gone down as a heroic chapter in the history of the Great Patriotic War.


The landing operations and the entire course of the fighting in the Novorossiisk area were directed by the 18th Assault Army under General Konstantin Leselidze. Leonid Brezhnev was appointed chief of that army's Political Department in April 1943. On his frequent visits to the troops at Novorossiisk, while he was still deputy chiefof the Political Administration of the Black Sea group of armies, he came to understand the crucial significance of the fighting in that sector. After he was appointed chief of the 18th Assault Army's Political Department, he devoted him self entirely to training the troops for the decisive battles for Novorossiisk. Few people in the West know what the job of a Soviet Army political instructor is. He is the depu ty of the combat officer and is responsible for the fulfilment of the orders received by the troops. He has innumerable duties: he is responsible for the continuous political education and combat training of the troops and must make sure that the soldiers are informed of developments and understand what is taking place in political, economic and military affairs at home and abroad. He has to set the troops an example of military discipline, courage, high morale and organisation. The political instructor has to be an example for the Commu nists in the armed forces, who are always in the front ranks, do the impossible, volunteer for the most difficult assignments, are the first to respond to the req uirements of their comrades in arms, encourage the wounded, and think first not of themselves bu t of their comrades.


The situation was extremely difficult on the Little Land, as it was throughou t the Taman peninsula. In a leaflet written on Brezhnev's initiative, this was mentioned:


"Having suffered a heavy defeat at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus and having been hurled back to the Taman peninsula, the enemy is now staking his all as a losing gambler. He is attempting to slow down the advance of the Red Army. At the cost of huge losses the nazi gang of murderers and plunderers is trying to cling to Novorossiisk. The heroic landing on Myskhako has created a real threat to this strongpoint on the scrap of Kuban land still in the hands of the enemy.


The Little Land is a deadly knife sticking in the back of the foul enemy!"""


The Military Council called on the troops to stand firm along their lines, to destroy the enemy and his equipment, and to counterattack.


The document had a powerful mobilising effect. It was read at meetings in all the units.


This was a grim period for the Little Land. Storms had made communication difficult with the mainland. This communication was maintained by small motorboats and fishing vessels.


At this critical time Brezhnev was a frequent visitor on the Little Land. Marshal Georgi Zhukov, who came to the Novorossiisk area with a special assignment from the Supreme Commander in Chief, Stalin, regretted that he had missed seeing Brezhnev at the Army Field Ad ministration. In his book \emph{Reminiscences and Refl,ections,} he writes: "Indeed, this was a bridgehead with a total area of no more than thirty square kilometres. All of us at the time were concerned with one question: Would the Soviet soldiers withstand the trials that fell to their lot in the unequal struggle with the enemy, who was bombing and shelling the defenders of this small bridgehead day and night?


That was what we wanted to discuss with L. I.Brezhnev, chief of the Political Department of the 18th Army, who had been there repeatedly and had a good knowledge of the situation, but on that occasion he was on the Little Land, where extremely heavy fighting was going on.


Brezhnev's comrades made special note of his ability to mix with people, to establish friendly contact quickly. Ivan Zhu rukhin, a poli tical instructor of the 255th Marine Infantry Brigade, recalls Brezhnev's visits to units of that brigade: "I was amazed at his ability to get along with people. He would enter a dugout, ask everyone to move up closer, and begin talking right away as if he had known everyone for a month." Indeed, he knew many of the soldiers, noncoms and officers, knew what each could do, and guided their combat activities accordingly. When he was on a visit to the Little Land in April of that year, he learned that in one of the sectors the Germans had driven a wedge into the Soviet lines. He at once telephoned the units in the adjoining sectors and with his usual tact gave no orders, only asking, "How is Mamayev making out? They need his submachine-gunners badly there. I'm sure they would chop off the enemy wedge." Alexander Mamayev had just been decorated with the Order of Lenin. When these words were passed on to him, he and his submachine-gunners closed the breach.


It was during those days of intense fighting in April 1943 that a winged phrase uttered by Brezhnev passed from mou th to mou th on the Little Land: "You can kill a Soviet man, but you cannot defeat him!"


It was at that time, when he was visiting a unit consisting of Kazakhs, Azerbaijanians, Ukrainians and Russians, that he said, "It would be no mistake to say that men of all the nationalities of our country are fighting on the Little Land. This land will be a memorial to friendship among peoples, as indeed the whole war we are now fighting will be."


To go to the Little Land was ajourney of extreme peril, and Brezhnev made such journeys frequently. The Germans kept torpedoing the tiny craft carrying Soviet troops, laying mines in their way, and strafing and shelling them. One day as Brezhnev was inspecting the landing places, which were constantly shelled by the enemy, he noted how fearlessly the sailors were keeping them going and said to the soldiers, "The sailors merit your respect, for without these heroes you would not have held the bridgehead." And he added with a smile, "True, they give us infantrymen a bath now and then, but that is not their fault."


These "baths of infantrymen" are described by Ivan Solovyov, who was an apprentice seaman at the time: "On one of these trips we sailed out of Gelendzhik while it was still dark, passed Kabardinka, moving in the shelter of the high coast to keep out of sight of aircraft, and cut across the Bay of Tsemess in the direction of the open sea. We were followed by two or three motorboats.


"The weather was foul. There was a cold rain, visibility was poor, bu t the Germans did not harass us-that was the most important thing. When we had covered half the way across the bay, we saw the silhouette of a fishing boat directly ahead. Ivan Dotsenko said, 'It must have left earlier than we today.'


We were about six hund red metres away from the fishing boat when a pillar of water rose directly in front of its bow. The sailors cried, 'It's hit a mine!' Dotsenko ordered full speed ahead, using everything our motor had."


"When we approached the fishing boat, it was still afloat bu t had a list to starboard. Several men were swimming in the water. We picked up three; the others were picked up by the fishing boat. Just then we were joined by the other motorboats, and together we reached the shore.


A steep cliff gave shelter from the German shells, and a half-su nken barge served as a pier. When all the men picked up from the damaged fishing boat had stepped onto the barge, Dotsenko looked at one of the officers and exclaimed, 'Why, it's our commissar!'"


"I have never seen the man before and learned only then that he was Colonel Leonid Brezhnev, chiefof the Political Department of the 18th Assault Army. They said that he had been thrown overboard by the blast and that it was a miracle he was not killed. He looked cheerful, bu t it was obvious that he was feeling very cold after his dip in the icy water. Meanwhile, an inferno raged on the shore: artillery and machine guns were firing away, submachine guns were rattling, and shells were bursting. One sailor said to me, 'Young fellow, we're having a steam bath today. The Germans are making it hot. They want to get us out of here.


See, even the chief of the Political Department is here with us!' Everybody went ashore together with Brezhnev. Then Dotsenko ran" back and said to me, 'Get my emergency rations. We must pu t some warmth into the commissar. The men need him badly just now!' I ran to the motorboat, got the flask of alcohol, and took it to the cellar of what used to be a wine distillery. The officers, soldiers and sailors had gathered around Brezhnev. He was given the flask, and Dotsenko said, 'Take a swig of this sailor's milk. The weather's bad, and it's cold for a swim.' Brezhnev laughed, pulled at the flask, and thanked Dotsenko, but reproached him for having sent a boy to fetch the alcohol.Just then German mortars opened fire, and Brezhnev and the other officers went to the firing lines along a ravine.


"A naval officer ran up and shouted to the men in the motorboats, 'The men are getting hell. They are being attacked by the Germans and must be helped.' We grabbed our submachine guns and hand grenades and rushed forward. Three German attacks were repulsed.


At nightfall, when we returned to the motorboats to take away the wounded, I saw Brezhnev again among the soldiers. Somebody said, 'It would be fine, comrade commissar, to celebrate May Day in Berlin.' Brezhnev smiled, saying, 'That's what we'll eventually do, bu t for Hitler there'll soon be nothing to celebrate. He personally issued the orders to throw you into the sea, but nothing has come of it. You fought like lions. You and I will yet reach Berlin!'"


"On the way back I heard some wounded men say, 'The commissar's a brave man, but his is an intelligent bravery. He will not let the men take unnecessary risks. He inquired into everything, inspected all the trenches, saw everything for himself, and got the feel of everything. You feel confident when you are with a man like him.'


One felt that this was said with sincerity and respect. Brezhnev had visited the Little Land time and again. Everybody there knew and esteemed him and always gave him some token of soldierly concern."""


Thirty years later, when he visited the Little Land and gazed at the green-clad hills surrounding this tiny patch of land, Brezhnev said, "These hills were held by the fascists. . . . We took the risk of landing a force. What with? All we had were some fishing boats.


"Caesar L. Kunikov, a man following a humanitarian profession, was appointed commander of the task force. . . . Prior to the war he was editor of a newspaper. The task force landed. And for 225 days and nights everything was red-hot there. . . . Later, after we had built up our strength, we struck at Novorossiisk from three directions . . . . And very soon we reached Taman.


When I was in Cuba, Fidel Castro asked me where the fighting had been heaviest. I said that throughout all the four years I did not remember heavier fighting than on the Little Land. We had only thirty square kilometres ofland and a huge density of troops."


Of course, our soldiers were very resourceful. To prevent our aircraft from bombing them in view of that density, they took off their underwear and laid it out along the dugouts . . . . This helped.


Brezhnev looked at the faces of those who had been on the Little Land with him. "We could not abandon that land. With it we would have given away the Black Sea and much else. When we liberated the Caucasus, we laid the beginning for the liberation of the whole of the Ukraine."


I congratulate you on the fact that Novorossiisk has been entered on the list of hero cities, Brezhnev told the people of Novorossiisk. "Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Novorossiisk, and the other hero cities are the pride of our people. For a long time I wondered ifl could go through that experience again. . . . I knew that you cherished the memory of the heroism shown by the defenders of Novorossiisk. The North Caucasian Front, the Black Sea, the Little Land-these were one of the main sectors of the war fought by our people. Together with Stalingrad we were tackling one and the same task."


Brezhnev's assistant Victor Golikov handed him a photograph. "This was the machine-gun emplacement at the extreme tip of the left flank i n this war," Brezhnev said. "Our machine-gunners challenged the machine-gu nners at the northern extremity of the right flank to a competition."


A monu ment stands today in Novorossiisk near the sun-kissed vineyards. It is made of 2,750 pounds of smelted splinters, mines, shells and bombs.


This was the amount fired in terms of each soldier fighting on the Little Land. Throughou t the Little Land there were only four wells. In the Valley of Death there was one. Many men perished at this well. There were days when all who went to fetch water were killed.


\emph{Operation Novorossiisk}


The operation for the liberation of Novorossiisk, conducted on September 10-16, 1943, was one of the outstanding actions of the Great Patriotic War. It involved ground, air and naval forces.


The assault was mounted from three directions-from the vicinity of the cement factories and from the Little Land-while a powerful task force of more than 6,000 men in only the first echelon landed directly in the centre of the city and its port.


A key role in planning and conducting this operation was played by Brezhnev. He was one of the army's talented leaders who urged a direct strike at Novorossiisk in order finally to breach the enemy's strongly fortified Blue Line* and complete his rou t in the North Caucasus.


Long before this operation commenced, after the battle for one of the hills north of Novorossiisk, Brezhnev, his former deputy Sergei Pakhomov relates, said to his staff at the Political Department, "We're hanging about here in one place and taking hill after hill with immense difficulty, with heavy losses, and we're getting practically nowhere. Would it not be better to concentrate all our efforts and strike directly at Novorossiisk? This would speed up the total defeat of the enemy in the Kuban area and on the Taman peninsula and deliver us from unjustified and unnecessary losses."


That is how events turned out. Novorossiisk was the key to the entire Blue Line. The successful advance of the other armies of the North Caucasian Front began only when the city was taken by the 18th Army. Novorossiisk was liberated on September 16, and on the next day the Soviet forces slipped through the Volchyi Vorota pass, which was practically the only outlet from the Novorossiisk Valley. On September 21 they liberated the town of Anapa, and on October 3 the town of Taman. By October 9 the 56th Army, under Lieu tenant General Grechko, had destroyed the Germans at Chushka Spit and cleared the enemy out of the entire Taman peninsula.


The idea of directing the main strike at Novorossiisk, which Brezhnev had shared and urged, had been maturing for a long time in the minds and hearts of the troops and was discussed in the Army Military Council. When the order for the offensive was given in accordance with instructions from GHQ, it was enthusiastically welcomed by the troops. In the course of a year of fighting for the city every soldier, sailor, noncom and officer had looked forward to the enemy's total defeat at Novorossiisk. This was an inspiring and major political factor and played a large role in the success of the operation.


Brezhnev took a direct part in planning this military operation and did much to help deploy and train personnel.


He thoughtfully gave assignments to the staff of the army's Political * This was a line of fortifications built by the enemy at the approaches to the Taman peninsula. Its right flank extended to the Sea of Azov, and its left flank stretched to Novorossiisk and the Black Sea.


Department. For instance, he sent the older and more experienced party workers, such as Major Anushavan Arzumanyan (who was later to become an academician and member of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) , Major Ivan Shcherbak (who later became a Candidate of Historical Sciences) and others to the 3l 8th Division, which was advancing from the vicinity of the cement factories, and the younger men, like Gurii Yurkin and Dmitri Matyushenko, to a company of marine submachine-gunners that was to land in the port and seize the railway station or to other task units.


Brezhnev personally supervised the training of the assault groups and instructed the personnel of his own department on how to conduct political work among the soldiers and sailors with whom they would storm the city on land or from the sea. Brezhnev gave much of his attention to ensuring these troops had equipment, making sure that each had everything he needed.


He also visited the units that were to assault the port and city of Novorossiisk.


Moreover, he showed his abilities as the coordinator of the joint operations of the 18th Army and units of the Black Sea Fleet.


It must be noted that in the sector held by the 18th Army the nazis had concentrated large forces and created dense firepower. The battle would obviously be hard-fought and bloody.


On August 30, 1943, General Konstantin Leselidze, commander of the 18th Army, called a conference at which General Nikolai Pavlovsky, the Chiefof Staff, reported on the alignment of strength and the plan for the operation.


At this conference Brezhnev spoke of the political consciousness and morale of the troops. He stressed the fact that all the soldiers, sailors, and officers were eager to start that offensive, that they were burning with the desire to give battle and crush the enemy at Novorossiisk and on the Taman peninsula.


At 0230 hou rs on September 10, 1943, Soviet night bombers struck at the enemy's control centre in the vicinity of Kirillovka. The fires illuminated the port installations, serving as the beacon for the approaching task force.


At 0245 hours the 18th Army's artillery commander ordered his guns to open fire. In the course of 15 minu tes more than 800 pieces of artillery fired 35,000 shells and mines.


Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft attacked incessantly. Fires broke out in the city, and the smoke formed a heavy curtain over the port, screening the ships and, at the same time, hindering observation and giving the landing craft difficulty in getting their bearings.


By 0250 hours the assault group had destroyed the submarine nets and units of submachine-gunners landed on the eastern and western piers. The second task force-the 393rd Separate Marine Battalion under Lieutenant Captain Vasili Botylev-landed first. In the course of 30 minutes, under heavy enemy fire, 800 men reached the shore, bringing with them nineteen heavy machine-guns, ten mortars and forty antitank guns.


The third task force-the l 339th Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Sergei Kadanchik-landed somewhat later. More than I 000 troops gained a foothold at the import wharf and in the vicinity of the electric power station within 30 minutes. Simultaneously, the first task force-the 255th Marine Infantry Brigade under Colonel Alexei Potapov-landed on Cape Lyubov.


Troops advancing from the Little Land and the Main Land joined in the action as the task forces were landing.

\section{Assault on the City}


Thus began the famous assault on Novorossiisk, which the enemy had strongly fortified and believed was an impregnable fortress. The population had been forcibly expelled from the city, and there was not a single living soul in it. The streets and houses were mined.


After Novorossiisk was liberated, Soviet sappers deactivated and removed more than I 00,000 mines. All the houses along the shore and on the main lines of advance had been turned into permanent reinforced concrete pillboxes.


None the less, after they had seized a bridgehead, the task forces joined battle. They attacked the enemy, driving him out of his trenches and dugou ts and from the buildings in the port. There was continuous fighting up to September 16.


In its address to the liberators of Novorossiisk, the 18th Army's Military Council wrote: "Comrades in arms, by a swift advance and a crushing strike jointly with sailors of the Black Sea Fleet you have breached the enemy's defences. . . . The Army Military Council warmly congratulates you on these first successes of the task forces and calls on you to press inexorably forward, only forward, until the total liberation of the Taman peninsula, where we are awaited by our children, wives, mothers and fathers who have suffered under nazi tyranny.


"Sailors of the Red Fleet, men of the Red Army, officers and political instructors! Without respite or stop, follow on the heels of the enemy,


surround and destroy him. One more strike at the enemy, comrades in arms, and Novorossiisk will be cleared entirely of the fascist scum."


The last of the fascists were driven out of the city and port at daybreak on September 16, 1943. There were only individual pockets of resistance. The Irkutsk Division joined in the battle. Lieutenant Captain Alexander Raikunov's company of submachine-gunners, who had taken three towers of the Novorossiisk grain elevator and controlled the railway station captured earlier, strove to prevent the nazis from leaving the city with impunity. Gurii Yurkin was the 18th Army's Political Department representative in Raikunov's company. When the battle ended, they buried their dead near the railway station.


But as they were abou t to fire a salute in honour of the fallen soldiers, they saw a group of high-ranking officers on the road. This was u nexpected because until then there had been only reconnaissance men from other units in these places.


One of the officers-he was Brezhnev-recognised Yurkin, embraced him, and said, "They thought you were killed. Go back, and I wish you luck." Raikunov reported to Colonel General Ivan Petrov, the front commander, that his company had carried out its assignment. Petrov at once ordered all the men to be decorated with battle orders.


The 18th Task Army fought its way to the Kerch Strait, liberated Taman, and accomplished yet another feat: landing a strong task force in the Crimea. In this operation, too, a major contribu tion was made by Brezhnev. It was necessary to coordinate all the commandos for a bold and decisive step-to cross the wide Kerch Strait in small boats in stormy weather, seize a small bridgehead at the village of Eltigen, south of Kerch, and begin the battle for the Crimea.


As at Novorossiisk, Brezhnev sent his instructors to the task force assigned to capture Eltigen, and they honourably carried out their extremely difficult battle assignment. Completely surrounded for more than 40 days, the task force showed unparalleled heroism in the fighting on this flaming land and then drove deep into the rear of the enemy, seized Mount Mitridat, destroyed the enemy's artillery positions, descended to the town and port of Kerch and broke through the enemy rmg.


All the members of the task force were awarded high government decorations, and fifty-six of them were created Heroes of the Soviet Union.


Brezhnev will speak of the heroic exploits of those days later, in his book \emph{Little Land.}


The epic of the 18th Army's participation in the battles in the North


Caucasus ended with the Eltigen operation. In November 1943 the army's administration and some of its units, including marine infantry brigades, were transferred to the vicinity of Kiev and incorporated in the First Ukrainian Front. This marked the beginning of a new stage of the 18th Army's battle history.


Thirty years after the victory, on September 7, 1974, Leonid Brezhnev pinned the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal on the banner of the hero city on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This was a solemn and moving moment.


Speaking to his comrades-veterans who had taken part in the defeat of the fascist forces at NovorossiiskBrezhnev had full grounds for saying, "lfa person has had the opportunity to be a direct participant in any outstanding event of his time, an event that marked an important period in world history, it is remembered by him for the rest of his life. For the older generation of our party these even ts were the Great October Socialist Revolu tion and the Civil War. For you and me, for my generation, it was the Great Patriotic War. Superhuman effort and complete dedication-they were the hallmark of all of us who took part in this greatest war in history. This was so because we fought for and defended what was dearest to us, our Soviet socialist homeland, and we are happy that we won a great victory over the enemy, that we contributed our bit to that victory."


These words of a soldier who became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were addressed to the minds and hearts of the Soviet people. In them are grief over the irretrievable losses borne in the war by the Soviet people and pride for those people, who displayed unbounded self-sacrifice and mass heroism in that terrible war. And how natural was his repetition of the words of the oath taken 30 years ago by the heroic defenders of Novorossiisk: "As we go into battle, we give our oath to the Motherland that we shall act with speed and boldness, that we shall not spare our lives for the sake of victory over the enemy. We shall give our will, our life, and our blood, drop by drop, for the happiness of our people, for you, the Motherland we love so passionately . . . . Our law is and shall be: only forward and forward." Remembering these men, Brezhnev said, "The heroes were true to their oath. They went forward and forward, crushing the enemy and scorning death!" And he had gone forward and forward with them, had been in the thick of the fighting, and had scorned death.


His qualities of a Soviet leader were shaped in the crucible of war-a soldier who subsequently became an outstanding fighter for peace, for the eradication of wars.

\chapter{3. Liberation of the Ukraine}


In 1943, when the Soviet Army was expelling the nazi invaders from the Soviet soil, the party began recalling its functionaries from active service. Leonid Brezhnev, too, was told that he would have to return to his formerjob as secretary of a Regional Party Committee, bu t he requested permission to remain with his unit until the end of the war.


On a cold day in November 1943 Brezhnev arrived in Kiev with his unit. He was familiar with the capital of the Ukraine, which he had often visited before the war. He had attended the 14th and 15th congresses of the Commu nist Party of the Ukraine and plenary meetings of its Central Committee, and he had spoken at various conferences. Now he saw the city scarred after fierce fighting and the German occupation, bu t free from the nazi thugs.


Late in November 1943 the military situation west of Kiev deteriorated seriously. The Germans had recaptured Zhitomir and driven a wedge of almost 50 kilometres into the Soviet battle lines. The Soviet High Command was aware of the German intention to make new strong thrusts there.


Battle fatigue plagued the Soviet troops who had forced the Dnieper


.and liberated Kiev and Zhitomir on the eve of these events. The nazis had brought in fresh divisions from France, Greece and other occupied European countries and now sought to throw the Soviet troops back across the Dnieper and recapture Kiev and the entire bridgehead on the river's right bank. The first Ukrainian Front under General Nikolai Vatu tin was assigned to thwart these plans.


The Supreme Commander in Chief ordered the 18th Army to be moved to the main sector-the Kiev-Zhitomir highway. The army had earned a splendid record in the Caucasus by liberating Novorossiisk and the Taman peninsula.


On December 2 the first of the 18th Army's battalions of infantry and marines moved to this sector advanced rapidly to the firing lines over the snowbound fields and the deserted Zhitomir highway west of Kiev.


The 18th Army in co-operation with other armies of the front was to engage the enemy near the village of Stavishche and turn the tide of the battle for the Ukrainian capital.


In his book \emph{The SouthWestern Thrust} Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Moskalenko recalls the strong impression he carried away from a meeting with Brezhnev in that trying period. He first met Brezhnev during the handover of part of the sector of the planned offensive to the 18th Army, which had moved in from the North Caucasus. "Brezhnev arrived with a group ofrepresentatives of his army, and we took them to inspect the divisions of the 52nd Infantry Corps of which they were to assume command. For their part they informed us of the battle worthiness of the 74th Infantry Corps, which was to be transferred to our army. "In the course of a general conversation and then in a narrow circle of commanding officers Brezhnev expressed his satisfaction over the fact that 18th Army units had joined those of the First Ukrainian Front operating in this major strategic area.


We also learned that he had taken part in all of that army's defensive and offensive operations in the North Caucasus. I liked his simple manner and firmness ofjudgement and action. In short, we realised that Brezhnev was an excellent organiser of party-political, ideological and educational work, who also had a broad outlook on the art of warfare. Moreover, he turned out to be a good comrade and an interesting man to talk to.


The situation in this sector of the front became particularly grave in the early hours of December 12. Captain Ivan Kravchuk, former aidede-camp to the chief of the Army's Political Department, describes the exploit Brezhnev performed on that night.


"From the front line came a telephone call saying that the nazis were trying to break through our lines near the village of Stavishche. All of us took our weapons and rushed out. Colonel Brezhnev got into his jeep. I followed him.


Each of us had a pistol, and the driver had a submachine-gun and four hand grenades in his kit. Another submachine-gunner joined us. Roughly a mile away from the front line we abandoned thejeep because of intensive German shellfire and heard the rattle of machine-guns ahead."


"Brezhnev shouted to the soldiers around us, 'Comrades, there is no way ofretreat! Kiev is behind us! The enemy shall not pass. Our duty is to stand to the last!'


He had no time to say anything else: German machine-guns lashed out and enemy infantry attacked. We had only one active heavy machine-gun, but that fell silent after a few moments. Brezhnev ran down the trench towards it."


"I ran after him. We jumped over a few still bodies. Brezhnev looked back. 'Ivan, take a look, some may yet be alive. See if anyone needs help!' I fell back and hastily touched two or three bodies. They were all dead. I covered their faces with their caps and followed Brezhnev. Just


then I heard our only machine-gun come alive, rattling away in staccato bursts of fire.


When I got there, I saw the machine-gunner lying in a heap in a pool of blood, with Brezhnev firing away. I pulled the dead man away and moved the cartridge box closer to Brezhnev. There were few rou nds left. Meanwhile, the nazis were driving on, heedless of the fire, with no more than 30 to 40 metres between them and our trench. They were hurling hand grenades and shouting in drunken voices, \emph{'Rus kaput!} Surrender!' Brezhnev replied with short bu rsts of fire, making each round tell. German flares went up into the sky one by one, and as they burned, Brezhnev carried on his well-aimed fire. Outwardly he retained his usual self-control, but he had flung off his fur cap and gloves, and on three occasions he pushed me away when I tried to pull him down to the ground to save him from the hail of bullets and shell splinters. Loading the last cartridge belt, he said, 'Run along the trench, get everyone together, tell them to save their hand grenades for the last minu te, and prepare for hand-to-hand fighting!'"


"Through the rattle of fire and the drunken shouts of the nazi infantrymen we heard the dull roar of the German tanks. They had taken up their attack positions and were apparently poised for a swift push across to the Zhitomir highway. In our trench I found no more than a dozen men still alive.


But as happened time and again in the war, we were rescued in the nick of time: from the rear our heavy artillery struck out at the enemy, and salvos of Katyusha rockets ripped the air. The guns knocked out the German tanks, and the Katyusha rockets cut down the German infantry. Within minutes a sergeant carrying an antitank rifle ran into our trench, followed by a platoon moving in file and then by a whole company."


I retu rned to Brezhnev. Two men had already taken up their positions by the machine-gu n, while he was sitting on the ground, leaning against the wall. The front of his white sheepskin coat was smeared with blood. I rushed to him, but he smiled at me, safe and sound, and said, 'Ivan, let's have a cigarette.' I rolled a cigarette with my fingers, which wouldn't bend, put it to his lips, and passed my hand over his chest. The blood had dried up; it was the blood of the dead machine-gunner. I sat down beside Brezhnev and also had a smoke. . . . All the rest of that day we paced the trenches of the front line.


Soon, in the small hou rs of December 25, 1943, to be precise, Soviet troops launched their offensive on Zhitomir and Berdichev. Troops of the 18th Army were once again fighting along the main direction.


A few days before the offensive began, Brezhnev issued a directive to all the heads of subordinate political departments, which was typical of his constant care for the men in the ranks. He wrote: "Always save the strength and health of the fighting men. The hard-and-fast rule is that they must be kept supplied with hot food and hot water. We must ensure the strictest control so that the men get everything the state allocates for them. Those who are neglectful or idle in this respect must be severely punished. Unflagging attention must be given to the operation of the medical services. The political departments of units must appoint men responsible for the evacuation of the wou nded from the field of battle and for emergency medical aid."


The fighting for Korysteshev, Zhitomir and Berdichev was especially fierce. Soviet troops advanced rapidly across a roadless terrain turned into a sea of mud by a sudden thaw after a hard frost.


Brezhnev, who displayed constant concern for the officers and men, for all his subordinates, often forgot to take care of himself.


In the fighting for Berdichev he had another narrow escape when, submachine-gun in hand, he took part in storming the barracks where the Germans had barricaded themselves, thereby cutting off a group of Soviet troops from the main battle lines.


Many years later, at a meeting with war veterans of his unit, Major General Timofei Volkovich recalled that on january 3, 1944, a memorable day for him, then a colonel, he had broken th rough with a storming party to the barracks held by the Germans there to discover a handful of Soviet troops who had made their way close to the German machinegunners.


The men were led by an officer with a submachine-gu n. Volkovich saw the officer quickly swing his submachine-gun and give a long burst of fire that killed two nazi soldiers who appeared on the roof. A moment later a German rifleman looked out a window and fired at the Soviet officer, who was saved by a soldier; the man pulled the officer to the ground just as the German was about to fire, while another took care of the nazi. When the officer got up from the ground, Volkovich recognised Colonel Brezhnev. Volkovich was unable to contain himself and said, "Colonel, you have no right to be here. What are you up to?"


The same as you, Colonel!


Please go away. This is no place for you.


"My place is where the situation req uires the earliest fulfilment of the combat task. Are you aware that our forward units fighting in the city are encircled? We have to break through to them. Don't get excited, Colonel. Let's smoke these nazis out of these damned barracks


together."


Immediately after Berdichev was liberated, Brezhnev, in addition to his many military duties, took a most active part in restoring normal life. He did much to help the city with food supplies and transport facilities. He ordered twenty captured trucks and eight passenger cars to be assigned to meet the needs of the city. These came in handy for transporting food supplies from the rear. Besides, the 18th Army's Political Department secured for Berdichev some of the grain stocks from military warehouses. This was also done on Brezhnev's initiative.


In the summer of 1944 the nazis, who had suffered a major defeat in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, entrenched themselves in the Carpathians, which blocked the way to the area beyond. This was a natural fortress, 270 kilometres wide and 100 kilometres deep, which the enemy reinforced with a ramified and deeply echeloned network of strongpoints, trenches, barbed-wire fences, minefields and various engineering installations.


It became quite obvious to the Army Command and indeed to all officers and men that there would be intense fighting on rugged mountainous terrain. The army's Field HQ was in the area of Snyatyn, Kolomyya and Gvozdets. The army was reinforced with the 11th and 17th Guards Infantry Corps and somewhat later with the 95th Infantry Corps. These were battle-tested units, but none had special training, experience or equipment for mountain fighting, much less for fighting in a range like the Carpathians. There was a need to study the experience gained in the early fighting for the Caucasus and make it available to the troops as soon as possible.


In this connection, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko says in his book \emph{Across the Carpathians} that the political instructors of the 18th Army, whose Political Department was headed by Colonel Brezhnev, were actively preparing the troops for the offensive.


While preparing the East Carpathian operation, the 18th Army's Political Department set its sights on having every party and Komsomol political instructor ready to work with the rank and file during the operations on mountainous terrain, Marshal Grechko wrote. "Ten army seminars were held in the units and at the army's Political Department to train 430 men within a matter of two or three days. Apart from general political reports, these seminars discussed the various aspects of fighting on forested mountainous terrain and the tasks of political and military education in the new combat situation."


All the work of the political instructors was being carried on while heavy fighting was going on east of the Carpathians. Officers and men set many examples of gallantry, showing a growing capability for fighting with courage, determination and initiative in the new conditions.

\section{Fighting in the Mountains}


The closer Soviet troops got to the Carpathians, the less they saw of the familiar lowland landscape. In the 18th Army only a few units had been trained to fight on forested mountainous terrain. It was necessary to train all the officers and men to fight in the local conditions, to provide mountaineering equipment, lighter weapons and pack animals.


It was also necessary to get the units up to full strength, to fortify the decimated ranks of the party organisations, to raise the morale of the troops fatigued by the constant fighting.


Inthat difficult situation the chiefof the army's Political Department had men he could rely on. He had rallied together a group of principled, courageous and resourceful men with considerable political and combat experience. An atmosphere of vigour and initiative prevailed. The Political Department functioned efficiently. Brezhnev's subordinates respected and liked him, never had to be told twice what to do, and accomplished the possible and the impossible to ensure the fulfilment of combat orders.


The dugouts and other places where the chiefof the Political Department worked were always open to visitors.


Brezhnev had a friendly word for everybody, always made a point of asking how all were coping with their duties, listened to their req uests and suggestions, gave them advice and instructions.


Ivan Shcherbak, who was a lecturer of the army's Political Department, recalls in his reminiscences Brezhnev's inexhaustible resourcefulness, high exactingness, kind ness, sincerity, unassuming manner and modesty.


Brezhnev never had to insist on his subordinates' always being with the troops. He set them a personal example.


The 18th Army became used to seeing Brezhnev where the main strike was to be delivered. He commanded the deepest respect of the men for this. He was well informed on the actual state of affairs in the units, and responded quickly to overcome any shortcomings and meet the needs of the troops.


Nikita Dyomin, former chief of the Political Department of the 17th Guards Infantry Corps, testifies: "In any situation, however hard the going was, Brezhnev was always with his men, building up their faith in victory, carrying conviction to them, which in effect made him the heart and soul of the officers and men of our army."


Anton Gastilovich, who was in command of the 17th Guards Corps, recalls: "Brezhnev came to visit us on several occasions, spending days on end in the front-line units. He generously shared his rich experience in mountain fighting, which he had acquired in the battles at Tuapse, at the Goitkh Pass, at Novorossiisk, and on the Taman peninsula. Brezhnev never failed to support all our requests with army HQto strengthen the combat potential of our corps and made arrangements to provide such assistancejointly with the Military Council. This did a great deal to help us in our work and added to our confidence in our own strength." Indeed, Leonid Brezhnev generously shared with all his experience acquired during military operations in the mountains of the North Caucasus, and the conferences he attended often developed into something like tactical exercises. He advised officers to refrain from storming the enemy in the mou ntains head-on, unless there was an urgent need. It was better to bypass and surround the enemy, to set up small assault groups to operate independently. He cited examples of bold initiatives taken by a soldier or group of soldiers to carry out tasks which otherwise would have taken a whole unit to perform.


What is most important, Brezhnev said, addressing the commanders and political instructors of the 317th Division, "is to teach the small units to act on their own; reconnoitre the roads, gorges, passes; seize and hold commanding heights, roads and narrow defiles; boldly bypass the enemy; and take him by surprise."


He was very cautious when it came to risking the lives of the men, and they appreciated this care, respecting him all the more for avoiding u nnecessary risks.

\section{Key to Battle Success}


As chief of the Political Department Brezhnev explained that success in battle depended on the close, co-ordinated co-operation of commanders and political instructors. At a conference on the eve of the Carpathian-Uzhgorod operation he said:


"The commander and the political instructor have an especially important, honourable, and responsible duty to perform in battle. The commander is the man who organises the battle, and his orders are law to all his subordinates. The political instructor is the commander's right hand and must always be where the success of the battle is being decided, where the fighting is heaviest, where there is need for personal example


to inspire the soldiers to carry out their combat assignment. The commander and the political instructor are a single whole, and they must be the regiment's heart and soul."


Staying constantly with the corps, divisions, regiments, battalions and companies, Brezhnev req uired commanders and political instructors personally to see to it that every officer and man had a clear understanding of their tasks in the fighting, knew how to use their weapons to the best effect, displayed initiative and resourcefulness, and were physically fit. He urged them to train their men in the finest combat traditions of the Russian soldier and the Red Army.


As a political officer Brezhnev made use of every conceivable instrument to build up morale, to raise the enthusiasm of his men; he knew the Soviet soldiers' pride in their country's history, and he dug into it for educative purposes.


On his initiative the men were reminded of the heroic exploits of Suvorov's men in the Alps and of the Russian soldiers in the Carpathians in 1916 and were told of the experience of the recent fighting in the Caucasus and at Novorossiisk.


One day, while on a visit to the 17th Guards Infantry Corps, Brezhnev inspected the regiments and the battalions of the corps' 8th Division. He spoke to many officers and political instructors and then climbed to a commanding height to see the battlefield for himself.


Over there is the Yablonovsky Range! Beyond it are our brothers in the Transcarpathian Ukraine! It's only a stone's throw away, he said. "And beyond that lies the valley of the Tisza, and then Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Over there the people are impatiently waiting for us. It's not a very long way to go!"


Nodding at an elderly soldier, he continued: "This man is also eager to get beyond the Carpathians. He must surely be over fifty!"


The man realised that they were talking about him and came up. "Machine-gu nner Parshin," he said.


Fyodor Parshin fought in these parts in the First World War, the battalion commander reported.


Is that so? Brezhnev said.


Yes, Comrade Colonel. I did fight in these parts. Our regiment captured and defended this very height.


Parshin led them to an old overgrown trench.


Our platoon was entrenched right here. He pointed to a hillock and added, "That was the dugou t of the company commander. We made it hot for the Germans over here, and I'm sure we'll smash them this time." Brezhnev heartily shook hands with the old machine-gunner and thanked him. He saw to it that the 18th Army took the experience of the veterans into account, especially in training reinforcements.


However hard the fighting, raw troops were not, as a rule, sent into battle at once. They underwent combat training and toughening near the line of fire, outside the range of enemy artillery, learning the fighting traditions of their unit and getting advice from experienced men.


This well-organised educational work helped accustom the new recruits to the battle conditions in a much shorter period, so that they displayed skill anJ staunchness in subsequent fighting.


An important aspect of the political instructor's duties was that the truth should reach enemy troops.


Under the impact of the Red Army's successes, especially of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which included the 18th Army from August 1944 onward, antiwar sentiments began to spread in the Hungarian 1st Army. These sentiments were encouraged by the efforts of a special unit of the 18th Army's Political Department. This work, too, Brezhnev personally organised and guided. "In the offensive started by our troops, many Hungarians and Germans have been taken prisoner," he wrote in a directive to the chiefs of the subordinate political departments. "The testimony of war prisoners shows that enemy morale is low, and this gives us the opportunity to influence them more effectively by our propaganda."


The fact is that the efforts to shake morale among enemy troops had a substantial effect in the battle for the Carpathians. In that period something like 3,000 broadcasts were organised, 2,500,000 leaflets were published, and about 800 prisoners of war and defectors were infiltrated into the enemy rear. As a result, nearly 10,000 officers and men went over voluntarily to the Soviet side. Colonel General Miklos Bela, commander of the Hungarian 1st Army, and several of his officers surrendered voluntarily on October 18 in the sector of the 351st Infantry Division.


The disintegration of the Hungarian 1st Army assumed major proportions. However, the Germans managed to slow it down by savage reprisals. They swiftly moved several German units into the area, brought German units into the battle lines held by the Hungarians, and threatened to execute anyone trying to get out of the war begun by German fascism and hated by the Hungarian people.


The great diversity of tasks and problems and the quest for the needed forms and methods of work made up the day-to-day uninterrupted effort, which Brezhnev directed tirelessly.


On October 8 the 18th Army liberated Lavochne, the last populated locality held by the naz1s m the Soviet Ukraine. This marked the complete liberation of the Soviet Ukraine from the German invaders.

\section{In Transcarpathia}


Inan order of the day issued on October 18 the Supreme Commander in Chief congratulated the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front for successfully crossing the main Carpathian range and for taking its passes. A twenty-salvo salute was fired by 224 guns in Moscow in their honour.


In summing up the results of the 18th Army's combat operations, Brezhnev reported to the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front: "In a relatively short time ( the latter half of September and October) our troops successfully overcame all obstacles, drove the enemy out of his fortified defence lines, inflicted tremendous losses on him, and, contrary to the assertions of military experts about the Carpathians being impregnable, broke into the Hungarian Plain with decisive support from troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.


"From September 19 to November 1 alone, 22,075 enemy officers and men were killed or wounded, and 21,269 taken prisoner. We captured 206 guns, 300 mortars, 1,054 machine-guns, 12,535 rifles and submachine-guns, and other weapons . . . .


The Carpathian operation was a gruelling test for all the men of the 18th Army, from private to general. This test has been successfully passed.''"


The people of Transcarpathia welcomed their liberators like brothers, with open arms and sincere joy. White-haired old men, children, and men, women, boys and girls in national dress went out to welcome the Soviet troops. They offered them the traditional "bread-and-salt" greeting and bunches of flowers, invited them to their homes, regaled them with fruit and wine, and gave them whatever help they could. They acted as guides and sappers, scouts and medical orderlies, aided soldiers in rebuilding roads and bridges, cleared away roadblocks, and helped to capture fascists hiding in the mountains. For their part, Soviet troops assisted the local people-their brothers and sisters-with food, medicines and entertainment, and helped them understand the international polical situation and so decide their own future.


On October 28 Brezhnev arrived with a group of generals and officers in Uzhgorod, which was still under enemy shellfire. They were met by a delegation of the municipal council. On behalf of the city population, Pyotr Sova, a municipal councillor, wholeheartedly thanked the Soviet command for the liberation of Uzhgorod and expressed the long-standing desire of the people of Transcarpathia to reunite with the Soviet Ukraine.


The speech in reply, Councillor Sova recalls, was delivered by a slim you ng colonel, who bore himself with dignity. He had a manly, goodnatured face with expressive features, and a smile twinkled in his eyes.


Brezhnev spoke of the sacred mission of the Soviet Army: to rout the enemy and help the peoples of Europe regain their freedom and independence.


He stressed that the Soviet troops had entered Transcarpathia as liberators. In reply to the Transcarpathian people's ardent desire to reunite with the Soviet Ukraine, expressed by the municipal councillor, Brezhnev said, "We have no intention of interfering in your affairs. That is you r own business, and it is up to your people to decide. We will never act against the will of the people."


The fact was that the people of the Transcarpathian Ukraine had lived under the yoke of foreign states for centuries. Progressives of the Transcarpathian Ukraine regarded the coming of Soviet troops as an opportunity to establish their own people's government and to reunite with their motherland.


Meetings were held spontaneously in towns and villages, and people's committees were elected. All sections of the population, including the clergy-both Orthodox and Roman Catholic-took part in the election.


It was a momentous period in the history of Transcarpathia. The masses of Transcarpathia, who for the first time had the opportunity to shape their destiny, expressed their will on November 26, 1944. On that day the first Congress of the People's Committees of Transcarpathia was held at Mukachevo and adopted the historic Manifesto on the Reu nification of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine. lnjune 1945 the governments of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty u nder which the Transcarpathian Ukraine was reu nited with the Soviet Ukraine.


As soon as Transcarpathia was liberated, the people felt the fraternal assistance of Soviet troops. The 18th Army's Political Department and its chief did much to help them build a new life. Brezhnev as usual worked around the clock. On November 2, 1944, he was promoted to the rank of Major General.


Major General Brezhnev was directly involved in the work to open schools, shops and medical institutions and to rebuild factories and plants. On his initiative, 9 million pounds of grain from army stores were handed over to the needy population. He spoke at meetings and rallies about the liberative mission of the Soviet Army, the Soviet people's massive labour effort in the rear, and the international situation. In the meantime, he continued to guide party and political work in the 18th Army, which was still engaged in active combat.


The people of Transcarpathia repaid Brezhnev with affection for his constant concern for them. Many of them remember his good deeds and tell their children and grandchildren about them. He won their affection by his frankness, sincerity and respect for others. Pyotr Sova, the municipal councillor, says, "Brezhnev showed that he was a skilled diplomat and statesman. He was the most popular representative of the Soviet Command, and local people cherish their memory of him."


The young general was warmly received in every home he visited. He spent the few leisure hours he had with Sergei Stasev, chairman of the People's Committee of Uzhgorod, with artist Andrei Kotsko, chief of the people's militia, and with the civil leaders Pyotr Sova and Nikolai Katerinyuk.


Today Kotsko, who holds the title of Merited Art Worker, lives in a home on one of Uzhgorod's quiet tree-lined streets. On holidays and on festive occasions, when he entertains his friends, he invariably recalls the memorable days oflate 1944.


Time and again he points to the place where the weary you ng General Brezhnev used to sit after a harrying day, to the paintings Brezhnev liked, and leafs through the general's favourite books. He comes up to a shelfand carefully shows his guests the books Brezhnev presented to him and recalls their frequent heart-to-heart talks. . . . They used to discuss the battle successes of the Soviet Army, the postwar order in Europe, pore over maps, and reckon the distance still to go to Berlin. The way ahead, every mile of it, was hard toil, but at the end ofit lay the cherished goal of peace.


Brezhnev always had respect for individ uality. To him the people were never a grey, faceless mass, as some in the West speak of Communist leaders. On the contrary, Brezhnev always noted and valued individual traits in every person.


What do you intend to paint after the war? Brezhnev asked his host. The artist was unable to reply at once. Indeed, what would he tell the people in the idiom of his art? Of the horrors of war? Of the triumph of peace?


They would then get to talking about the goals of art for the people. They discussed at length the trends in the Western European art and literature then in vogue, and each time Kotsko was amazed by the general's erudition in the history ofliteratu re and the arts.


There were indeed many meetings and conversations, and people in Transcarpathia still remember them.


One night Brezhnev was returning in a car from the front lines to the city. Passing through a village, he caught sight of two figures in the glare of the car's headlights. He ordered the driver to stop. A man and a woman asked him for a lift, and both were invited to get in. The car drove on. The strangers introd uced themselves as Noemi and Nikolai Katerinyuk.


That was the beginning of their acquaintance. The general left an indelible impression on Noemi. He was the first Soviet citizen she had met; she found that he was quite unlike what she had imagined Communists to be.


Noemi had been born and educated in Budapest, and at school she had been constantly told that Communists were little less than savages: they held nothing sacred; their ideology was inhuman; their deeds were even worse. When the 18th Army entered Uzhgorod, Noemi closed all the shutters and stayed in the house. She was sure that Soviet soldiers would revenge themselves on the Hungarians for fighting in the war against the Soviet U nion.


As millions discovered about the same time and later, nothing of the kind happened. The 20-year-old Noemi was even more confused. Today she is a correspondent of the regional newspaper \emph{Karpathi igaz so} and recalls, with a smile, her doubts and worries. To this day she is grateful for meeting Brezhnev, who helped her see the world in a new light and answered the questions that troubled her. He explained that the Soviet Army was fighting no particular nation bu t the fascists. What is more, it never terrorised the civilian population.


The general had a reciprocal sympathy and respect for the young couple. He called at their house frequently. He grew fond of their 2-year-old daughter, often playing a game with her or telling her a fairy tale. Now and then he grew pensive, thinking of his own son and daughter. How were they getting on?


He told them about his mother, his wife, sister and brother and how much he wanted to see them all.


The times, however, were still strained and troubled. In Western Europe the people still languished under the nazi yoke.

\section{Onward West ln january 1945 the 18th Army advanced into Czechoslovakia.}


Ludvik Svoboda, who was President of Czechoslovakia for many years, reminisced about that period: "Injanuary 1945 I went to see the commander of the Soviet 18th Army in my capacity as commander of the Czechoslovak Corps. The 18th Army HQwas in a village north of Kosice. I drove there by car and met the commander of the 18th Army, General Gastilovich. We agreed on how we would co-operate and mapped out the lines of the forthcoming offensive.


General Gastilovich and I established good businesslike relations. Until the end of the war the Czechoslovak Corps fought as part of the 18th Army. The 18th Army won its first major success on our soil when it liberated the city of Kosice, where the government of the Czechoslovak Republic soon arrived and the well-known Kosice Programme was proclaimed as the basis for the state system of the new free republic and its policy of unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union.


In the fighting to liberate Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, General Brezhnev organised the work of the 18th Army's political instructors in such a way that the command could always rely on the high morale of Soviet troops, says Colonel General Anton Gastilovich, now a professor and Doctor of Military Science.


What was especially well organised was the highlighting of the heroic exploits of Soviet officers and men. Thus, for instance, from January to April 1945 seventy-six leaflets entitled \emph{Glory to Our Heroes!} were issued in the 650th Infantry Regiment of the l 38th Division alone. The morale of the Soviet troops kept growing, and with every passing day our men struck harder and harder at the enemy.


A total of 140,000 Soviet officers and men gave their lives for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. Countless thousands were wou nded or crippled.


Many years later Leonid Brezhnev said, "The war is a thing of the past. But our feelings have not changed. The sense of profound community that unites the peoples of our countries has struck deep root in the hearts of the Soviet people and the Czechs and Slovaks."


Wherever Brezhnev went he established warm relations with the local people, the Czechs and the Slovaks. Dr. Mikulas Stanislav, a clergyman, recalls:


"In February 1945 battles were being fought around our village. There was firing every day. And we were sitting it out in a cellar. A Russian general-tall, black-browed, you thful, and very friendly-was quartered in our house.


One day he invited me to have dinner with him, his aide-de-camp, and three other officers. I asked him his name, and he said it was Brezhnev. I mustered my courage and asked, 'What kind of government" are we going to have?' Brezhnev replied, 'You yourselves will establish your own government. This government will apparently be a popular one. Czechoslovakia will be a free republic.' Unfortunately our conversation was cut off because the Germans started shelling the village and the windowpanes in our house were shattered. General Brezhnev did not move an eyelid, but I went down to the cellar and stayed there with my family until the fighting ended. When we came upstairs, General Brezhnev had already gone. . . .


In the past few years I have often felt like writing Brezhnev a letter to remind him of his stay in our locality, to express to him my affection, despite the fact that he is a Communist and I am a clergyman, and to thank him for the assistance given to our people in their most difficult years.


It was explained to the pu blic at large that the local people could safely rely on the assistance of Soviet soldiers in establishing a new antifascist power. This attitude on the part of the Soviet Command, the work of the political instructors, and the conduct of Soviet officers and men were met with great satisfaction. The population, which had been intimidated by fascist propaganda, now began to trust Soviet servicemen and regard them with affection as their liberators. Good relations were established between the population and Soviet troops. Local people often helped the troops.


The events in Brezhnev's life connected with the liberation of Czechoslovakia left a deep imprint on his memory. This is why at the ceremony at which Czechoslovak decorations were conferred upon him in November 1976 he again recalled the war roads of 1945 that Soviet officers and men had traversed together with the Czechoslovak Corps, the flames of the popular uprising in Slovakia, the uprising in Prague, and the joyful days of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the nazi invaders.


The people of Poland welcomed the Red Army with ju bilation. The 18th Army was assigned to liberate part of south-eastern Poland in the area of the High Tatras. During a heavy snowfall in the dead ofnight the 17th Guards Infantry Corps broke through the German defences north of the range, in the Czarny Dunajec area near Poronino in Poland.


Besides Poronino, the 18th Army liberated Nowy Targ, Gorny Dunajec and many other comm u nities in that part of Poland. Poronino and Nowy Targ are associated with Lenin's life. He lived in Poronino for some time. There the Bolsheviks held an important meeting under Lenin's guidance in 1913. He was detained by the Austrian authorities and kept in the Nowy Targ prison.


A view of Kamenskoye, the village where Leonid Brezhnev was born


The hillside part of Kamenskoye


Workers of the wire-making and repair shop. Brezhnev's father is second from left in the fourth row. The photograph dates to the end of the 1920s


The Brezhnevs in 1930


This is where Leonid Brezhnev lived in Dneprodzerzhinsk


Graduates of the Metallur!!ical Institute m Dnenrorlzer-


1935, L. I. Brezhnev playing chess with N. P. Dubynin


Chatting with men going into action, 1942


Admitting new members to the Communist Party during the fighting for


Tuapse, 1942


Next to Brezhnev is his army friend Avksenty Tikhostoop, during a break in the fighting in the Novorossiisk area, 1943


With machine-gunners in the Novorossiisk area


With Captain Ivan Kravchuk in the Novorossiisk area,


1943


Military Council of 18th Army, April 1945


At the Victory Parade in Moscow, June 24, 1945


(a) With combat veterans


(b) Marching past


Major General Brezhnev,


1945


Meeting fellow war veterans of the fighting for Novorossiisk, 1974


Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party's Dnepropetrovsk


Addressing Zaporozhstal steelworkers in Zaporozhye,


1947


\textbf{In the rolling mill, 1947}


Brezhnev, First Secretary of the CP of Kazakhstan Central


Committee, 1956


Inspecting the dam of the Lenin Hydropower Station on the


Volga, 1958


Brezhnev, President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in


J-.;o l< rPm J;n ffip 1 Q\{;')


A sitting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme


0 \textbar{} Soviet, 1963


With \textbar{} \textbar{}


Yuri \textbar{} Gagarin, \textbar{} the \textbar{} first \textbar{} At a harvester combine \textbf{plant in} Krasnoyarsk


Inspecting an enterprise in Frunze, the capital of Kirghizia


Inspecting the Novorossiisk factory \textbf{built} m co-operation with PepsiCo USA


Among workers at the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory in Leningrad


As the troops moved closer to these towns, Brezhnev told all the commanders and political instructors to see to it that everything associated with Lenin's name was preserved.


The Czechoslovak Corps and the Soviet 18th Army saw the end of the war at the Svitavy River. This, however, did not happen on May 9, 1945, bu t a few days later, on May 12. Many people in the world do not know of the following events in the history of the Second World War.


Even after all the other troops of the Third Reich had surrendered, a group of German divisions under General Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoemer, which operated in the central part of Czechoslovakia, refused to lay down their arms and attempted to fight their way to the West.


The former commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General Gastilovich, recalls: "In the early hours of May 9, I received an order from the front HQto send our envoys to all the four German divisions entrenched in front of our army to give them the terms of surrender. But at 0900 hours all the four officers came back. They had been rudely driven away from three divisions and told that there would be no surrender. The commander of the fourth division sent me a short polite letter, saying that he had received no orders to surrender, so he would continue to fight.


Attempts on the part of Soviet troops to advance were met with heavy, well-organised fire. It turned out later that General Field Marshal Schoerner, commander of the German Army Group Centre, consisting of more than fifty-seven divisions, on May 9, had ordered his troops to continue fighting and retreat to the West.


The Schoemer group had 1 million men, 10,000 pieces of artillery, 1,000 aircraft and 2,000 tanks. Early in May, when Hitler was already dead, the Schoemer group remained the only battle-worthy part of the Wehrmacht, on which Hitler's henchmen relied as their last stake.


The scheme of the nazis was frustrated by the successful operations of Soviet troops, in particular the 18th Army and the Czechoslovak Corps. This, however, took much effort and a large toll of lives. In those days Brezhnev displayed great energy to stimulate the entire political apparatus to maintain high morale among the troops. This was not easy to do, because everyone realised that although the war was over, more lives had to be lost.


On the night of May 10 Major General Brezhnev wrote his last battle report to the command in which he said, "The enemy, who has refused to lay down his arms, spent much of his ammunition in firing at our front lines and began a hasty retreat. During the whole of May 9 and 10 our


\textbf{PFHL - E} troops pursued the retreating enemy and engaged him in various sectors. Now our troops are in pursuit of the Germans."


That was many years ago, but the' veterans of the 18th Army vividly remember those trying days in May 1945 and commemorate them by meeting exactly on May 12 every year. Such meetings in Moscow are often attended by Brezhnev as former chief of the Political Department of the 18th Army.


As chief of the 18th Army's Political Department and later of the Political Administration of the 4th Ukrainian Front Brezhnev skilfully coped with the tasks facing Soviet troops abroad.


When a Victory Parade in Moscow's Red Square was planned, Brezhnev was appointed commissar of the composite front-line regiment of the 4th Ukrainian Front.


The Victory Parade in Moscow was a spectacular national holiday. It crowned the epoch-making victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and the victory of other nations of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.


Brezhnev's appointment as commissar of one of the composite frontline regiments was a sign of recognition of his great services to his country.


The former commander of the 18th Army, Gastilovich, who also took part in the Victory Parade, writes: "I was glad that Brezhnev was appointed commissar of the composite regiment to represent the 4th Ukrainian Front, and I had the honou r to march with him, my comrade in arms, in the ranks of the victors over the sacred stones of Red Square. "Captured German banners collected from all the u nits were to be hurled down at the foot of the Lenin Mausoleum during the parade. "The Victory Parade was held onJune 24, 1945. It was a striking and majestic spectacle. It has been filmed in a documentary, and everybody has had the opportunity to see it." * * *


The Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov has called one of his books about the Great Patriotic War \emph{No One Is Born a Soldier.} Like the millions of Soviet people who took up arms in defence of their country, Brezhnev was not born a soldier. War tore him out of his civilian job.


But he lived the life of his people, and when the people had to go to war, he became a soldier, too.


Like the other Soviet people, he faced death in defensive battles, rose to attack, was cold and hungry, grieved over the loss of his comrades, and rejoiced in Soviet war successes. He was to be seen in the trenches more often than at headquarters. He was always in the midst of the rank and file, sharing their dangers and risks, their short rations and scarce ammunition.


It was not simple to withstand all the hardships of war. "Soviet generals, officers and men experienced many trials on the roads of war. The nerve-racking retreat and continuous fierce fighting. Days, months and years spent in the face of death. Long and fatiguing marches in winter frosts and in summer heat, in lashing autumn rains and over roadless terrain in spring." This is what Brezhnev said on May 8, 1975, of the Soviet people's great exploit. "When now, three decades later, one recalls what fell to the lot of the rank and file, commanders and political instructors of our armed forces, it is hard to believe that all this actually happened and was actually endured . . . . \textbf{But} we did endure all this. We withstood all trials and won victory, defeating the nazi aggressors."


A man of a cheerful nature and excellent abilities as an organiser, Brezhnev generated around himself an atmosphere of hope and a high awareness of each man's duty to the socialist country, which sprang not from any mystic sense or fear but from the realisation that the war was fought to save the country, mankind and, indeed, civilisation as a whole from the nazi threat.


Having passed through the flames of the most terrible war, facing death, suffering and bloodshed, seeing razed cities and bu rned crops, he came to love life and people still more.


Indeed, the war taught him to display even greater concern for people and to safeguard them against the scourge of war.


That is why, Brezhnev said, "we believe it to be our sacred duty to do our utmost so that not only we bu t our children, grandchild ren, and great-grandchildren never taste war, and all the peoples live in peace and have good relations with each other."


This is the key to understanding Brezhnev's selfless dedication to the cause of peace. Nobody can defend peace better than those who have been scarred by the flames of war.

\part{Chapter 3. Tackl ing the Tremendous Job of Building a New Society}

\chapter{1. Home to the Dnieper Valley}


The Dnieper Valley with its vast green fields and thriving industrial cities-a land Brezhnev loved dearly-lay in ruins when he returned home after the war.


What had been the blast furnaces of the Zaporozhstal plant, the aluminium and ferroalloy factories, the Lenin Hyd ropower Station on the Dnieper, the Communard plant, the engine works, and other plants and factories was now a scene of wreckage, Leonid Brezhnev recalls. "The damage caused to the economy and population of the region by the German invasion was estimated at almost nineteen billion rou bles." The Soviet people were retu rning to their jobs to handle the tasks of civilian construction, of building a society which would meet all of man's material and intellectual wants. Brezhnev wrote and spoke about this, and we know what was in his heart and mind when the war ended, when he, like all other Soviet men and women, surveyed the present and contemplated the future.


The experience of fighting in the front lines strengthened Brezhnev's character and gave him qualities few contemporary statesmen have attained. He was already a skilful organiser with a profound knowledge of psychology. His war experience gave him still greater insight into the thoughts and aspirations of his people, with whom he had shared the bitterness of retreat and the joy of victory.


Pain gripped his heart when he discovered that many of the men he had worked with to transform this region into a flourishing industrial land would never come back and work with him again. Hund reds he had known personally were buried far away from their native places. The finest sons and daughters had laid down their lives to defend their homes, the people they loved, and their country. These were heroes, and Brezhnev thought of them as he looked at the chaos before him, and, as he told his contemporaries, he vowed to dedicate his life to preventing war from every occurring again.


The losses and devastation this war caused are beyond comparison, Brezhnev said. "The grief it brought people still pains the hearts of mothers, widows and orphans." The war had invaded every family, taken from almost each a son, a father, or a brother. Brezhnev had spoken with many of the kin of the dead and had brought them whatever solace was possible since he knew all too well the infinite woe of the survivors at the loss of their loved ones. "There is no heavier loss for a person than the death of his near ones, his comrades and friends. There is no sight more depressing than that of destroyed fruits of his labour, into which he had pu t his energy, his talent, and devotion to this native land."


These were some of the feelings he voiced as he strode through the ruins of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. As he said later, " There is no smell more acrid than that of homes bu rned to ashes. Disfigu red by fire and metal, lying in ruins, was my native land, now liberated from the nazi barbarians." He examined the grim statistics of how many Soviet men and women had died in this area and the numbers of those shipped to concentration and slave labour camps in Germany.


Brezhnev walked through the wreckage of Zaporozhye, which had once been a major industrial centre and was now a scene of mou nds of twisted metal and rubble. The Zaporozhstal plant, pride of prewar Soviet heavy industry, lay in ruins before him like a toppled giant. Blast and open-hearth furnaces and all the machinery were destroyed completely. One forlorn building stood intact on the ground pockmarked by shells: the pumping station. The magnificent hyd ropower station built by heroic efforts during the First Five-Year Plan, which had proudly towered over the Dnieper, was one vast ruin. The total damage inflicted to the economy of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk regions was estimated at 48. 7 billion rou bles. The scene was the same wherever the flames of war had scorched the land.


No nation in history had to pay so high a price for victory. In the war 20 million sons and daughters of the Soviet people had lost their lives. The invaders had destroyed 1,710 large and small towns and burned down more than 70,000 villages. Tens of millions had been made homeless. In their flight the vindictive nazis had wrecked nearly 32,000 factories and plants, totally or partly, and had ripped up 40,000 miles of railroad tracks.


The countryside suffered equally; 98,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms and machine-and-tractor stations lay in ruins. Great quantities of machinery had been shipped to the Third Reich, as had mou ntains of raw materials and foodstuffs. Cultural monu ments had been wantonly destroyed in an effort to rob the Soviet people of their national history and red uce them to slavery.


No statistics can give a true picture of the real scale of the losses the Soviet people suffered in the war years, Brezhnev said. "How can one count up and express in figures the great work, the wealth of thoughts and talent that many generations of our people had invested in creating the enormous material and cultural values destroyed by the nazis?" Never in human history had a state sustained such devastation.


On August 30, 1946, the Communists of Zaporozhye, on a recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, elected Leonid Brezhnev first secretary of the Zaporozhye Regional Party Committee. A year later, in November 1947, he was elected first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee.


The tasks facing the Soviet Union were truly formidable. It was necessary to rehabilitate the economy and regear it to civilian work within an incredibly short period.


Nothing could be put off u ntil some later time; everything had to be done immediately. Rehabilitation work had to be carried out without requisite building materials, the land ploughed up when tractors were unavailable, children taught in half-ruined schools, and sick people treated in looted hospitals.

\section{Formidable Problems of Economic Recovery}


The tasks that arose before Brezhnev on a regional scale demanded immediate solution. He changed into civilian clothes on the third day after demobilisation andjoined in the peaceful battle for metal and bread. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR outlined the central economic and political task of the country for the 5 years ahead as follows: "To rehabilitate the war-ravaged areas of the country, to bring up industry and agricultu re to their pre-war levels, and then to surpass them considerably."


The Fourth Five-Year Plan adopted in 1946 envisaged the rebuilding of the Zaporozhstal plant, work on which had been started back in 1944, as soon as the nazi forces had been expelled from the city. The reconstruction of the plant, however, had been slow.


Brezhnev was clearly aware of Zaporozhstal's immense importance for the national economy. The plant was the Soviet Union's sole producer of thin sheet steel, badly needed by the car, tractor and consumer goods industries, as well as for housing construction. As secretary of the Regional Party Committee he clearly saw the difficulties that would have to be overcome. As a metallurgical engineer he knew that it would not be an easy technological job. However, he had complete faith in his people. The deeds of the dead inspired the living. Brezhnev went to the building site to discuss matters with the workers. He made them no unrealistic promises, bu t he left them confident that their needs would be met. His keen interest in everything the workers said led to a frank conversation in which the party leader formed a clear picture of the situation on the building site.


Meetings with workers were a high priority for Brezhnev. He visited them constantly on the various building sites, talking with groups and individual workers. He inquired about their housing conditions, about the quality of their food, about what they read, even about their children's grades at school.


As secretary of the Regional Party Committee he explained to them that the Communist Party and the government were doing everything possible to improve the condition of the people and that their living standard would be steadily raised as industry and agriculture developed.


Brezhnev consulted party executives and considered measures to improve the living conditions of the workers, engineers and technicians. In Dnepropetrovsk he made a detailed study of the situation on (he spot and stayed at the plant until he had formed a full picture of the progress of the rehabilitation work and the improvement in the housing and living conditions of the workers.


In Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Brezhnev gave close attention to the selection and placement of trained workers. He was thoroughly familiar with the staffs of the regional, city and district party committees. He knew the secretaries of many primary organisations, as well as local government officials and economic executives. He was well aware of their professional and political qualifications and knew who could be entrusted with what kind of work.


Brezhnev carried out painstaking work among the secretaries of the primary party organisations on whom the process of economic rehabilitation largely depended. He often met with the secretaries of the party committees of Zaporozhstal. He took close to heart the large and small concerns of these enterprises, regularly addressed party meetings and meetings of economic executives, and gave them assistance in organisational work and mass political education.


Conferring with other leading executives of the region, he was never afraid to recommend demobilised servicemen, talented young men and women who had shown their mettle, for responsible jobs.


Speaking at a meeting at Zaporozhstal, he advised that a strike force should be set up to ensure plan fulfilment by the concentration of manpower and supplies to cope with priority tasks.


He set an example of how to go about one's work and direct construction efficiently. In a crucial period of construction he transferred his office and communications to the site and even stayed there overnight. The most characteristic trait of the man was the effort to gear everything to the common goal. His example was followed by regional and city party committee workers who assumed leadership of the primary organisations on the building site.


Brezhnev's working day would start on the construction site; then it would continue at the regional, city, and district party committees, on other building sites, and on collective farms. Late at night he would return to the Zaporozhstal plant to review what had been done during the day and make plans for the next day. There he received local party, government, and economic executives who had urgent business.

\section{Calm and Confidence}


Brezhnev's office at the Zaporozhstal plant became the headquarters of the construction project. His move directly to the site had created a good working atmosphere devoid of tensions despite difficult times.


The first secretary of the Regional Party Committee created an atmosphere of exceptional, genuinely Communist goodwill around the Zaporozhstal project and its personnel. It was noted that whenever the difficulties were greatest, whenever we were plagued by setback, whenever nerves were especially tense, the voice of the first secretary would be calmest and most confident, Veniamin Dymshyts, manager of the Zaporozhstroi building organisation, recalled.


Brezhnev was invariably in the vanguard. On his initiative the first-ever single schedule for an entire project was drawn up at the Zaporozhstal plant. It coordinated the work of nearly forty technical groups and hundreds of sections and work teams-in short, the project's entire personnel. He felt that such a schedule would provide a picture of the situation in every section, making it possible to control the work, to pull up lagging sections, and to encourage those who worked best. "The schedule", he said, "is a pivot, an instrument for creating a climate of all-out effort."


Brezhnev personally checked on compliance with the schedule. Whenever the slightest delay occurred, he hastened to help the men at the head of the construction project and the plant. One hund red and twenty factories run by different ministries and located in ten different cities supplied equipment and materials. Machine tools came from Moscow, metal structures from Dnepropetrovsk, rails from Kuznetsk, industrial equipment from Kramatorsk, lumber from Byelorussia, railroad ties from Archangel, electric motors from Yaroslavl, bitumen from Transcaucasia, pumps from Melitopol, cable from Leningrad, trucks from Gorky . . . . If one enterprise delayed supplies, the entire schedule would fall behind. Brezhnev would immediately get in touch with the concerned ministers, Regional Party Committee secretaries, and plant managers to plead, explain, persuade . . . . He came to be widely known as the man who got things done. It was hard to say no to him.


The difficulties of reconstruction were compounded by the fact that the work force was far less skilled than that of prewar times. Many skilled workers and engineers had been killed. The war-ravaged enterprises had to be raised from ruins by unskilled workers, by women, by teenagers. Training the personnel required time and additional outlays. But funds were found. Innumerable schools and courses were opened in the region to enable ex-servicemen, young people and women to acquire industrial skills. The training was done on the job. The schedule was met, but only by the most strenuous efforts.


Inresponse to an appeal from the Regional Party Committee, village Commu nists, Komsomols, and collective farmers joined the work force at the Zaporozhstal, Dneprostroi, Communard and other projects. All had to be accommodated and fed; there were more than enough problems.


Zaporozhstal was the number one project. This giant of the country's southern steel industry, like other enterprises, could not operate without electricity. Therefore, rebuilding the Lenin Hyd ropower Station on the Dnieper was a high-priority task. Its commissioning, however, was delayed. Here, too, there was a shortage of workers, engineers, and technicians, housing, and equipment. Nor were these the only headaches for the secretary of the Regional Party Committee. Brezhnev kept close watch on the quality of the reconstruction work and stressed again and again that this first among the Soviet hydropower giants had to remain one of the most impressive monumental works of architectu re in the country.


He found the time to contribute regularly to the newspapers \emph{Bolshevik Zaporozhya, Dneprovskaya Pravda, Zarya,} and \emph{Chervone Zaporozhya} to inform the public about the situation in the country, in the republic, and in the region. In his articles "Rebuild Zaporozhstal Quickly," "Three Years of Creative Work to Revive Zaporozhye Region," "Dnepropetrovsk Region on the Eve of the Soviet Ukraine's 30th Anniversary," "We Must Not Rest on Our Laurels," and others, the first secretary of the Regional Party Committee laid bare shortcomings, pointed out ways of overcoming them, and formulated the tasks for the future.

\section{Life Triumphs}


The work carried 011t by the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committees under Brezhnev's leadership began to bear fruit. The war-ravaged factories and plants were placed in operation one after another. In the period l 948-49 a number of enterprises actually produced more than in the prewar year I 940. Many people living in ruined houses moved into new homes. The collective farmers received thousands of tractors, hund reds of harvester combines, seeders, and trucks. The fraternal Soviet republics supplied them with thousands of head of cattle and horses.


Factory after factory was resuming production. The resurrection of each was a thrilling event. More than I 0,000 people gathered one day in July 1947 in front of blast furnace No. 3.


The secretary of the Regional Committee remembered all the stages of its reconstruction.


He had personally checked how the experts from the Teplostroi building organisation handled the masonry work, and he remembered their complaints about the poor quality of the refractories.


He looked about him at the happy faces of the people who had come to see the results of their effort. There-the furnace was breathing and rumbling! Its rumble was drowned by the cheers of men and women congratulating one another, hugging, kissing and weeping for joy. He, too, shared their happiness. He, too, had put all his heart into this work. A few months earlier the country had welcomed the heroes of the Lenin Hydropower Station when its first generator unit began producing commercial power. This was good news for everyone in the country. Once again there had risen the "Sun of the Ukraine," as the power giant on the Dnieper used to be called. The project was dear to everyone not only because of its economic importance and superb technical design bu t also because of the memories it evoked-memories of enthusiastic and self-sacrificing work in the thirties.


Meetings to celebrate the triumphs of labour were being held at one construction project after another. Enterprises in Dnepropetrovsk and Krivoi Rog, Dneprodzerzhinsk and Melitopol, Nikopol and Marganets reported that they were back in production. Reports of the rebirth of war-ravaged enterprises mingled with reports of the construction of new factories and ore mines, power plants, railroads and highways.


For the successful restoration of the Zaporozhstal plant almost 2,000 building workers, assemblymen, steel smelters, and those who helped them were decorated with government orders and medals. Leonid Brezhnev was decorated with the Order of Lenin.


But industry is not the only bounty enjoyed by the Dnepropetrovsk region. It has vast and fertile collective farm fields. But to make them really fruitful, one had to pu t his soul in the land and skilfully organise the work force.


The land along the Dnieper is one of the country's granaries. It contribu tes significantly to the harvest of the Soviet Union as a whole. To restore its agriculture as quickly as possible, the government supplied seed and machinery on a very substantial scale by the standards of that time.


To find ways of helping the regions restore its former agricultural repu tation, the secretary of the Regional Party Committee stepped up his extensive tours of districts and collective farms, consulting agronomists, farm chairmen and rank-and-file farmers. He asked a multitude of questions, inquired into details, studied the situation. His questions reflected his profound concern, and his advice showed his profound knowledge.


He devoted much attention to the repair of farm machinery and to supplying fuel, fertilisers and seeds to the collective farms.


The Dnepropetrovsk region overcame the difficult situation.


In 1948 and 1949 it was among the first to fulfil the plan for the delivery of grain and other farm produce to the state.


To visualise the scale, complexity and acuteness of the problems faced by agriculture, it must be recalled that following the ravages of war and the dire effects of drought, the country was unable to end food rationing until 1947. With the termination of rationing it was necessary not merely to provide essentials to the population but also to lay a firm foundation for a future state of plenty.


An important feature of the Dnepropetrovsk region was the broad spectrum of its farm production. Wheat was undou btedly the main crop. Animal husbandry, orchards, vineyards and fishing were other important food sources.


All of them req uired close scrutiny. One must remember that far from all types of farm work were mechanised in those days. Power transmission lines had not yet been extended to all villages. At a meeting with collective-farm chairmen in May 1950, Brezhnev spoke of the many tasks facing the countryside. He urged the farmers, thinking of today's grain, to look ahead to the bountiful harvests of the future. At that meeting his audience was led to conclude that management required knowledge, skill and a constant striving to accomplish still more.


In 1950 the region, together with the entire country, completed the Fou rth Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule. The prewar industrial level had been surpassed, and grain harvests were bigger than in the best prewar years. The network of educational institutions, hospitals, health and holiday homes, and nursery schools and day-care centres had been rebuilt and enlarged. It was a miracle ofreconstruction. Many people in the West were astounded. They did not believe it could be done withou t extensive foreign aid. Once again they u nderestimated the limitless potentialities, capabilities and enthusiasm of the builders of socialism. The boastful forecast of the nazi General joachim Stulpnagel, who was guilty of the immense damage caused to the Dnieper area and who had written in a wartime report to Berlin, "It would take Russia 25 years to restore what we have destroyed," did not come true.


The Ukrainians highly appreciated Brezhnev's great contribution to the restoration of the national economy and his outstanding abilities as an organiser. lnjanuary 1949 a congress of the Comm u nist Party of the Ukraine elected Brezhnev to its Central Committee. This further extended the range of his duties and enhanced his responsibility to the party and people.


\textbf{lnj}anuary 1950 at a general meeting of workers of the Petrovsky steel plant in Dnepropetrovsk, Brezhnev was nominated for election to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This nomination was supported by workers of other factories of the region. Brezhnev was elected to the Soviet parliament. ln july 1950 he took leave of the Dnepropetrovsk region-there was new work waiting for him, this time in Moldavia. All his preceding activities had prepared him for leadership of a repu blic. Naturally, he felt attached to the Ukraine, where he had been born, had grown up, had been educated and had passed through the school oflife. "I worked in the Ukraine for many years," Brezhnev recalled later. "I fought on its soil in the war, and like many other Russian people, I am familiar with the fine qualities of the Ukrainians and have a sincere affection for them." His work in the Ukraine had broadened his horizons and outlook on life. It was there that he developed the qualities of an outstanding statesman.

\chapter{2. In Moldavia}


It is hot in Moldavia in the summertime, and the air is redolent with the fragrance of grass and flowers. The landscape is a bright canvas of orchards, fields and meadows; the voices of people, the songs of birds, and the hum of machines ring loud and clear. Summer was in full riot when Brezhnev came to Moldavia. Onjuly 15, 1950, Soviet newspapers ran a report on a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party, which elected Leonid Brezhnev to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee.


In photographs of those years we see a sturdy, stocky man with a you thful (he was 43 at the time), energetic, smiling face, crowned by a shock of curly hair. His comrades and fellow workers said that his great optimism and joy of life made a deep impression on all.


The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic of the early fifties confronted Leonid Brezhnev with a tangle of social, political and economic problems.


Situated in the south-westernmost part of the Soviet Union, this region with a small area and a high population density, which had proclaimed Soviet power after the October Revolution, had been divided from 1918 to 1940 against the will of its people. The Dniester River had separated one part of Moldavia from the other. The region on the left bank of the Dniester had been Soviet, while the region on the right bank had been occupied by the fascist Romanian gentry.


In 1940 the people's aspirations and historical justice triumphed. The two parts of Moldavia were reunited within the framework of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Then came the year 1941, bringing with it the dark night of the fascist occupation, not as lengthy as in previous years but equally bitter and humiliating.


When units of the 5th Strike Force under General Nikolai Berzarin (who became the first commandant of Berlin in 1945) liberated


Kishinev, the Moldavian capital, in the last days of August 1944, they encountered devastation that staggered even hardened soldiers. The centre of the city was a solid mass of ruins; it looked more like a lifeless lunar landscape than a city. As they were driven out by Soviet forces, the invaders took away with them everything they could carry. Before retreating, they had looted Kishinev so wantonly that they even ripped out window frames and unscrewed door handles. Not a single factory in Moldavia had escaped destruction.


As the saying goes, misfortunes never come alone. In addition to the destruction wrought by the invaders and the grief of the widows and orphans, crop failu res struck. Drought devoured the farm fields and meadows of Moldavia for two years in a row in 1945 and 1946.


Characteristically, in that period the Moldavian economy, industry first and foremost, was not merely restored bu t actually built from scratch.


Before the war nearly 70 percent of Moldavia's population was completely illiterate. There were whole villages without a single literate inhabitant. The newspaper \emph{Sovetskaya M oldavia} wrote on October 15, 1950, that since the end of the war about half a million people had been taught to read and write. Nevertheless, there were still abou t 40,000 illiterates and l 00,000 semiliterates in Moldavia.


Thick scholarly monographs devoted to that period and eye-witness accounts testify that the early fifties were an important turning-point in Moldavia's history.


What the republic needed was leadership which could infuse the people with energy and buoyancy, give them confidence in their powers and lay the groundwork for Moldavia's rapid advance on a new socialist basis.


Any passerby on Sadovaya Street in Kishinev will show you a one-story building separated from the roadway by a lawn. Leonid Brezhnev and his family moved into this house in 1950 and lived there for 2 years.


The Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party had its headquarters at 115 Kiev Street in a two-story building faced with white and red brick. lnjanuary 1918, when Soviet power was first established in Moldavia, the Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Romanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Odessa Region had its offices in this building.


The office of the First Secretary was on the second floor in the left wing of the building. This was the headquarters and brain centre of Moldavia. The strings of the management of industry, agriculture and culture converged in it.


Every morning, punctually at eight, the First Secretary walked briskly to the entrance. Leonty Sheetov, a member of the Central Committee staff in those years, recalls:


"On the way to his office Leonid Brezhnev would step into nearly every room to say hello, tell a joke, inquire about people's health and mood and the latest news.


All this took ten to fifteen minutes-Brezhnev treasured time and taught us to value it, too. Yet in those few minutes he set a vibrant tone for the entire Central Committee staff. Not only did he infuse us with fresh energy, bu t he knew how to draw energy for himself from the people around him . . . . This quality is a distinguishing feature ofa born leader, a man who is always among the people and not on top of them, who lives together with them, for them, and thanks to them."


"When Brezhnev returned from trips to Moscow, he would gather the entire Central Committee staff and tell them what had transpired and how affairs were progressing in various regions and republics of the Soviet Union.


He emphasised our place in the Soviet family of nations and pointed out our prospects. We were impressed by his ability to link minor and major problems into a single whole, to link the city and the country, the destiny of an individual and the destiny of the nation."""


There is an old aphorism that you can judge a man by his style of work. Brezhnev's style of work reflects his essence, his nature as a man and a leader.


Lukeria Repida, now a Doctor of Science and a prominent scholar of Moldavia, who was a minister of the republic in the fifties, recalls the years of work together with Brezhnev.


We already saw that he was a born leader, astute and broadvisioned, she says. "Even in the most difficult circumstances he was able to keep the situation under control and to carry people along with him, not only by his tireless energy bu t also by presenting the problem in a new way. He was a very highly organised person, with a daily programme worked out to the minute. A man of extensive practical experience, he posed and solved problems on a solid theoretical foundation. He worked a great deal, day and night, and he always worked methodically."


Everybody who worked with Brezhnev in Moldavia noted the constant attention he paid to people. In the photographs of the fifties on display in the Museum of History of the Moldavian Communist Party, Brezhnev is always seen with a group of people, never by himself.


In a photograph taken in a farm field together with collective farmers of the Tarakliya district in the summer of 1950 he stands beside a harrow, listening attentively to the farmers. In another picture, taken at an agricultural exhibition in Kamenka in 1951, he stands beside Hero of Socialist Labour Maria Kardonskaya. Neither in dress nor i n manner does Brezhnev stand out among the others. But even if you have never seen him, you r attention is instantly drawn to him because he is in the centre of a group of people listening and looking at him.


In a recently pu blished book entitled \emph{Reminiscences} ef \emph{Communists,} Faina Medlokritskaya, a former secretary of the Kishinev City Party Committee, writes: "As a Commu nist I should like to tell about the impression people here formed of Brezhnev while he worked in our republic. First of all, we remember him as a splendid orator who could inspire his audience. We listened with rapt attention, although sometimes he spoke for as long as 3 hou rs.


Brezhnev's reports and speeches were politically sharp, backed up with instances from life, and illustrated with passages from works of fiction. He always set himself very high standards when preparing for a speech and demanded that all party functionaries do the same.


His exactingness combined with his concern for people. Medlokritskaya recalls further: "He is a very understanding and considerate person. I remember the following episode. When he learned that Lidia Teplyakova, the managing director of the Styaua Roshi knit-goods mill, had fallen ill, he rang her up in the hospital, spoke encouraging words to her, and then contacted the doctors and told them to do everything they could for her. Unfortunately, at the City Party Committee we learned about Teplyakova's illness only later. When we visited her, she told us about Brezhnev's call. We could see that it had given her morale a great boost and multiplied her strength to fight a grave illness . . . ."


On his arrival in Moldavia in 1950 Brezhnev quickly acquainted himself with the situation and the people, discerned the needs of the times, and acted capably in conformity wi th the tasks of the social and economic development of Moldavia and the country as a whole.


Timofei Troyan, curator of the Museum of History of the Moldavian Communist Party, recalls:


"Brezhnev was remarkable for his inexhaustible and dynamic energy and efficiency. He would summon an official to his office, have a long talk with him and compare opinions (but never try to overawe the latter with his authority). Then he and the visitor would climb into a car and drive to a project, to a near or distant district, for 2 or 3 days, sometimes for a week.


He was democratic and very accessible both to colleagues and to the public, to workers and peasants. Sometimes, after a long and intensive conference, he would say, 'Now let's knock it off and take a stroll around town.' """


Troyan also speaks about the master plan for the reconstruction of Kishinev and other Moldavian cities, which was drafted with Brezhnev's active participation.


On Brezhnev's initiative the Central Recreation Park was laid out, and Lake Komsomolskoye was dug. Work on this project began in 1951 in a marshy waste full of crags. Local people, especially Komsomols, took an active part in the work.


In October I 950, soon after Brezhnev was elected to the leading post in the Moldavian Commu nist Party, the sixth plenary meeting of its Central Committee was held. At the meeting Brezhnev pu t forward proposals for further measures to strengthen the repu blic's collective farms politically, organisationally and economically.


An interesting table in one of the displays in the Museum of History of the Moldavian Communist Party contains the following figures: \textbar{} \emph{1949} \textbar{} \emph{1950} \textbar{} \emph{1951} \textbar{} Number of collective farms \textbar{} 925 \textbar{} 1,770 \textbar{} 1,355 \textbar{} Number of collective farmers \textbar{} 375,000 \textbar{} 917,000 \textbar{} 3,388,000 \textbar{} It is clear from the table that in the course of a single year, from 1950 to 1951, the number of collective farms decreased because of amalgamation, while the number of members more than trebled. The Moldavian countryside took a big stride along the road of socialist reorganisation.


When Brezhnev took over the direction of the repu blic's economy, he set Moldavia's working people the task of advancing the standards of crop farming, so that high yields could be stable and independent of weather conditions.


The Soviet government handed over the former landlords' estates, orchards, vineyards and more than 20,000 head of livestock to Moldavian peasants. A total of 130,000 poor farmsteads were exempted from taxes. Industry developed at a fast pace in the republic and unemployment was completely eradicated.


Ina characteristic gesture of the socialist system, the fraternal peoples of other socialist republics gave a helping hand to industrially backward Moldavia. This is the way oflife in the Soviet Union; each republic helps the other whenever help is needed. l\textbackslash{},foscow and Leningrad, the Ukraine and the Urals, the Caucasus and Siberia all helped.


Machine tools and machinery, locomotives and trucks, tractors and


\textbf{PFHL - F} harvester combines, metal and coal, oil and other goods necessary to restore and develop industry and transportation, farming and cultural life arrived in Moldavia in an endless stream.


The enormous assistance from the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union enabled Moldavia not only to reconstruct the enterprises that had been destroyed and looted but also to build many new factories and plants equipped with up-to-date machinery. More than 40,000 acres of new orchards and vineyards were laid out after the war.


In the Central Committee's Report to the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia, in March 1951, Brezhnev described how the republic's towns and villages were changing beyond recognition: "In the Chadyr-Lu nga district, for example, before 1940 there were one secondary and eight primary schools, which were staffed with 20 teachers and had 300 pupils. Illiteracy among the population was as high as 85 percent. Now there are seventeen schools with 275 teachers in the Chadyr-Lunga district. The schools have 5000 pupils. Illiteracy has been wiped out. There are fifteen village clubs, a district House of Culture, a Young Pioneers' House, a cinema theatre and fifty-four libraries. Three radio rebroadcasting studios operate in the district."


Moldavia, predominantly rural then, made remarkable progress agricultu rally. Brezhnev reported that 94 percent of the peasant households in the republic had formed collective farms. The young collective farms of Moldavia provided a striking illustration of the revolu tionising role of machinery. Machine-and-tractor stations with a fleet of thousands of tractors, harvester combines and other farm machines were set up in the repu blic. Mechanisation increased the prod uctivity of the collective farms and raised the standards of farming and crop yields. In the first 5-year period following the war, the yield of grain crops in the republic increased 150 percent.


The fulfilment of the 3-year state plan for advancing livestock breeding increased the collective-farm herds of cattle sevenfold, the flocks of sheep and goats fivefold and the nu mber of hogs 730 percent. Whereas in 1949 the farmers had been paid 110 million roubles in cash and kind for their work on the collective farms, in 1951 their earnings reached 567 million rou bles.


The achievements of agriculture in the republic vividly demonstrated the vitality of the collective-farm system and the advantages of large-scale socialist agriculture, which made the use of machinery and intensive diversified farming possible.


Industry also developed rapidly in the repu blic. In 1951 industrial production rose by 41 percent over the previous year. The major part in this increase came from the food industry, which boosted production by nearly 50 percent.


Work was in progress on the construction of the Dubossary Hydropower Station, a silk complex, new sugar refineries, canneries and wine distilleries. The foundation was being laid for mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and instrument making-industries new to the republic.


Rapid progress was in evidence in the field of education, too. By October 1952 forty-six higher and secondary specialised educational institutions were functioning in the republic. They had a student body of 17,500. A state university and twenty-six research institutes were opened and fifty-six newspapers and magazines were published.


The Moldavian people had been denied the benefits of culture for centuries. Under the Soviet system they displayed a tremendous thirst for enlightenment, learning and science. They were able to share in the cultural achievements of the peoples of the other Soviet republics.


The year 1952, the last year of Brezhnev's work in Moldavia, wasjust as busy as the two previous years. On Brezhnev's initiative the republic submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union thoroughly substantiated proposals for the continued development of Moldavia's agriculture and food industry. The Soviet government made decisions which outlined further measures to promote agriculture and the food industry in the Moldavian republic. In March Brezhnev delivered a report at a meeting of party activists of the republic on how these decisions could be carried into effect and what measures should be taken to advance the economy to a still higher level in Moldavia. Observing that the food industry was accounting for 70 percent of the republic's gross industrial output and had made important progress, he pointed out at the same time that local primary material resources were still by no means being fully used.


Although Brezhnev did not work in Moldavia long, he accomplished much of importance. Not only had he laid the basis for a breakthrough in Moldavia's development, but he had also outlined the main directions of its future progress. The sources and roots of the economic prosperity in Moldavia today go back to the early fifties, when Brezhnev worked hand in hand with the people of Moldavia.


He has never forgotten Moldavia and revisits it from time to time. During the celebration of the republic's 50th anniversary in October 1974 he was the one who pinned the Order of the October Revolu tion on Moldavia's flag.


The republic gave an enthusiastic welcome to this man, u nder whose leadership, a quarter of a century before, it had laid the foundation of today's and tomorrow's successes.


Speaking in October 1974 at a meeting to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Repu blic and the founding of the Communist Party of Moldavia in Kishinev, Brezhnev recalled those times:


It seems just recently that we met in the conference hall of the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of Moldavia, nearby on Kiev Street, to discuss the organisational, political and economic consolidation of the young collective and state farms. We selected Commu nists who moved to the villages to remake life in them along socialist lines. That was a difficult, strenuous time. However, one cannot but speak well of it since it was then that the foundations of the present successes were laid.


Brezhnev's businesslike grasp of matters and his talents as an organiser were widely recognised in party circles. On September 23, l 952, the Commu nists of Moldavia delegated him to attend the 19th Congress of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet U nion. At the Congress in October he was elected to the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet U nion and a plenary meeting of the Central Committee elected him an alternate member of the Presidium and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

\chapter{3. In the Virgin Land Areas}


In l 953, 31, l 00,000 tons of grain were procured in the Soviet Union, while the amount consumed for food and the country's other requirements was 32,400,000 tons. The shortage of grain was offset from the state reserves. Effective steps were therefore needed to help provide the country with more grain in a brief time.


In the spring of 1954 the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union adopted the decision "On Further Increases in Grain Production in the Country and on Developing Virgin and Long-Fallow Lands." Millions ofacres offertile land were to be brought u nder the plough beyond the Urals and farther east, in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, mainly in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Repu blic. The land was to be used to raise wheat and other crops.


Brezhnev was assigned by the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union to assume the political leadership of this enormous project outlined by the party and to organise the development of virgin lands in Kazakhstan. The Commu nists of Kazakhstan elected him Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in February 1954 and First Secretary in August 1955.


The republic was faced with the tremendous task of ploughing in 2 years nearly half of all the unused lands in the Soviet Union that were to be made fertile. This was a formidable task not only because of its magnitude but also because of the record time in which it was to be carried out, unusual even in the Soviet Union, which has more than once astounded the world by its spectacular accomplishments.


This project was without precedent in the history of agriculture. The Communist Party and the government allocated large financial resources for it. The republic was provided with enormous quantities of machinerytractors, harvester combines, seeders, trucks and farming implements. But machinery alone was not enough. Manpower was also needed.


In response to an appeal from the party and government scores of thousands of enthusiasts volu nteered to join in the work. Thousands of farm-machine operatives and other skilled workersmembers of the Komsomol and young people from all over the country, including its remotest parts-came to the virgin-land areas. Nearly l million volunteers arrived there in the early years of the project.


Within 2 years the machine-and-tractor stations and the state farms received more than 122,000 tractors, 26,000 harvester combines, more than 22,000 trucks and large quantities of other machinery and equipment.


Experienced leadership and organising talent were needed to cope with the project. It was necessary to set up scores of new state farms (90 were established in 1954 and about 250 in 1955)--that is, to build new villages and settlements in the areas to be reclaimed. The scale of the work increased month after month.


In 1955 the budget of the Kazakh Republic was almost double that of the year before. The problems that arose concerned not only the organis-:tion of work and the timely acceptance and transfer of the large number of machines from one area to another bu t also the provision of accommodations and food for thousands of people and the satisfying of their household and cultural needs.


Work teams to be employed on the project were made up of new arrivals from different parts of the country, from different republics. In most cases they were strangers to each other. They had to live and work under quite difficult conditions. Inview of this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan had to take urgent steps to enable the newly formed teams to work with maximum efficiency.


Brezhnev was in the lead of this drive. People who worked on the gigantic development project warmly recall their meetings with him. Here is an account of the battle for grain by one of them, Fyodor Morgun, now the First Secretary of the Poltava Regional Party Committee:


In 1954-55 we often saw a single-engine AN-2 plane in the air, and we knew that it carried Brezhnev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. He toured many of the farms and knew most of their managers quite well. His visits helped us a great deal. After seeing the situation and the difficulties of the settlers with his own eyes, he was able to make the necessary decisions and thereby help all the new farms, even those he was unable to visit, because in most cases they had common problems.

\section{Spirit of Corifidence}


Brezhnev still recalls those difficult but exciting days:


There were jubilant crowds welcoming new arrivals, and new songs, born of the throbbing pace oflife. There was the romance of performing exploits and a genuine spirit of adventure inherent in pioneering work. There was the splendid feeling of confidence that arises when difficulties are overcome and made to retreat. Many such difficulties had to be dealt with. Within a few months it was necessary to receive several hund red thousand settlers, provide them with accommodations, satisfy their everyday needs, begin the construction of state farms, grain elevators, roads and bridges.


Many things went wrong at first, hitches and misunderstandings would arise, and mistakes, too, were made. People were arriving in uninhabited areas; they were unfamiliar with local conditions and the 'spcific climate and sometimes knew little about farming in general. However, they were inspired by an idea of great national importance and by the wish to get to grips with nature and to remake it.


Brezhnev would search for an answer to the many problems posed by the project. He called upon the experience of old-timers. He demanded that the republic's ministers, party executives and economic managers concern themselves more with the specific problems and needs of the new settlers and take a day-to-day interest in the work of the state and collective farms.


I recall this episode from my latest tour of the regions, Brezhnev told a conference of Communists of Kazakhstan. "We were flying from the Zhdanov state farm in the Bulayevo district. The secretary of the District Party Committee was on the plane with me. I told him that somewhere in the vicinity there was a state farm named after the Taman division. The secretary confirmed that this was indeed so; this recently organised state farm was about 40 miles away. We found the farm, located a suitable place to land and landed.


"The people were living in vans. The builders had pitched their tents nearby. The farm had just begun acquiring machinery and was given an assignment to sow 7,500 to 10,000 acres of land ploughed up in spring and another 40,000 acres of land ploughed up the previous year-50,000 acres in all. And this at a time when the farm was onlyjust getting on its feet and was short of both manpower and machinery. They had actually sown only 7,500 acres by that time. You can imagine the quality of the work done-nearly all of it was unacceptable.


I asked if anyone had visited them. They replied that the District Party Committee secretary had, 3 days before. Now this was a good secretary, a member of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. But evidently he still thought that helping a state farm was a matter of concern only to the Ministry of State Farms and noticed nothing and gave no help."


The people on that state farm were feeling pretty low. There were no roads, bread and other foods were supplied to the local store irregularly, and other goods were also scarce, even though the wholesale supply depot, as I learned, was well stocked. The District Party Committee secretary realised he was at fault at once when he saw this. A bakery was brought to the farm overnight, as were food supplies and two truckloads of consumer goods. In short, everything went well.


From the first steps of his work in Kazakhstan Brezhnev sought ways of boosting the yields of wheat, sunflower and other crops in the republic as a whole, and he encouraged livestock farming. He urged the farmers to study the experience of other republics. Inhis speeches he stressed the importance of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union which enabled them to benefit from their mu tual assistance and fraternal support.


The results of such teamwork by people of different nationalities were strikingly evident in Kazakhstan, where agricultural experts from the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and other republics of the Soviet Unionjoined efforts in their work on the virgin-land development project.


This project was a school of internationalist education, a school of intellectual and physical training, a school of vocational training in the true sense of the word. In a speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the virgin and long-fallow lands project, Brezhnev said, "This project set many on the right course in life. Scores and hund reds of tractor drivers, harvester combine operatives and builders have become managers of state farms, leading experts, party and government executives. When we say that the virgin-land development project advanced people to a higher level, we mean not only their record of promotions. There is another kind of advancement just as significant and noble in terms of human achievement. I have in mind their intellectual advancement, the improvement of their skills and their attainment of moral maturity."


Despite the difficulties, more land was ploughed and sown than had been planned. In Kazakhstan 45 million acres of virgin land had been reclaimed by the end of 1955. As a result, the crop area in the republic reached 67,500,000 acres-that is, nearly three times the 1953 figure. In 1954 alone the republic supplied the country with 1,600,000 tons of grain above the year before.


This was reported by Brezhnev injanuary 1956 to the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and later to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan's success was an achievement of the whole country-it meant that the task of providing the country with adequate quantities of grain set by the party and government was being successfully accomplished.


History recorded a spectacular human achievement when the Soviet people won the victory in their battle to plough up the virgin lands. Hundreds of state farms, modern industrial enterprises and research centres have sprung up on this formerly barren land.


Brezhnev contributed greatly to Kazakhstan's industrial development. InAugust 1955 he made a detailed report to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the repu blic's Commu nist Party which discussed the problems of improving the management of industry and advancing technology, as well as the application of scientific and technological achievements to production, specialisation and cooperation.


As a result, in the latter half of the fifties, Kazakhstan accounted for more than half the national output of copper, lead and zinc. Electric power output increased several times, compared with what it had been in tsarist times. The industrial centres, such as Karaganda, Balkhash, Temir-Tau, Ust-Kamenogorsk and others, developed rapidly.


Not only has a new large grain-growing area been developed in the east of the country, but the economy and the entire image of a vast region have been transformed.


Kazakhstan today is one of the Soviet Union's main granaries and the biggest livestock-breeding area, Brezhnev stated with full justification in 1976. "Kazakhstan today has hundreds of up-to-date industrial plants, which are contributing greatly to the country's economic progress. Kazakhstan has thousands of scientists and cultural workers, whose art has earned the well-deserved recognition of all the Soviet people."


Take Kazakhstan, Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "Its economy and culture are blossoming. More than 250 modern industrial enterprises, large workshops and other prod uction facilities were built there in the period of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone. It is becoming customary for Kazakhstan to grow 16 million tons of cereals annually. Together with the cereal outpu t of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine this forms the basis of the nation's food stock."


Great credit is due to Brezhnev for the rapid advancement of this virgin-land area, which a little more than two decades ago was mostly a land of endless expanses untouched by the human hand.

\chapter{4. Working in the Leading Bodies of the Country}


At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 Brezhnev was re-elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee elected him an alternate member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the Central Committee. At the same time, beginning in 1958, he was Depu ty Chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. SinceJune 1957 he has been a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the highest party body in the periods between the plenary meetings of the Central Committee (later, in 1966, the Central Committee Presidium was renamed the Politburo of the Central Commi ttee, as it was called when Lenin was alive) .


Holding these posts, Brezhnev travelled all over the country, touring factories and collective farms. He remained the same Brezhnev: modest and straightforward, considerate and untiring. At a factory in Omsk, in distant Siberia, for example, he talked to shop managers and workers directly on the shop floor, inquiring into their living conditions.


Visiting a state stock-raising farm, he looked over its facilities and spoke to the specialists, the milkmaids and the women who tended the calves, asking about their needs and wishes. At the Chapayev collective farm near Omsk he met the chairman and members of the farm board and visited the farm's library and club. He was most attentive to the opinion of the people concerning one or another decision of the party and in turn expounded the party's policies and furnished help on the spot. He was thoroughly acquainted with the life, thoughts and aspirations of the workers, peasants and the working intelligentsia.


The Central Committee entrusted Brezhnev to work on problems connected with the development of heavy industry and capital construction, the equipment of the armed forces with the latest weapons and the promotion of space exploration. He directly supervised and controlled the preparations for the first manned flight in outer space. After the successful mission of the world's first cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, in the Vostok spaceship, Brezhnev was made a Hero of Socialist Labou r for his outstanding contribution to the development of rocketry and for ensuring the success of the spaceflight performed by a Soviet citizen.


Referring to space exploration, Brezhnev emphasises that it is not only paving the way for humanity's future gigantic achievements, whose fruits will be used by coming generations, bu t is also directly benefi ting the whole world, the Soviet people, and the building of communism. He frequently repeats that the development of outer space should serve the cause of progress, peace and the happiness of all the peoples of the world and not become a means of destruction and war.


As before, he devoted a great deal of attention to the virgin-land development project. "I clearly remember Comrade Brezhnev's visit to the Tolbukhin state farm in August 1957, when he was already a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," recalled Fyodor Morgun, an old-timer of the virgin-land development project. "It had rained heavily for a whole week, and there were puddles on the roads. The district authorities expected his plane to land at the district centre and asked the state farm to send its two cars there. I myself settled down to wait at the farm office.


"At about nine in the morning I heard the drone of an approaching aircraft. I walked out on the porch and saw that it was coming in for a landing. It circled once and smoothly landed next to a cowshed we were building. It made a turn and taxied up almost to the office building.


The door opened, and Leonid Brezhnev and the leaders of Kazakhstan stepped out of the plane."


"Almost all the state farm workers rushed to meet the guests, and right there by the side of the aircraft a lively conversation ensued about the affairs at the farm and our life. Brezhnev said that he would like to see the ripening grainfields.


We'll have to wait for a while,' I said. 'Our cars are at the district" centre. They'll be back soon.'


" 'We can take this truck; the cars can JOm us later,' he replied, waving his hand in the direction of a machine-repair truck which had just driven up. The crew of this vehicle, consisting of a driver and mechanics, repaired farm machinery directly in the field. I urged Brezhnev, who began to walk towards it, and the other guests to wait for the cars because the truck was packed with tools and spare parts.


Fortunately, just then several jeeps appeared from behind a bend in the road, their wheels throwing up fountains of mud. We climbed in and headed for the fields."


"The standing crops were straight and clean, but they were somewhat stunted, and the ears were not too heavy. That year we had a poor harvest. The drought hit our farm, too. We visited almost all the field teams and inspected most of the crop area.


The grain where team number two worked was better than the rest. Looking over one of the fields, Brezhnev asked, 'Do you intend to employ swath harvesting or straight-combine harvesting here?'"


" 'We haven't decided yet,' I replied. 'The crops are shortish and not bushy at all and, therefore, stand far apart. The sheaves will be thin and may fall to the ground between the stubble. But we are also ready for swath harvesting.'


Do whatever you think best. The main thing is to prevent losses,' Brezhnev replied."


"He returned to his jeep, and we drove on, stopping at two millet fields of the third team under Ivan Surkov. The millet was pretty good that year, and it was already being machine-harvested. The sheaves of millet lay in even rows. Brezhnev walked up to them, took a heavy ear, looked at it carefully, rubbed it between his fingers, and said, 'This crop deserves serious attention here in the virgin lands. Its cropping capacity is not lower than that of wheat. In this drought year the millet looks much better than the other grain crops. What yield do you expect on these fields?'


From fifteen to twenty centners per hectare, while the wheat yield will hardly be eight.'"


" 'You did the right thing by sowing millet, and you should sow more of it in the future,' said the Secretary of the Central Committee. 'Withou t millet we cannot solve the country's cereals problem.'


Back on the central estate the guests looked over the houses that were being built and talked again with those who had moved into new homes. I invited the guests to my house for dinner. While we had been inspecting the fields, my wife, Alexandra, had made borsch and cutlets."


The guests ate with appetite. After dinner Brezhnev took a few books from the shelf, thumbed through them, carefully looked over my modest library, and said a few words to his assistant, Victor Golikov. After that he warmly bade goodbye to my wife and walked out. A few pigeons were fluttering about near the door.


" 'Whose birds are these?'


I pointed to my 9-year-old son, Vladimir."


" 'I used to keep pigeons when I was a boy, too,' Brezhnev said with a smile. 'I also have a pigeon fancier-my son. But he's a bit older than you rs. Whenever I get a new assignment and have to move to another place, we take the pigeons along. Our Moldavian pigeons have been in Alma-Ata, and now they are in Moscow.'


As we drove back to the aircraft, Brezhnev recou nted some amusing episodes connected with his son's pigeons. Stopping at the side of the aircraft, the guests wished all of us who had gathered to see them off every success in work and good health, said warm words of parting, and flew to Kokchetav."


A couple of weeks later I received a large parcel of interesting new books from the dispatch office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was a gift to our family from Leonid Brezhnev.


The study of Leonid Brezhnev, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union, was a headquarters where key problems connected with the development of the Soviet economy, including heavy industry and capital construction, were solved. His name was indissolu bly linked with concrete accomplishments in the economy and with unprecedented achievements in space exploration. Many prominent foreign personalities and statesmen, with whom he had had personal meetings either when they visited the Soviet Union or during his trips abroad, came to know him well.


In May 1960 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR elected Leonid Brezhnev Chairman of its Presidium, one of the most distinguished and responsible posts in the country.


The Supreme Soviet is the highest organ of state power. Its Presidiu m is accountable to the Supreme Soviet for all its activities and performs a wide range of importan t state functions. Among other things, i t issues ordinances, interprets the laws of the Soviet Union, revokes decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet U nion and of the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics when they do not conform to the law, exercises the right of pardon, appoints and removes the High Command of the Soviet armed forces. In the recesses of the Supreme


Soviet of the USSR the Presidium has the authority to declare war or to order a general or partial mobilisation. It ratifies international agreements signed by the Soviet U nion, appoints and recalls Soviet ambassadors, receives letters of credence, and so forth.


Leonid Brezhnev held the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for 4 years. In this period the Supreme Soviet examined and adopted legislation submitted by the government designed to improve the management of industry and construction, increase state pensions, abolish some taxes levied on the salaries of industrial and office workers, and complete the transfer of all industrial and office workers to a 7and 6-hour working day. It also passed other legislation in the interests of the Soviet working people, including a law on raising the wages of workers in public education, health, the housing and u tility services, trade, public catering and other branches of the service industry.


Holding the high post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev carried on extensive work to enhance socialist democracy, ensure the rule oflaw and perfect the state apparatus.


The October 1964 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union relieved N. S. Khrushchev of his duties and elected L. I. Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Central Committee.

\chapter{5. With the Party and at Its Head}


Leonid Brezhnev's election to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, in 1966, at a Central Committee plenary meeting after the 23rd CPSU Congress as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee followed naturally from the very content of socialist democracy and the Soviet Union's political and social development, which create conditions for promoting from the midst of the people outstanding organisers with extensive and diverse experience in political, economic and state administration to leading party posts. The fact that it was precisely Leonid Brezhnev who was promoted to fill this post was logical and natural.


The year 1964 marked the beginning of a radically new stage in Brezhnev's life. In the past he had had to deal with important matters, surmount formidable difficulties and carry a heavy burden of responsibility. But the problems, difficulties and responsibilities now became even greater since he had to make decisions of national and international significance.


To get a clear idea of the range of problems with which Leonid Brezhnev is now concerned, it is necessary to see the Commu nist Party's place in the life of the people. Brezhnev himself notes with good reason that the nature of his activities as General Secretary is, above all, defined by the role which the Communist Party plays in the country.


The party is the leading al).d guiding force for the continued improvement of the developed socialist society that the Soviet Union has now become and for the building of communism.


The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a mighty and dynamic organism. It formulates its policy on the basis ofa scientific approach to and a searching examination of the needs of the people. It unites all sections of society and all nationalities, and it cultivates in the people the will, preparedness and ability to fight for the Communist ideals.


As far as I know, many people in the West do not have a clear idea about our political system, Leonid Brezhnev said. "Erroneous views are expressed. It is asserted, for instance, that the party takes upon itself the functions of other organisations, both state and social. This, of course, is incorrect."


The competence of Soviet state bodies-the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, republican and local organisations of power-is clearly defined in the Constitution, Brezhnev explains. They frame laws and supervise their observance, ensure the functioning of the economic organism, and promote science, culture, public education, health protection, etc. Social organisations have their own fields of activity: the trade unions are above all concerned with protecting the interests of the working people and organising their work and leisure; the Komsomol's duty is to educate the younger generation along socialist lines. But, Leonid Brezhnev stresses, it is the party which is the inspirer and political organiser of the achievements of the Soviet people.


Guiding the development of society as a whole, the party does not take over from state and social organisations. On the contrary, it encourages them to work with the maximum efficiency and to bear full responsibility for their jobs. The party does not command bu t uses means of persuasion, relying on its enormous prestige and experience and the support of the broad masses. Brezhnev points out that the party strives to promote the all-round development of the activities of the state bodies and stimulates their initiative in every way.


In postwar years the membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has increased almost threefold. By early 1981 it numbered


17,480,000. But this does not mean that applicants are admitted indiscriminately. It is a great honour to be a member of the party, one that has to be earned. The 26th CPSU Congress has noted that the number of those wishing to join the party is growing. Only those who constitu te the most advanced sections of the working class, the collective farmers and the intelligentsia are admitted to its ranks.


As regards its composition, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union above all is a party of workers, who constitu te 43.4 percent of its members. The percentage of representatives of other sections of the population is as follows: collective farmers 12.8; technical intelligentsia, scientists, literary and art workers, and people working in public education, health protection, the administrative apparatus and the military about 43.


In the years that elapsed between the 25th and 26th Congresses (February 1976 to February 1981) , over l!million best representatives of the working class-that is, 59 percent ofall new members-joined the CPSU. Collective farmers comprised over 10 percent of the new membership. The influx of Soviet intelligentsia into the party continued.


The Communist Party is a well-organised, smoothly functioning organisation. The CPSU has 414,000 primary and 457,000 shop organisations, and more than 618,000 groups.


The regular plenary meetings of the Central Committee examine the most important and urgent questions of the all-round development of the Soviet society and state, as well as questions of domestic and foreign policy. There were eleven such meetings from 1976 to early 1981, i.e., between the 25th and the 26th Party Congresses.


As Brezhnev stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, the basic trends of economic development were analysed annually at plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee. Other problems of a long-term character were also considered. For example, in connection with the draft Constitution of the USSR, in 1977 there was a substantive examination of the questions related to the development of socialist statehood and the entire social system in the conditions of mature socialism. The Central Committee plenary meeting in July 1978 was devoted to the further elaboration of the party's agrarian policy. The plenary meeting in June 1980 specified the Soviet Union's stand on fundamental foreign policy issues and the tasks of the struggle for \emph{detente} in an international situation that had deteriorated.


The Central Committee elects a Politburo to guide the work of the party between its plenary meetings and a Secretariat to guide current affairs.


An immense responsibility rests with the General Secretary of the Central Committee, who directs the implementation of all the collectively made decisions and co-ordinates the activities of the party apparatus. He plays a key role in the Central Committee and the Politburo.


The range of questions dealt with by the Politbu ro and myself as General Secretary is considerably wider than those dealt with by Western leaders, Brezhnev has said. "We keep in our field of vision practically all the spheres of h uman activity, everything that takes place in our vast country. This includes the ideological activities of the party and society, the economy and social problems, and the development of socialist democracy. It is impossible to list everything. International affairs also take a great deal of effort."


Leonid Brezhnev informed the 26th CPSU Congress about the work of the Politburo. In the period under review, it held 236 meetings. Its entire work was concentrated on key issues linked to the practical fulfilment of the resolu tions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU and plenary meetings of the Central Committee, to new developments in home and foreign policy.


The questions considered by the Politbu ro were carefully prepared beforehand. They cover an extraordinarily wide range. Many of them are growing increasingly complex. In some cases the Politbu ro sets up special commissions to study developments comprehensively and draw general conclusions, and also to take the necessary practical steps quickly.


Brezhnev noted that, quite naturally, various opinions were stated and many comments and recommendations were made in the course of the preparations for meetings and during the discussions. However, all decisions were adopted in a spirit of complete unanimity. This unity underlies the strength of collective leadership.


As he pu ts it, the Politburo may be described as the operational headquarters of our millions-strong party. It accumulates the collective wisdom of the party and gives shape to party policy expressing the interests of the whole of Soviet society, of all Communists and non-party people.


The selection of personnel, organisation and inspection, and practically all the current questions of party life comprise the round of work of the Central Committee Secretariat. Over the 5-year period between the two latest congresses, it held 250 meetings.


One can judge the truly immense range of questions which lie within the sphere ofactivity of the General Secretary by what is written into the Constitu tion about the role of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union. The relevant article of the Constitution says:


"The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and pu blic organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.


The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of commumsm."


All Party organisations shall function within the framework of the Constitu tion of the USSR.


Addressing the Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 4, 1977, when it met to discuss the draft Constitution, Leonid Brezhnev said:


"The majority of bourgeois analysts have also criticised the provisions defining the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the life of Soviet society. They have made much of the alleged 'proclamation of the dictatorship of the Communist Party', 'the primacy of the party over the state', 'a dangerous integration of the party and government institu tions', 'the obliteration of the boundaries between the party and the state'.


How is one to regard this? The motives for this attack are clear enough. The Communist Party is the vanguard of the Soviet people, their most conscious and progressive section, inseparably united with the people as a whole. The party has no other interests at heart bu t the interests of the people. To try to counterpose the party to the people by talking about the 'dictatorship of the party' is tantamou nt to trying to separate, say, the heart from the whole of the body."


. . . As the Soviet people tackle the increasingly complex and responsible tasks of building communism, the Communist Party will have a growing role to play, Brezhnev said. "This leads not to restriction but to the increasingly profound development of socialist democracy in full conformity with our party's programme."


\emph{An Important Stage in the Development of Soviet Society}


As we have already noted, Leonid Brezhnev has always paid great


\textbf{PFHL} - G attention to issues of socialist democracy. In his report at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union he stressed that one of the basic features of the new constitu tion would be "the further consolidation and development of socialist democracy".


Leonid Brezhnev became the head of the Constitu tion Commission which worked scrupulously and thoughtfully, looking closely into each problem as it arose. By May 1977, the draft of the new Constitu tion was completed. It was the result of many years of intensive work by a large group of people. The Constitution Commission, set up by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, included experienced party and government workers and representatives of the working class, the collective farmers, the intelligentsia and the country's numerous peoples. Eminent scientists, specialists and men and women working in state bodies and pu blic organisations were involved in the preparation of the draft. It was examined at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and then at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was then published in the press and a nationwide discussion of the draft began.


The discussion of the draft Constitu tion took place over a period of nearly 4 months and was nationwide in the true sense of the word. Altogether it involved more than 140 million men and womenthat is, over 80 percent of the adult population of the country. Never before had our country known active participation by the pu blic on such a scale.


The draft was discussed at some 1,500,000 meetings of working people at enterprises and collective farms, in military units and in residential areas. The draft was considered by all the Soviets, from the rural Soviets to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republicsthat is, by more than 2 million deputies, representing the whole people.


An unending flow ofletters was received from the Soviet people. Their writers, like those who took part in the discussion at meetings, were men and women from all walks oflife and different age-groups, representing all our nations and nationalities, party members and not, and all of them, like the masters of the country which they were, thoroughly examined the draft Constitution, making proposals for improving the text and expressing other considerations bearing on various aspects of the life of the country and society.


We can say with confidence and pride, Leonid Brezhnev noted, "that it is the whole Soviet people who have in fact become the true creators of the fundamental law of their state," adding, "the nationwide discussion has made it possible to improve the draft Constitu tion significantly and to write into it a number of useful additions, clarifications, and amendments."


The true extent of socialist democracy is seen from the fact that altogether some 400,000 proposals for amendments to individual articles have been made for the purpose of clarifying, improving and supplementing the wording of the draft.


In early October 1977, at the Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was addressed by Leonid Brezhnev, the new Constitution was adopted. Compared with the draft which had been published a few months before, it incorporated amendments to 110 articles and an additional article, as proposed by the Constitu tion Commission, as well as amendments and additions proposed by the deputies in the course of deliberations at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.


Speaking about the importance of the new Constitu tion, Leonid Brezhnev emphasised that "it, one might say, epitomises the whole 60 years' development of the Soviet state".


The Constitu tion reflected the political, social and economic changes carried out over that period. "During the past four decades deep-going changes have taken place in our country and in the whole of our society," Brezhnev said. "When the 1936 Constitu tion was adopted, we had essentially just completed laying the foundations of socialism. What we now have in the Soviet Union is an advanced, mature socialist society."


Developed socialism, Brezhnev said, is "that stage of maturity of the new society at which the restructuring of the entire system of social relations on the collectivist principles intrinsic to socialism is being completed. Hence, the full scope for the operation of the laws of socialism, for bringing to the fore its advantages in all spheres of the life of society. Hence, the organic integrity and dynamic force of the social system, its political stability, its indestructible inner unity. Hence, the closer drawing together of all the classes and social groups, all the nations and nationalities, and the formation of a historically new social and international community, the Soviet people. Hence, the emergence of a new, socialist culture, the establishment of a new, socialist way of life. Of course, only that socialist society can be described as developed which is based on powerful, advanced industry, on large-scale, highly mechanised agriculture, which in practice permits an increasingly complete satisfaction of the varied requirements of citizens to become the central and direct goal of social development."


As a result of the complete triumph of the socialist social relations, the Soviet state, which arose as a dictatorship of the proletariat, has developed into a state of the whole people.


Describing these changes and referring to what today distinguishes our society, Leonid Brezhnev said, "New harmonious relations, relations of friendship and co-operation, have taken shape between classes and social grou ps, nations and nationalities, du ring the years of socialist construction, in joint labour, in the struggle for socialism, and in the battles fought in its defence. All the nations of the Soviet Union demonstrate this monolithic unity by their labour and by their approval of the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." He then underscored one of the most important features of Soviet society. "A new historical community, the Soviet people, has taken shape in our country," he said. "It rests on the inviolable alliance of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, with the working class piaying the leading role, and on the friendship of all nations and nationalities of the country."


The phrase "a new historical community, the Soviet people" does not mean that national distinctions have disappeared or are ignored in the Soviet Union, let alone that there has been a merging of nations. "The Soviet people's social and political unity," Leonid Brezhnev explained, "does not at all imply the disappearance of national distinctions. Thanks to the consistent pursuance of the Leninist nationalities policy we have, simultaneously with the construction of socialism, successfully solved the nationalities question, for the first time in history. The friendship of the Soviet peoples is indissolu ble, and in the process of building comm u nism they are steadily drawing ever closer together and are being mu tually enriched in their spiritual life. But we would be taking a dangerous path if we were artificially to step up this objective process of national integration."


The more than 100 nations and nationalities inhabiting the Soviet U nion have retained their peculiarities, their national features, their languages and their finest traditions. They have every opportunity for attaining a still greater developmen t of their national cultures. At present, for example, practically all languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union are written, literary languages, whereas prior to the revolution, literature developed in only thirteen languages, and even so, the possibilities of progress for most of them were extremely limited.


At the same time another aspect typical of Soviet people should be borne in mind. The Soviet people are not simply an aggregate of nations living side by side in one state. Whatever their nationality, the Soviet people have many common features which unite them as an entity. These features are a common ideology, a common historical destiny and joint work, similar social and economic conditions, basic interests and aims, and a developing unity of Soviet socialist culture which absorbs all the real values inherent in each of the national cultures.


As Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet nations are now more closely united than ever. National cultures are thriving and enriching one another, and we are witnessing the moulding of the culture of the whole Soviet people--a new social and international community. In our country this process is taking place as it should take place under socialism--on the basis of equality, fraternal co-operation and free will.


All the nations and nationalities of our country, and, above all, the great Russian people, have played their part in the formation, consolidation, and development of the mighty union of equal nations that have taken the road of socialism, noted Leonid Brezhnev. "The revolutionary energy, unselfishness, diligence and profound internationalism of the Russian people havejustly won them the sincere respect of all the other peoples of our socialist homeland."


In developed socialist society, a socialist state of the whole people, the leading role is played by the working class.


Once a worker himself, Brezhnev has never broken his ties with his class. He has always shown and continues to show concern for the working people, and their work is accorded honour and respect.


At the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 Brezhnev said that "the working class plays an ever larger role in the life of society. It is growing numerically. Today nearly 80 million people, or two-thirds of the employed population, are workers. This means that in our country the working class is not only the largest class numerically but constitutes the majority of the working people. The proportion of workers is steadily growing in party, trade union and Komsomol committees and in higher and local government bodies."


Unquestionably, the consolidation of the leading role played by the working class is linked to the rise of its ideological, political, educational, and professional level. Ten years ago only a little more than half of the workers had a secondary ( 10 or 8 years) or higher education, while by the early 1980s their share was already three-quarters. The vocational training of the young people who are to replenish the working class is improving. In the 1960s only one-third of our you ng men and women learned a trade at vocational schools, bu t in the period of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone trades were learned by 12,500,000 persons, that is to say, by two-thirds of the workers who entered prod uction. The very character of the labou r of the modern worker is changing-becoming more and more intellectual.


The working class has been and remains the main productive force in society. It enhances its leading role as its general culture, its level of education, and its political activity increase.


All the classes and social groups of society are coming closer together in the Soviet Union. This is an objective but by no means a spontaneous process. Here a significant role is played by the social policy pursued by the party and the government. Their aim is to create a society in which people will not be divided into classes.


With the industrialisation of agriculture far-reaching changes are taking place in the life of the collective farmers. Step by step their labour is becoming similar to that of factory workers. The number of machine operators and other workers using advanced technology is growing in rural areas. It is not surprising, therefore, that the proportion of collective farmers with a secondary ( 10 or 8 years) or higher education has grown from 39 to over 60 percent in the 1970s.


Transformations in rural life lead to what Lenin termed the erasu re of the distinctions in the social status of the worker and the peasant.


Work by hand and work by brain are fusing ever more closely in the prod uction activity of millions of workers and collective farmers. Many of them are innovators and inventors, authors of articles and books, statesmen and pu blic figures. They are highly cultivated people, intellectual in the true sense of the word.


In evaluating the experience of our society's development over the past few decades, Leonid Brezhnev says, we can assume that a classless structure of society will take shape mainly within the historical framework of matu re socialism.

\section{Socialist Democracy Is Genuine Democracy}


Few statesmen have had the experience of working in elective offices that Brezhnev has. This is a very significant fact. He has served at all levels of representative democracy, from deputy of the district and city Soviet to Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR-that is, the President of the country.


In his capacity as top party and state leader Brezhnev devotes much attention to the development of socialist democracy. "Now we know not only from theory bu t from years of practice that just as real democracy is impossible without socialism, so is socialism impossible without the constant development of democracy," Brezhnev said. "We understand the improvement of our socialist democracy, above all, as the continuously increasing involvement of the working people in managing all the affairs of society, as the further development of the democratic foundation of our statehood, as the creation of conditions for the all-round development of the individ ual."


The base of the socialist state and the fullest embodiment of its democratic nature are the organs of people's rule, the Soviets of People's Deputies: the town and village Soviets, the district and area Soviets, the Soviets of People's Depu ties of the autonomous regions, the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics, the territorial and regional Soviets of People's Depu ties, the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, and, finally, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.


A Law on the Status of the Deputy has been adopted in the Soviet Union. It clearly defines the rights and duties of deputies, as well as the duties of state and social bodies with respect to deputies. The Soviet state guarantees each deputy the necessary conditions for the unhampered and effective exercise of his rights and duties. Persons who prevent a deputy from exercising his powers or encroach on his honour and dignity as a representative of state authority are responsible before the law. Depu ties of the Supreme Soviets have the right to initiate legislation. At present many important issues are raised and resolved on the initiative of the deputies of the Soviets. "The proposals being pu t forward by the deputies on the basis of mandates from their electors," Brezhnev said, "reflect the requirements and needs of our people as a whole."


These mandates are an expression of the most diverse requirements of the population, reflecting the concrete interests ofindividual groups of working people and of society as a whole. That is why fulfilment of these mandates is an important part of the work of the Soviets and of their deputies, Brezhnev stated in his report to the Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 4, 1977. "Suffice it to say that in the past 2 years alone more than 700,000 electors' mandates have been fulfilled. That is one of the real expressions of socialist democracy. It is important that not only depu ties bu t also the heads of enterprises, collective farms, construction projects and offices should give due attention to the carrying out of mandates."


In response to the suggestions made in the course of the discussion the new Constitution contains an article which says, "Electors give mandates to their deputies. The appropriate Soviets of People's Depu ties shall examine electors' mandates, take them into account in drafting economic and social development plans and in drawing up the budget, organise implementation of the mandates, and inform citizens about it."


This gives a very good idea of Soviet reality. A deputy is duty-bou nd to heed the voice of his constituents. In the past 5 years more than 1,800,000 mandates of the electors concerning various aspects of economic and cultural development, pu blic education and health protection, trade and food catering, the municipal services and the service industry have been translated into reality with the deputies' direct participation.


As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, a new phase commenced in the work of the Soviets of People's Depu ties with the adoption of the Constitu tion of the USSR and then of the constitu tions of the Union and autonomous republics.


There has been a noticeable invigoration of the work of the highest bodies of state authority-the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviets of the repu blics. By coupling legislation, administration and supervision, the Supreme Soviets actively guide the work of the Councils of Ministers, the ministries and the departments. This helps to identify and eliminate shortcomings in good time and adds to the general vitality of state life.


An immensely beneficial effect is prod uced by the present renewal of Soviet legislation on the basis of the Constitu tion. New laws are making it possible to regulate various aspects of social relations with greater precision and accuracy.


New, more effective legislation designed to improve health protection, strengthen family ties, further improve labour relations and protection of the environment, and ensure rational use of natural resources has been adopted in recent years. According to Brezhnev's speech at the 26th CPSU Congress, the work of perfecting legislation will continue. Here there are three priority areas: management of the national economy, the exercise by citizens and public organisations of their constitu tional rights and completion of the publication of the Code of Laws of the USSR.


Referring to the nature of the present Fundamental Law of the country, Leonid Brezhnev noted that the main purpose of everything new it contains is designed to broaden and deepen socialist democracy. Now that the Soviet Union has completed the construction of a developed socialist society, we are in a position to improve substantially the clauses of the Constitu tion dealing with the rights of Soviet citizens. The famous lines from the \emph{M anifesto} ef \emph{the Communist Party} by Marx and


Engels-"The free development of each person is the condition for the free development of all"-have, in fact, become the fundamental principle of the Soviet state. This has been inserted in the Constitu tion, which has a special clause proclaiming the general principle of equality of all Soviet citizens irrespective of nationality or race. With the u tmost clarity the Constitu tion consolidates socialism's gains in such an important matter as ensuring equal rights to women and men.


Leonid Brezhnev noted that the 1936 Constitu tion also guaranteed a broad range of socio-economic rights bearing directly on the very foundations of life. But now their content has been deepened and enriched, and the material guarantees made are even more clearly defined. This is reflected in the new Constitu tion. If, for example, it was said that the people had the right to work, now this is supplemented with the right to choose a trade or profession, the type of job and work in accordance with the vocation, ability, training and education of the citizen and, what is no less important, with due account taken of the needs of society.


Here is another principle. The 1936 Constitu tion guaranteed the right to social maintenance in the event of illness or disability. The new Constitu tion treats the question more widely by guaranteeing Soviet citizens the right to health protection. While the right to education was referred to in general terms, now the reference is to universal, compulsory secondary education and to broad development of vocational, specialised secondary, and higher education.


A new principle has been introd uced, namely, the right to housing. This right is ensured to an ever-increasing extent through the implementation of the programme of housing construction and through state assistance in building co-operative housing and individual dwellings. Brezhnev pointed out that our new Constitution will be one of the first in the world to proclaim this vital human right.


The Constitu tion more fully and concretely defines the political rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, including the right of every Soviet citizen to take part in the management and administration of state and public affairs, and list the concrete forms of such participation.


The freedoms of speech, press, assembly, meetings and street processions and demonstrations inscribed in the old Constitu tion are fully confirmed in the new Constitu tion. The former constitu tional guarantees of individual rights have been largely supplemented by the right of citizens to submit proposals to state bodies and pu blic organisations, to criticise shortcomings in their work, and by the right of citizens to protection by the courts against encroachments on their life, and health, personal freedom, and property, honour and reputation. The Constitu tion states that persecu tion for criticism is prohibited.


Persons guilty of such persecu tion shall be called to account.


Naturally, the Constitution proceeds from the assumption that enjoyment by citizens of their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests of society or the state or infringe the rights of other citizens. Citizens' exercise of their rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of their duties and obligations.


Our 'critics' pretend to be unaware of the fact that the clauses in the Constitution causing their dissatisfaction fully conform to fundamental international documents, Leonid Brezhnev said. "Let us remind them of this fact: the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights says unequivocally that 'everyone has duties to the communi ty in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible' and that the exercise of rights and freedoms by citizens requires 'due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just req uirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.' "


The broadening and deepening of human rights in the new Constitu tion upset the fabrications of those Western propagandists who misinterpret this issue and turn it inside out. In Brezhnev's opinion such "operations" and campaigns are attempts to weaken the socialist community and undermine the socialist system. "Our enemies would like nothing better than to find forces of any kind that oppose socialism in our countries," Brezhnev said. "And since such forces do not exist, for there are no oppressed, exploited classes and no oppressed, exploited nationalities in a socialist society, they invent a substitu te and by means of specious advertising create the semblance of an 'internal opposition' in the socialist countries. Hence, the noise about the so-called 'dissidents' and the outcries about alleged violations of human rights in the socialist countries.


What is there to say on this score? he went on. "It is not forbidden in our society to 'dissent' from the majority and to be critical of some aspect of social life. We regard comrades whose well-grounded criticism is designed to be of help as honest critics and are grateful to them. And we regard those who criticise groundlessly as mistaken.


It is another matter if a handful of people who have broken away from our society actively come out against the socialist system and embark on anti-Soviet activities, violate laws, and, lacking support inside the country, seek help from abroad, from subversive imperialist propaganda and intelligence centres. . . . Quite naturally we take and shall continue to take those measures against them which are in keeping with our law.


A distinctive feature of the new Constitution is that it includes for the first time a section on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.


It says that the Soviet state steadfastly pu rsues a Leninist policy of peace and stands for strengthening of the security of nations and broad international co-operation. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at ensuring international conditions favourable for building communism in the Soviet Union, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In the Soviet Union war propaganda is banned.


The Soviet Union is the first state which has included in its Constitution the ten principles governing relations between states which constitute the core of the Final Act of the conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.


Our new Constitu tion, said Leonid Brezhnev, "shows most convincingly that the first state of victorious socialism has for all time inscribed on its banner the word 'peace' as the highest principle of its foreign policy, meeting the interests of its own people and all the other peoples of our planet."


\emph{Trade Unions in the Life of Soviet Society}


The Constitution of the USSR, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "has greatly enhanced the role of public organisations in the development of our democracy. The largest of these are the trade \textbf{unions.''}


The Constitution includes a clause concerning the role of work collectives. Brezhnev noted that this was consistent with the fundamental course of the party and the significance it attaches to the development of democratic principles in production management.


The trade unions are the biggest mass social organisation of Soviet people. It has a membership of about 130 million; i.e., it embraces almost the entire working class, the intelligentsia and the large contingent of the agricultural population. Having admitted millions of collective farmers to their ranks, the trade unions now unite virtually all the working people.


Not everybody abroad has a clear idea of the role played by the trade unions in the life of the Soviet people and in communist construction.


Their status differs greatly from that of the trade unions in capitalist countries, and they, as Brezhnev observed, "are given an important place in the life of our society". The Soviet trade unions are operating in a socialist society and this determines their essential nature.


The trade u nions have the task, above all, of protecting the rights and interests of the working people and actively dealing with everyday social questions, Brezhnev said. "But they would be unable to do much in this sphere if prod uction did not develop and iflabour discipline and labour prod uctivity did not rise. It is precisely because our trade u nions are dedicated to the workingman's interests that their du ty is to show concern for boosting prod uction."


One of the main and distinctive features of Soviet trade unions is that they directly and actively participate in the development of the whole of society and in the management of the economy.


Being a key link in the general system of socialist democracy, they draw the working people into the administration of the state. They take part in working out solutions to many problems of the development of the national economy, ranging from the elaboration of state plans to the management of each enterprise.


The trade unions take a direct part in the management of prod uction. There are more than seventy functions of management that cannot be performed without the consent of the trade-union commit tees; twenty functions are totally within the competence of the unions.


They play an important role in the production and social activi ties of the personnel at industrial enterprises, construction sites and offices, and they participate in their administration through permanently functioning prod uction conferences.


It is necessary to encourage heads of production associations and enterprises, as well as leading ministerial officials, regularly to report directly to the workers on the work done, said Brezhnev.


In addition to wage issues and incentives, social insurance comes within the competence of the trade unions. The unions have considerable funds and resources at their disposal for organising leisure and recreation facilities, treatment at sanatoriums and health resorts, tourism, physical training and sports. Furthermore, they are concerned with improving all the aspects of the working people's living conditions and public catering.


The state has assigned to the trade u nions part of the general state budget that is earmarked for social insurance. The unions themselves draw up the social insurance budget and control its distribution. In 1980 this budget was set at 34,500 million roubles (6.6 percent more than in


1979 and more than double the funds allotted to defence) . The social insurance budget provides the funds for sick benefits, whole or partial cost of accommodation at health and holiday resorts, accommodation for patients at preventive treatment centres and various other benefits. Add ressing the 16th Congress of the Trade Unions, Leonid Brezhnev said, "The trade unions have a rich arsenal of forms and means to exercise their right-workers' meetings, permanently functioning production conferences and collective agreements. They have the right of legislative initiative. In a word, the trade unions have many rights and opportunities." He made the point that they should be used more fully and effectively.

\section{The Soviet Youth}


Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev often addresses you ng people. This is natural enough. Young men and women under 26 constitute half the population of the Soviet Union. It is indeed a "young country".


The Central Committee and Brezhnev personally pay much attention to youth problems. "It may be said withou t exaggeration," he emphasised, "that no major matter is decided withou t the participation of the youth, whether it concerns the affairs of the Soviet Union, a region, a district, or the personnel of an enterprise."


The growing thirst of young people for fruitful creative work and their wish to turn it into a vital prime necessity are a progressive trend in the development of the Soviet society.


Brezhnev takes all these features of the younger generation into account in all his activities. "It has always been in the Communist tradition to trust the young people," he said, "to rely on their inherent enthusiasm and noble desire to work for the common weal, and at the same time to help them correctly orientate themselves in life and to arm them with the knowledge and experience of the older generations."


Young people in the Soviet U nion have their own organisation, the Young Communist League, or for short the Komsomol, which has a membership of more than 40 million members. The Komsomol, says Brezhnev, performs a colossal amount of work. In this organisation the young people receive their political education. They are tempered on construction projects, in factories and on state or collective farms, in higher educational institu tions, and in students' building teams that work in the most diverse spheres of the economy during vacations. "The most important, the central task of the YCL," said Leonid Brezhnev, speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "is to help form the rising generation into politically active, knowledgeable people, who like and know how to work and are always prepared to defend their country." "Let us recall the many good initiatives the Komsomol has carried into effect," said Leonid Brezhnev. Among them the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway and the high-priority Komsomol construction projects, assistance in land-improvement and ru ral construction projects in the Non-Black Soil Zone of the Russian Federation and many others.


Brezhnev reminds the young people that the tasks they face now are those of the higher school of socialist economics rather than the elementary school of socialist economic management that faced the country in the past. The most important thing today is to acquire up-to-date knowledge and promote scientific and technical progress.


In the Soviet Union exceptional importance is attached to the development of education, including higher education. The all-round development of you ng people in higher schools is based on an organic combination of education and training designed to bring up educated, ideologically tempered and spiritually mature young men and women. Since the establishment of Soviet power the country has built up an extensive network of higher and specialised secondary educational establishments which have trained nearly 40 million skilled specialists. Annually 800,000 people graduate from institu tions of higher learning. During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-85) the higher educational establishments and technical colleges will graduate approximately another 10 million young men and women.


Brezhnev called on the students to strive for the summits in their professions. "The loftiest beacon in study," he said, "should be the demands which life makes today on a Soviet specialist, on an active participant in commu nist construction."


On Brezhnev's initiative the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet U nion and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted a decision on the further improvement of general secondary schools, the system of vocational and technical training, and higher and specialised secondary education.


At the dawn of socialism Lenin dreamed of seeing our homeland become a country of universal literacy, he said several years ago. "We solved this task long ago. Now we have reached new horizons and are completing the transition to universal secondary education."


Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981, Brezhnev could note that this target had already been achieved: the transition to compulsory universal secondary education had been consummated.


In this field the Soviet Union has made spectacular progress. In the period from 1950 to 1975 the number of people with a 10-year education increased thirteenfold. In the 1979-80 academic year 44.2 million people were receiving general education.


The transition to universal secondary education is directly connected with the heightening of the role of the school. Brezhnev devotes special attention to the need to bring the substance of secondary education into greater conformity with the present-day requirements of science, technology and culture.


Young people are enthusiastically tackling these tasks because the future is in their hands. National contests in physics, chemistry, and mathematics in which millions of school-children participate with great interest have become a tradition. Throughout the country there are societies of senior-grade pupils and centres of you ng technicians and natu ralists.


Since all education is free, all people have access to it.


By the end of 1980 the number of people with a higher or secondary education in the USSR amounted to about 146 million, representing an increase from 65 percent of the gainfully employed population in 1970 to 83 percent in 1980.


At the 26th CPSU Congress Brezhnev noted that in the USSR today one in every four workers is mainly involved in mental work. The intellectuals are playing an increasingly significant role not only in science, education and culture, bu t also in material production. Soviet intellectuals see it as their vocation to devote their creative energies to the cause of building commu nist society.

\section{The Increasing Role ef Science}


Being himself an engineer and an experienced statesman and party leader, Brezhnev has always paid a great deal of attention to promoting the development of science and technology. "The Communist Party," Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "proceeds from the premise that building up a new society without science is simply inconceivable." His name is associated with many achievements in this field.


The life-giving wellspring of technical, economic and social progress, the growth of the people's spiritual culture, and its well-beingthat is what science means to us today. That is how the General Secretary assesses the significance of science for Soviet society.


The Soviet people are genuinely proud of the Soviet Academy of


Sciences. "It is the party's policy to continue showing tireless concern for the promotion of science and for its headquarters, the Academy of Sciences, whose 250th anniversary was widely marked. In it is concentrated the flower of our science--venerable scholars, founders of scientific schools and trends, and the most talented you ng scientists blazing new trails to the pinnacles of knowledge. The party highly values the work of the academy and will enhance its role as the centre of theoretical research and the co-ordinator of all scientific work in the country."


The spreading of Soviet science is unprecedented; in the past decade the party has been giving close attention to the organisation of regional scientific centres.


This idea was prompted by the need for a more rational distribution of scientists and researchers throughout the vast Soviet Union, to link their effort closer to the local conditions of economic development and to concentrate material, manpower and financial resources. This idea splendidly expressed the needs of the evolving "science-industry agriculture" system in adequate organisational forms.


Scientific centres are being founded or have already been established in the Union Republics. In the Russian Federation there are several successfully developing scientific centres, including the Ural centre, the Far Eastern centre, six branches of the Academy of Sciences, etc.


All these scientific centres draw on the experience of one of the earliest and biggest of them-the world-famous Siberian Branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Founded in 1957, it has already played a tremendous part in promoting science and developing the productive forces of the Soviet Union, particularly in its eastern areas. The Siberian Branch engages in basic and applied research, and its links with industry and agriculture are becoming increasingly close. In 1978 the Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk centres of the Siberian Branch were founded.


The Academy of Sciences' network of institutions includes about 250 centres with 40,000 research workers. The Academy maintains ties with 250 international and national research centres and institutions.


The party expects the scientists, Brezhnev said, "to carry on deeper and bolder research into new processes and phenomena, actively to contribute to scientific and technical progress, searchingly to analyse the arising problems, and to come forward with responsible recommendations on the best ways of solving them in the interests of strengthening the country's might and improving the life of the people, in the interests of building communism."

\section{Economy: Results and Prospects}


One of the most important trends in the party's guiding activity is the elaboration of economic policy and the search for such forms of organisation and management of the economy as would best contribute to its growth, accelerate scientific and technical progress, and raise the living standard of the Soviet people.


The plenary meetings of the Central Committee and party congresses, which followed the October 1964 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted important decisions which steeply raised economic management to a qualitatively higher level.


For many years gross outpu t had been the criterion for assessing the economic activity of an industrial enterprise. Now i,ts performance was to be judged by the volume of sales and profits. Brezhnev, who initiated this change, emphasised that at the current stage the principles underlying the party's economic policy called for "greater emphasis on economic methods and incentives in management, a radical improvement of state planning, more economic independence of and initiative by industrial enterprises and state and collective farms, and an enhancement of their responsibility and larger material incentives for their work."


Experience confirmed the efficiency of the new system of planning and economic stimulation and its beneficial effect on the entire activity of enterprises. Their personnel became more interested in the results of their work, in getting better results with the least outlay of labour, in economising means and materials, in fuller utilisation of equipment and its timely modernisation. Rapid economic development brought to light ever new ways of improving management. In 1979 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted decisions on the further improvement of the economic mechanism and the planning system. "They have to be consistently put into effect," L. I. Brezhnev said. "And at the same time it is necessary to proceed further, solving the problems that have accumulated. It should be said in general that improving the organisation of management structures is a matter that does not tolerate rou tine. The living, developing organism of economic management cannot be adopted to established, customary forms. On the contrary, forms have to be made to fit the changing economic tasks. That is the only way the matter should be approached."


Inthe formulation of economic policy it is very important to take into account the basic features of each stage in the country's development. Brezhnev stressed this frequently. Comparing, for instance, the current economy with that of the end of the 1930s, he said that today it stands at a much higher level of development, as do socialist social relations and the culture and awareness of the masses. Now a developed socialist society, to which Lenin in 1918 referred as the future of the country, has already been built by force of the Soviet people's dedicated labour. This enabled them to undertake the practical and important taskthat of building the material and technical basis of communism.


The Soviet Union has made impressive headway in consolidating its economic might, and it has secured a considerable rise in the living standard.


It should be recalled that the Soviet Union sustained great losses during the war and the temporary occupation ofa part of its territory by the Hitlerites. They killed millions of civilians, and millions of Soviet soldiers laid down their lives on the battlefield. The nazis destroyed and plundered enormous material resources in the temporarily occupied territories. The enemy fully or partially demolished nearly 32,000 industrial enterprises; plu ndered 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms, and 2,890 machine-and-tractor stations; and destroyed tens of thousands of schools, hospitals, technical colleges, higher educational establishments and libraries. All told, the enemy plundered or destroyed material assets to the sum of 679 billion rou bles (in prewar prices) .


It seemed impossible even to think of rehabilitating the country, rebuilding the industry from the ground up and restoring agriculture in just a few years. But the Soviet people managed. Their heroism in labour was akin to their heroism in battle. L. I.Brezhnev vividly described this in his \emph{Rebirth.}


The social transformations carried out in the Soviet Union paved the way for swift progress in all spheres of life.


In 1977, the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, the country's potential was bigger than it had ever been. The national income in 1977 was almost 70 times higher than in tsarist Russia in 1913 and more than 100 times higher than in 1917.


In the late 1970s the Soviet Union's socialist industry turned out 145 times more than Russia's factories did in 1913 and 225 times more than in 1917. Today Soviet industry prod uces as much in 2 or 3 days as was produced in prerevolu tionary Russia in a year. In 1913 Russia ranked fifth in the world after the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France in industrial output, with the United States producing eight times as much as it did. And today, as was pointed out at the 26th CPSU


Congress, the Soviet Union is the world's largest prod ucer of many major items, such as petroleum, steel, cement, mineral fertiliser, wheat, cotton, electric and diesel railway engines. The USSR has the greatest number of lathes in the world and its industrial output exceeds that of the FRG, Great Britain and France combined.


Deep-going changes have been wrought in agriculture since the establishment of Soviet power. A large-scale collective-farm economy has been established. In the early period of socialist construction Lenin dreamed of providing farmers with 100,000 tractors. In the midseventies the collective and state farms had 2,400,000 tractors, 700,000 grain harvesters and almost 1,500,000 trucks. As a result, agricultural production in the year of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolu tion surpassed the 1913 and 1917 levels by 230 and 340 percent respectively.


In the 1970s the technical base of agricultu ral prod uction was strengthened considerably. There were advances in the chemicalisation, overall mechanisation and industrialisation of crop and livestock farming. To accomplish these by no means simple tasks, capital investments in the agricultural sector of the economy have been increased. In 10 years they exceeded 300,000 million roubles. This is 2.3 times as much as in the previous decade.


Intensification of farming has made it possible-even with fewer personnel-to achieve a steady rise in production. In the past 10 years production per hectare was 1.3 times greater than in the previous decade.


Another effect of the intensification has been a greater stability of farm production. Although 3 of the past 5 years were unfavourable, the grain harvest has averaged 205 million tons per year. The total agricultural prod uction in the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plan periods was 272,000 million roubles greater than in the previous two 5-year plan periods.


The entire Soviet Union has become a giant construction site. In the past decade work was continued on developing a major oil and gas base in the Tyumen and Orenburg regions, the Kami Autonomous Republic and the Uzbek and Turkmen Union Republics.


The gas industry is you ng but it is growing and gaining strength at a pace perhaps no other branch of the national economy can equal.Judge this for yourself: while in 1960 the gas fields of the whole country produced 45 billion cubic metres of gas, today the same amount is extracted annually in the Orenburg Region alone. The total production of gas in the Soviet Union in 1980 was in excess of 435 billion cubic metres.


A new iron-ore base for the iron-and-steel industry is being developed in the region of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly.


The world's biggest hydropower station at Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisei has gone into operation and attained its rated capacity. The Konakovo thermal power station near Moscow is also working at full capacity.


The construction of the Ladyzhinskaya and Estonian thermal power stations and the Saratov hyd ropower scheme has been completed, and the construction of a mighty system of hyd ropower plants on the great Siberian rivers is in progress.


Uniq ue hydropower units have been commissioned at the SayanShushenskoye, Ust-Ilimsk, Nurek, Inguri, Dnieper, Nizhnekamsk and other hyd roelectric stations. Giant thermal power stations have been completed at Zaporozhye and Uglegorsk.


The nuclear power industry is expanding at a fast rate. New power reactors have been put into operation at the Leningrad, Chernobyl, Kursk, Beloyarsk, Armenian and Bilibino nuclear power stations. The industry is getting powerful up-to-date machinery: Atommash, the main supplier of nuclear steam-generating installations, has started prod uction.


Following the completion in record time of the Volzhsky car plant, the work to bring up to rated capacity another giant, the heavy-d uty truck factory at Naberezhniye Chelny, on the banks of the Kama, is rapidly nearing completion.


The construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway is now in full swing. "This project is tremendously important," Leonid Brezhnev noted. "The Baikal-Amur Railway will cut through the age-old taiga, crossing areas with enormous wealth that must be put at the service of the country. . . . "


Characteristic of the 1970s were big changes in the location of productive forces. In pursuance of decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, territorial-industrial complexes are being formed in the European part of the Russian Federation, in the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.


A mounting role in the economy of the country's Asian part is being played by the Sayan, Bratsk-Ust-Ilimsk, South Yakutian, KaratauJambul, Mangyshlak and South Tajikistan territorial-industrial complexes.


The 26th CPSU Congress gave a powerful boost to the further development of the Soviet economy. The thoroughgoing report presented by Brezhnev contained not only an account and analysis of the work the party had done in the field of national economic development during the preceding 5 years bu t also the guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR for 1981-85 and the period up to 1990.


In their speeches the delegates noted the exceptionally businesslike and constructive nature of the report and emphasised that it opened up good prospects for the further development of the Soviet economy and solving the problems it faced.


In his report Brezhnev pointed out that the results of national economic development had convincingly confirmed the correctness of the party's economic strategy. The country had made substantial progress in all sectors towards creating the material and technical basis of communism. The productive forces of Soviet society had reached a qualitatively new level. Scientific and technical revolu tion was developing in depth and in bread th, bringing fundamental changes in many enterprises and whole industries. Soviet scientific research occupied a position of leadership in vitally important areas of knowledge. The country's economic might was a reliable guarantee of further progress on the road of communist construction.


The 1970s saw a steady growth of the heavy industry, Brezhnev continued. Electric power generation had doubled compared with the 1960s. The country's metallurgy had been further reinforced. There had been appreciable quantitative and qualitative changes in the chemical and petrochemical industries.


The report provided also an in-depth analysis of the situation in other branches of the economy and concrete proposals for their further development.


Brezhnev dwelt extensively on tasks of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period.


A few months previously the CPSU Central Committee put out the Draft Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-85 and the Period Ending in 1990. Inaccordance with the principles of socialist democracy it was submitted for broad discussion in which more than 121 million people took part. The Draft was fully approved and supported by the working class, collective farmers and intelligentsia. Many useful suggestions, additions and amendments were submitted.


As the result of this broad, truly national discussion the party and the nation came to the conclusion that "the central objective of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan is to ensure the further improvement of the Soviet people's well-being on the basis of the steady and constructive development of the national economy, accelerated scientific and technological progress, the transition of the economy to the road of intensive development, the more rational u tilisation of the country's prod uction potential, the maximum saving of all types of resources, and an improvement in the quality of work."


The Congress fully shared this approach.


Speaking on the major aspects of economic policies, on problems that extend to all spheres of the national economy Brezhnev said that the most important of them was to complete the switchover to primarily intensive development. Making the economy more intensive and efficient


-if translated into the language of practical deeds-consisted above all in having the prod uction output grow faster than the input, in achieving more while employing relatively smaller resources in prod uction. The planning, the scientific and technological and the structural policy had to be subordinated to solving this problem. Economic methods and management policy likewise had to contribute to efficiency.


Brezhnev's words that Soviet people look to the future with confidence were received by the delegates with stormy, prolonged applause.


The far-reaching plans for the Soviet country's development and the building of a new, communist society are implemented by ordinary peoplethe industrial workers, farmers and intellectuals. They do this work efficiently, taking it as something natural, as a matter of course. Brezhnev speaks about them with pride: "It has long been observed that an endless succession of days that look very much alike, and everyday, routine work with which all of us are pre-occupied frequently prevent us from appreciating in full measure the significance and scale of developments around us. Even space-flights have become commonplace and routine, to say nothing of the commissioning of new plants or, say, people moving into newly built residential areas. It seems that this is the way it should be. Indeed, Comrades, this is the way it should be, because every morning dozens of millions of people begin their regular and most ordinary working day: they take their places at their lathes, descend into the pits, go to the fields, pore over the microscopes, calculations or diagrams. Most likely, they do not think of the grandeur of what they are doing but it is they who in carrying out the plans mapped out by the party take the Soviet country to ever greater heights of progress. When we refer to our time as the time of great accomplishments we pay tribu te to those who made it such-to the working people."

\section{Everything for the Benefit of Man}


"To create for the workingman the most favourable conditions for


labour, study, rest, for the development and the best possible application of his abilities, Brezhnev says, ""is the main aim and meaning of the policy which our party consistently pursues."" The supreme goal of the economic policy of the CPSU is to ensure the maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the people. And it is with good reason that the phrase ""everything for the sake of man, for the benefit of man,"" written down in the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has become a catchword in our country."


For many years in their heroic history millions of Soviet people consciously accepted hardships and privations; they were satisfied with bare essentials and did not consider themselves entitled to demand special comforts.


The country's steady economic growth has created new opportunities for further enhancing the well-being of the Soviet people, improving their working and living conditions, achieving considerable progress in health service, education and culture, in everything that helps mould the new man, the all-round development of the personality and the perfection of the socialist way of life.


A characteristic feature of Soviet reality is that there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union. The last of the unemployed got a job back in the early 1930s. Since then the Soviet people have completely forgotten the labour exchange and what it means to be dismissed. They have confidence in the future and know that the right to work recorded in the Constitu tion is a reality.


The very development of Soviet society shows how this course, designed to raise the well-being of the people to a still higher level, is translated into reality.


As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, the growth of Soviet economic might made it possible to accomplish a sweeping programme of improving the people's well-being in the 1970s. The sum of 32,000 million roubles was allocated for nationwide measures to increase wages and salaries, pensions, allowances and so forth. Each of these measures is a real and tangible step forward in the direction most important to us-that of improving the Soviet people's life. A general indicator of progress in this field is the growth ofreal incomes-i.e. of the sum total of material benefits and services enjoyed by the people. In 15 years, from 1961 to 1975, the real \emph{per capita} income has roughly doubled. Brezhnev stated with pride that the figure reflected a fundamental change in the level and mode oflife of the people and that it was a sort of revolu tion in their well-being.


The most important factor contribu ting to the growth of each family's real income is the rapid rise in wages, the principal source of benefits under socialism. Inthis period the average wages of industrial and office workers rose by nearly 100 percent and the remuneration of the collective farmers by more than 200 percent.


The continuous development of this process is borne out by the fact that during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, as Leonid Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, there was a new rise in the minim um pay and in the wages and salaries of the medium-income industrial and office workers in all branches of the national economy. In 1980 the average monthly wage was nearly 1.4 times the 1970 figure.


Stable prices of basic consumer goods are typical of the Soviet U nion. The prices of bread, meat, sugar, milk, potatoes and many other food products in state shops are the same as over 10 years ago.


Electricity and gas charges and subway, tramcar and trolleybus fares have not been changed for about 30 years. As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "One of the most noteworthy features of the Soviet way oflife is the growth of the benefits that people get from social consumption funds. During the past 5 years they have increased by nearly one-third and this year alone they will amount to 121,500 million roubles. This is an enormous sum of money. It is spent on improving the living conditions of the people, on protecting their health, and on education, the upbringing of children, social security and culture."


In recent years there has been a sharp growth in payments out of social maintenance funds-of allowances in case of illness and childbirth--and, especially, of various pensions. The pension age in the Soviet Union-55 for women and 60 for men-is noticeably lower than in many other countries.


By early 1980 the number of pensioners in the Soviet Union reached 48,700,000. Large sums are allocated for the payment of pensions. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan envisages raising the minimum levels of old-age and disability pensions for wage and salary earners and collective farmers and of pensions to compensate for the loss of the breadwinner; further levelling out of the social security offered to collective farmers and employees of state enterprises; gradually bringing the size of earlier established pensions closer to the level of the pensions currently awarded to those possessing similar qualifications. A further improvement in the living conditions of the Great Patriotic War veterans is also planned.


It is common knowledge that free medical service is available to all in the Soviet Union. "No social task is more important than concern for the health of the Soviet people," Leonid Brezhnev says. One of the most striking indicators of the accelerated development of health protection is the growth of its material and organisational basis and, above all, the number of doctors and the population under their care. While in the last prewar decade the number of doctors increased on an average by 10,000 a year, and in the period from 1951 to 1960 by 17,000, over the tenth 5-year period their number grew from 834,000 to 1 million. The accelerated growth in the number of doctors has made it possible to improve considerably the public health service. Inthe early 1950s there were on an average 650 to 700 people per doctor in the Soviet Union, ten years later 500, and in the late 1970s approximately 300 people. The number of hospital beds per 10,000 population rose from 118 to 125 over the Tenth Five-Year Plan period.


With the cost of medical treatment rising sharply because of the development and widespread use of sophisticated medical equipment, the lengthening treatment courses, and the appearance of new and more complicated ailments, free medical care is coming to play a particularly significant role in the life of society.


The Soviet people receive social and cultural services either free of charge or at reduced cost; in addition, they get many extremely important material benefits. Such forms of raising the well-being of the people play an immense role, particularly in solving one of the most complicated social problems-namely, the problem of housing.


The housing problem which our country inherited from capitalism became even more acute owing to the rapid urbanisation that began in the 1930s, and it reached a critical level in the 1940s and 1950s as a result of wartime destruction.


From the 1950s to the 1970s Soviet society made a tremendous effort to solve the housing problem. Inthe period from 1956 to 1976 the state, as well as the population with the help of state grants and loans, built more than 47 million homes (apartments and cottages) .


It should be borne in mind that housing construction in the Soviet Union is mainly state-financed and that the rent is very low. Itis, in fact, lower than in any other country and constitu tes on an average approximately 4 percent of the family budget, including the charges for electricity, water, etc. Brezhnev drew attention to this fact when he said, "Rent has not changed in the Soviet Union since 1928, although the wages of industrial and office workers have increased several-fold in this period and the quality of housing has improved greatly. Rent and u tility charges do not cover even a third of the actual cost. Therefore the state annually allocates about 5 billion rou bles for housing and u tility services. And this practice will continue."


The gigantic scale of housing construction and the socially just distribution of housing give every reason to believe that the housing problem will be fully solved in the foreseeable future.


The state housing fund which constitutes the bulk of the newly built housing is distributed practically free, and its maintenance is paid for with the red uced rent, which covers less than a third of the actual costs, while the state takes care of the rest of the sum. This system makes it possible to provide all sections of the population with comfortable homes. It is noteworthy that in the past two decades the overwhelming majority of the population either moved into new apartments or received additional space in old houses.


The Soviet Union occupies one of the top places in the world for the number of apartments built per 1,000 population.


In the Tenth Five-Year Plan period 50 million Soviet people had their housing conditions improved. As much as 530 million square metres of housing have been built.


As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "More housing was built in the 1970s than the entire stock of urban housing that existed at the beginning of the 1960s. The scale of housing construction is, Comrades, a great social achievement of ours."


High rates of housing construction are envisaged for the future too; the figures for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period are 530-540 million square metres.


Says Brezhnev, "We have not yet attained communism. But the whole world sees that our party's activities and its aspirations are aimed at doing everything necessary for the benefit of man, for the sake of man. It is this supreme and humane goal of the party that gives it kinship with the people, creates firm and indissoluble bonds between it and all the Soviet people."

\section{Development ef Foreign Economic Relations}


Among the key economic objectives there is one acqumng everincreasing importance-promotion of foreign economic relations. This is a direct result of the rapid growth of our economy, of the far-reaching changes taking place in the world, and of the success of the policy of peace and \emph{detente.} Brezhnev attaches great importance to these ties. "We regard foreign economic relations as an effective help to carry out political and economic tasks," he says. "The might and cohesion of the community of socialist countries have been growing stronger through economic integration. Co-operation with the developing states is facilitating the restructuring of their economy and social life on progressive principles. Lastly, economic, scientific and technical ties with the capitalist states are consolidating and broadening the material basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence."


Brezhnev emphasises the importance of promoting new forms of foreign economic ties and notes that they "greatly enlarge our possibilities and, as a rule, yield the greatest effect. I have in mind, among other things, compensation agreements under which new enterprises, belonging entirely to our state, are built in co-operation with foreign firms. We are granted credits, equipment and licences, and we pay for this with part of the output of these or other enterprises."


Inthe 1970s, the Soviet Union was active in the international division of labour. Suffice it to say that our country's foreign trade turnover increased almost four times in that period and reached 80,300 million roubles in 1979.


Today, virtually each branch of domestic prod uction is to some extent connected to foreign trade. For example, the export share in the production of metal-cu tting machine-tools is 9.8 percent; of rolling mill equipment, 21 per cent; and of tractors, 11.5 percent.


Inthe Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the Soviet Union also increased the export of its traditional types of raw materials-petroleum, natural gas, coal, timber, etc. The implementation of compensation agreements has added such goods as ammonia, polyethylene, polystyrene and vinyl chloride to Soviet exports.


Under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union is to make still wider use of the opportunities offered by foreign economic ties for raising the efficiency of social production.


Itwas noted at the 26th Congress of the CPSU that the Soviet Union's course towards extensive development of international economic cooperation remains unchanged, for that is our course of principle, reflecting in international economic relations the purposeful dedication of Soviet foreign policy to preserving peace and deepening \emph{detente} and understanding among nations.

\part{Chapter 4. Working for World Peace}


Never yet in the history of humanity had so many workers for peace gathered at so representative a forum as the one in Moscow in October 1973. The delegates represented the majority of mankind-the working people, religious groups, the world of science, the political world, women and youth from 124 countries and all continents. The forum was never equalled in scale.


The 3,000 delegates gave a standing ovation to the man who strode vigorously across the stage of the giant Kremlin Palace of Congresses to the speaker's platform.


On his lapel glittered the golden badge of Lenin Peace Prize Lau reate, conferred on him a few months before for his tremendous role in normalising international relations and bringing about a change of course towards a relaxation of tensions and world peace.


The ovation at the World Congress of Peace Forces on that October day in 1973 was an acknowledgement of his services to all people of goodwill who cherish peace and abhor war.


In the audience were representatives of forty-nine socialist and social-democratic parties and of fifty-eight national-democratic and revolutionary-democratic parties and movements, members of seventyfour Christian-democratic, liberal, agrarian and other parties and of many pacifist and clerical organisations, and members of the business world and professional groups. About one-fourth of the delegates were Communists.


The audience included 233 members of parliaments, representatives of 308 different trade unions, 84 women's and 104 you th organisations, representing hund reds of millions of people.


Brezhnev's speech was frequently punctuated by applause. Sometime later the prominent Catholic Professor Rudolph Weiler, of the theological department of Vienna University, said, "In my view, the important speech made at the Congress by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, gives a precise definition of the issues on which a dialogue is possible between groups of different outlooks."


Brezhnev said that for many centuries people had never tired of condemning and cursing war. Nations longed for enduring peace, but in spite of this, the sinister glare of armed conflagrations big and small is reflected on every page of human history.


Neither lessons of history, he co'ntinued, nor what appeared as man's natural aversion to mu tual destruction could prevent new bloodbaths, for the forces of war, those who profited by it, were too powerful.


Today, the situation has changed radically. The anti-war drive rests on a firm basisthe power of the forces of peace, democracy, freedom and national independence.


The audience enthusiastically welcomed Brezhnev's appeal to make


\emph{detente} stable, dependable and, in the long run, irreversible.


Peace is a word that is cherished, has always been cherished. Regrettably, the twentieth century knows of virtually no time of quiet undisturbed by the roar of guns and unspattcred by the blood of innocent people in this or that corner of the world.

\chapter{1. On the Basis of Historical Experience}


Speaking at the World Congress of Peace Forces, Leonid Brezhnev recalled the words "Peace to the Nations", a slogan which had led the working people of our country to the October Revolution at the height of the First World War.


Addressing that historic document not only to the governments but also to the peoples of all countries, the workers' and peasants' government of Soviet Russia expressed our country's firm desire for a just and democratic peace, Brezhnev said. "I emphasise, a peace that is just, a peace that is democratic, that is, a peace based on respect for the rights and interests of all peoples. And in the years since the great October Revolution we have always steadily and consistently worked to bring about the triumph of just such a peace in the world."


On November 7, 1922, on the 5th anniversary of the October Revolution, the first peaceful year of the Soviet Republic, the newspaper \emph{Izvestia} published a drawing by the then still you ng and later highly prominent Soviet cartoonist Boris Yefimov. It was a full-length picture of a bricklt1,yer laying the bricks of the foundation of the new society on whose banner were inscribed the words "Peace and Fraternity of All Nations." The first brick represented 1918, the second 1919, the third 1920, the fourth 1921, and the fifth (still held by the worker) 1922.


The bricklayer with a trowel-the epitome of peaceful constructionsymbolised the most typical feature of that autumn of 1922, when the Soviet Union, the worker-peasant state that had proclaimed peace and fraternity among nations the immu table basis of its policy, was onlyjust being built under Lenin's leadership. And this in a country of which \emph{Pravda} wrote at the time: "Impoverished, ragged, and hungry, the workers' republic is celebrating the great day of its birth. For four years it was bathed in blood, fields of battle were strewn with the bones of its finest sons, and its last crumbs were sacrificed to ensure victory. Millions of its people are in the deadly grip of hunger. The stacks of hundreds of its factories are belching no smoke. The factory whistles are silent. . . . But the Red Republic stands firm on free land, its own land, having overcome countless hosts of enemies."


These few years were crucial years for the Soviet people.


The importance of the external factor for the development and the very survival of the world's first socialist worker-peasant state was emphasised by Lenin, its founder. "From the very beginning of the October Revolu tion," Lenin said, "foreign policy and international relations have been the main question facing us." It is no secret that Soviet Russia's successes were furthered by such international factors as its peaceful and internationalist foreign policy, the support it won among the world's progressive forces, and the mass struggles for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism, while acts of aggression, the interventions, the continuous danger of an imperialist attack and the hostile capitalist encirclement worked against it.


The Great October Socialist Revolu tion showed the unseverable connection between socialism and peace. "An end to wars, peace among the nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence-such is our ideal," Lenin said. Soviet Russia was the first country to withd raw from the World War of 1914-18, offering peace to all countries and peoples. It tore up and published all the secret treaties concluded by the Entente powers on dividing the territory of other countries.


Peace, Lenin pointed out, was the crucial condition for the advance of the revolu tion to the stage of peaceful construction and the building of the first socialist society in history.


But the breathing space won by Soviet Russia in 1917-18proved very short.


Joining hands with the counter revolutionaries in Russia, fourteen imperialist countries began a campaign, as Winston Churchill put it, to strangle Soviet power in "its cradle".


This was when all Soviet people learned for the first, but not the last, time that the mere wish for peace, no matter how heart-felt and strong, was not enough. They learned that peace had to be defended, that it had to be fought for, and that a flexible policy of principle, an active and purposeful diplomacy, a dependable rear and trustworthy allies were required to achieve it.


The intervention of the imperialist powers caused a great loss oflife, destruction and suffering. The Soviet government sought to end the war and establish peace with any power that displayed the same desire. Rejecting the calls of Trotskyites and "Left" Communists for an "unintermittent war" against the capitalist states, Lenin firmly declared this policy unacceptable for real Communists. To begin with, it meant that the sacrifices and losses of the peoples of all countries would multiply immensely, that entire states might be destroyed, and even that Soviet power would be lost. Revolu tion, as well as counter-revolution, cannot be exported. Every nation must decide its own future and determine its own system and way of life, depending primarily on the development and situation of its own country. Countering the advocates of "unintermittent war" between the socialist and the capitalist systems, Lenin formulated and elaborated the main aspects of the other alternative-the peaceful coexistence of the two systems and contention and competition between them in an environment of international peace. This alternative was ultimately approved and supported by the whole Communist Party and the Soviet people. The principle of peaceful coexistence thus became the cornerstone of socialist foreign policy and diplomacy.


Apart from the demands of the masses and apart from the humanitarian feeling, the ever broader recognition of this principle in world relations was motivated, as Lenin brilliantly predicted, by the development of increasingly deadly and destructive types of arms and by economic needs and interests. "There is a force greater than the wish, will and resolution of any of the hostile governments of classes," Lenin said. "It is the force of the common worldwide economic relations that compel them to establish relations with us."


As a faithful Marxist-Leninist, Brezhnev is working continuously for a dynamic foreign policy, for the further development of its basic principles to suit the progressive course of events, the actual realities and for the effectuation of Lenin's precepts. "The Soviet people," he stressed, "associate their understanding of a just peace and their view of a policy of peace with the name of our leader and teacher, the founder of our party and state, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. It was Lenin who for the first time in world history linked the theory of scientific communism with the practical conduct of a state's foreign policy. It was this alloy of Lenin's thoughts and Lenin's deeds that gave birth to the principles and of socialist policy in international affairs in which we, his disciples and successors, take guidance and will always take guidance."


Brezhnev emphasises that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a consistent policy of peace, security and international friendship. Socialism has no other aim but to serve the interests of the people. And what this aim implies, above all, is combating war, which, as Lenin said, is the greatest blight for the working people.


Brezhnev's boundless loyalty to the communist ideals, the leading one being work and peace, along with his own tremendous, often difficult, combat experience, have made him an active champion and exponent of Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence.

\chapter{1. Promoting the Policy of Peace}


In the postwar years Brezhnev took a most active part in high-level discussions of the major problems of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy as a member and then as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and as an alternate and then a full member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. This made him familiar with all the key problems of postwar international relations and gave him valuable experience in dealing with intricate foreign policy issues. He acquired a deep knowledge of the state of affairs in other countries and their position on the world scene, down to the details, first and foremost in relations to the Soviet Union.


After he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1960, he shouldered great and responsible duties.


His stay in office was marked by considerable activity in the sphere of foreign policy.


Brezhnev's first mission abroad as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was to the German Democratic Republic in September 1960. People in other socialist countries, too, got to know Brezhnev. He visited Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rulgaria and Yugoslavia. And his every meeting with the leaders and people of the socialist countries yielded a rich political and economic harvest and became an impressive demonstration of friendship.


Establishing friendly relations with the developing countries, sup-


Visiting the experimental fields of an agricultural research institute in the


Altai Mountains


Among Young Pioneen the city of Kiev


Visiting collective farmers in Turkmenia


At the World Congress of Peace Forces in 1973


Kepuonc, tlreznnev 1s presencea with a teddy-bear, symbol of Berlin, the country's capital


In Cuba


At a mass meeting in Delhi


With Urho Kekkonen


Receiving representatives of \emph{Keidanran,} the Japanese federation of economic organisations, in the Crimea


Receiving US and Soviet spacemen of the joint Apollo-Soyuz project,


Moscow, 1976


\textbf{With} Indira Gandhi, December 1980


The first sitting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet after Brezhnev's election as its President, June 17, 1977


At a polling station during elections to local Soviets, June 1977


Resting


With his great-granddaughter Galia


At a polling station with his wife


Addressing the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,


February 1981


In India, December 1980


With K. Waldheim in the Kremlin, May 5, 1981


Kiev, May 9, 1981 porting the struggle of their peoples against old and new colonialism and for complete political and economic independence, and helping them in their striving for progress and peace were an important area of Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium devoted utmost attention to ensuring that Soviet relations with the developing countries constantly progress along lines of equal, mutually beneficial, and all-round co-operation and friendship. In those years he visited Guinea, Ghana, Morocco and Sudan in Africa, paid a visit of friendship and peace to India, that great country in Southern Asia, and had been in Afghanistan and Iran. These visits helped strengthen the friendly ties between the Soviet Union and the developing countries of Africa and Asia. Here Brezhnev's activity went counter to the plans of the colonialists. During his state visit to Morocco they made a criminal attempt on his life. When flying over neutral waters, the plane of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was fired upon.


Faithful to Lenin's precepts, the Soviet Union sought relations of peaceful coexistence with all capitalist countries withou t exception, big or small.


At the end of September 1961 Brezhnev paid a state visit to Finland. The very fact of the visit showed the importance attached by the Soviet Union to the maintenance of good relations with that country. The visit had a beneficial effect on the further development of Soviet-Finnish good-neighbourly relations, which significantly helped strengthen peace in the northern part of the European continent. The personal acquaintanceship and continuous contacts between Brezhnev and Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, dating to 1961, became an important element of the good-neighbourly relations of the two countries.


Brezhnev took an active part in drafting many important foreignpolicy documents. It was under this chairmanship that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which was a step forward in the formidable undertaking of the physical and moral purging of the international climate of the more noxious cold-war miasma.

\chapter{2. Consistent Champion of Peaceful Coexistence}


The range of foreign-policy problems in which Brezhnev engaged grew much broader after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union elected him its First Secretary in October 1964. Many


\textbf{PFHL . I} duties in this field were also retained by him as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.


Brezhnev became First Secretary of the Central Committee at a time when the international situation had grown more complicated. The struggle of the two opposite trends in world affairs-the peaceful and the aggressive-had become more acute. World react.ion had redoubled its subversive activity against the socialist countries and the progressive regimes in an effort to split the socialist community, to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its allies and friends, and to isolate it on the world scene. International tension increased.


International affairs were harmfully affected at that time by the American aggression in Vietnam and by United States interference in the affairs of the Dominican Republic.


In Europe the revenge-seeking reactionary elements in the Federal Republic of Germany not only continued to refuse to recognise the results of the Second World War-the postwar European frontiers and the existence of the German socialist state, the German Democratic Republic-bu t also tried by various means to gain access to nuclear weapons, making use, as Brezhnev pointed out, of "the NATO plans of creating a 'multilateral nuclear force'."


In the Middle East, Israel launched what came to be known as the Six-Day War against the Arab states on June 5, 1967. The aggressor managed to occupy part of the territories of Egypt, Syria andjordan bu t failed in his main aim-a decisive victory that would enable him to saddle the Arab peoples with his own peace terms. "The situation in the Middle East," Brezhnev noted, "continues to be tense, and everything must be done to prevent the flames of war from blazing up again."


In these conditions mankind was asking whether the world would continue drifting towards war or whether there would be a turn for the better in the world situation.


Firmness and single-mindedness were required to counter the hostile designs. Also required were a continuous initiative and flexibility in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the acute international problems.


This was precisely the approach of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In so doing, the party, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Brezhnev personally devoted their primary attention to an all-round study and assessment of the basic objective and subjective factors and tendencies in world affairs.


These important and acute international problems were discussed at the Central Committee's plenary meetings in December 1966 and July 1967. The initiative in posing them came personally from Brezhnev, who saw to it that the party should always be abreast of world events and that Soviet foreign policy should be built on its collective opinion, experience, and approval, that it should always work in the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of world peace and progress.


The international activity of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev said, "is the cause of the whole people. It reposes on the economic and defensive power of the country, on its spiritual potential, on everything created by the Soviet people. Its successes are the fruit of the experience and knowledge, moral powers and strenuous work of many representatives of the party and the state: members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, Central Committee secretaries, members of the Central Committee, a large number of the Central Committee staff, staff members of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for Foreign Trade, the State Committee for Economic Relations, and other ministries and departments, high-ranking functionaries and staff members of the Central Committees of the republics, of territorial and regional committees, comrades from city and district committees, and primary party organisations in town and country. . . . In this context, important tasks are performed by members of the Soviet parliament, the central and local organisations of the Soviets, the trade unions and other public organisations, by people in science and culture, and, of course, by the press, radio and television. Thousands of Soviet people are employed abroad-in embassies and other missions and as geologists and builders, doctors and teachers, metallurgists and chemists, transport and other specialists."


Great importance in framing Soviet foreign policy was attached to profound scientific analysis of international relations and the situation in individ ual countries.


Soviet foreign policy took account of the fact that in some countries the ruling circles were obstinately trying, as they still do, to cond uct a blatantly hostile policy against the Soviet Union and its allies, while more realistic views were emerging in other countries, reflecting to one or another degree the alignment of world forces and true national interests.


In these conditions Brezhnev again called attention to the urgency and the good chances of directing international relations to the principles of peaceful coexistence and declared the Soviet Union's loyalty to these principles. "The Soviet Union followed and will continue to follow Lenin's policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems," Brezhnev said. "It is directed to averting a nuclear world war, to settling disputes between states by negotiation, to respecting the right of every people to choose its social and state systems and settle questions of its internal development by itself . . . Our country is for settling outstanding problems step by step and consolidating peace."


But peaceful coexistence, Brezhnev stressed, is not a simple absence of military operations or a lessening of the war danger. If the peaceful coexistence of states belonging to opposite social systems is to be stable, i t must also be based on co-operation and on mutual understanding, confidence and advantage. "Our policy is a policy of good relations and mutually beneficial co-operation with all states, and our relations with countries that are interested in it are improving from year to year," Brezhnev noted. " We attach great significance to business contacts and the development of relations with the main capitalist powers."


Not only political but also economic imperatives imposed on the capitalist states the policy of establishing and broadening commercial, financial, scientific and technical ties and exchanges with the socialist countries.


Projecting the thesis of the influence of economic factors on foreign policy, Brezhnev pointed to the set of important factors working in this direction. "One of the specific features of our time," he said, "is the increasing use of the international division oflabour for the development of every country irrespective of its wealth and economic level."


Brezhnev observed that there was an ever-more visible influence on the entire system of international relations by problems that concerned the interests of all mankind. "Today," he said, "such global problems as those of raw materials or energy, combating the more dangerous and widespread diseases, environmental protection, exploration of outer space, and use of the resources of the World Ocean have become important and topical."


The growing Western understanding of the fact that capitalist states have as great a stake in peace and co-operation as the socialist countries has helped considerably to weaken the position of the exponents of the reactionary aggressive policy and to augment the numbers of the supporters of peaceful coexistence.


The thorough and clear exposition of the Communist Party's standpoint on the main international problems made by Brezhnev at the 23rd Party Congress ( 1966) represented a further development of the principles of Soviet foreign policy.


"At the Congress we can note with gratification the serious successes


of our policy in the period under review. The Soviet Union has good relations with most countries of the world, Brezhnev said. He noted that the Soviet Union was conducting ""its policy under the sign of struggle for an easing of tension, for a stronger peace, for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, for such international conditions where every nation could advance freely along the road of national and social progress . . . . The Soviet Union stands firmly for non-interference in the internal affairs of all states, for respect of their sovereign rights and the inviola bility of their territory . . . . As for the interstate relations of the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, we want them not only to be peaceful bu t also to include the broadest possible mu tually advantageous ties in the economic, scientific, and cultural spheres."""


In his report Brezhnev showed the invariable internationalist essence of Soviet policy; its continuity and the firmness of its basic principles, and, at the same time, its creative, innovative, and realistic character applicable to the changing situations and the vital requirements of the times. His analysis of the current world situation was based on profound insight into the substance of world events and on a knowledge of the objective laws governing humanity's progressive development.


The active and consistent work of the Commu nist Party and the Soviet government under Brezhnev's leadership in the domain offoreign policy helped frustrate imperialist attempts to make cold war an inalienable component of international relations. This consistent activity furthered the shaping of objective and subjective conditions for a visible change for the better in international relations. This, in turn, served as a premise for the major initiatives by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its General Secretary personally, and its Central Committee in resolving foreign policy and diplomatic problems and in the struggle for peace and social progress.


These initiatives found expression in the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples, of the 25th Congress and in the Peace Programme for the 1980s pu t forward by the 26th Congress.

\chapter{3. Effective Blueprints for Peace}


Never in recent decades has any state come forward with so comprehensive a set of concrete proposals on the basic international problems as the Peace Programme set out by Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971 and which paved the way to progress towards \emph{detente} in the 1970s. Adopted by the Congress it was striking evidence of the innovative spirit, bold ness, dynamism and farsightedness of Soviet diplomacy and fresh impressive evidence of the fact that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is guided in its activity on the world scene by the interests of the Soviet people, as by those of other nations of the world, that it responds to their aspirations and relies on their support.


The first section of the Peace Programme was aimed at the quickest possible termination of the aggressive wars fought at the time and the elimination of existing flash points of the danger of war and at instilling the principle of peaceful settlement in place of force in international relations. The Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union regarded the following as the first set of objectives in the struggle for peace:


To extirpate the hotbeds of wars in Southeast Asia and the Middle East and to promote a political settlement in these regions on the basis of respect for the lawful rights of those states and peoples suffering from aggression.


To repulse all acts of aggression and international violence instantly and firmly. The resources of the United Nations, too, must be used to the fullest extent for this purpose.


To make renunciation of the use and threat of force in resolving dispu tes a law of international life. The Soviet U nion, for its part, proposed that the countries with this same approach conclude pertinent bilateral and regional treaties.


The course of events confirmed the realism of this approach. The United States aggression in Vietnam and the rest oflndochina had reached a dead end. The world public demanded an end to the brutal assault on the rights of the Vietnamese people and other peoples of this region. Further delay of a political settlement meant only additional loss of life and new complications on the world scene and inside the United States.


In the case of the Middle East, the other seat of the danger of war for the world, the futility of the attempts of Israel's rulers to consolidate their hold on the Arab lands seized as a result of aggression had become obvious. The warning issued by Brezhnev could not be clearer: "The longer a political settlement in the Middle East is dragged out, the greater will be the outrage of the world public, the greater the Arab peoples' hatred of the aggressor and his protectors, and the greater the harm Israel's rulers will inflict on their own people and country."


Brezhnev called for the removal of the sources ofinternational tension surviving since the Second World War. He suggested:


Recognising as final the territorial changes that resulted in Europe from the Second World War, effecting a radical turn towards \emph{detente} and peace on that continent, and ensuring the convocation and success of the European Conference.


Ensuring in every way Europe's collective security.


Brezhnev reaffirmed thejointly expressed readiness of the signatories of the defensive Warsaw Treaty for the simultaneous annulment of this treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance or, as a first step, for dissolving their military organisations.


The Peace Programme strongly emphasised the need for renouncing use of force in international relations. Itwas aimed at limiting and later eliminating the material basis of the policy of aggression, violence and war. It put forward an all-embracing set of disarmament measures, and this, first of all, in relation to nuclear and other types of mass annihilation weapons liable to inflict grave losses on mankind. The programme envisaged treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, ending nuclear weapons tests by all countries everywhere, including underground tests, and establishing nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world. ''We are for the nuclear disarmament of all states possessing nuclear weapons," said Brezhnev, "and for the holding for this purpose of a conference of the five nuclear powers-the Soviet Union, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and Britain."


The nuclear disarmament proposals were closely tied in with provisions limiting conventional armed forces and with general and complete disarmament. The programme set the objective of stepping up efforts to terminate the arms race and convening a world conference to examine all aspects of disarmament. The Soviet Union called for the winding down of foreign military bases, for reducing armed forces and armaments in regions where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, notably Central Europe, and for reducing military expenditures.


These measures would substantially clear the international atmosphere of fear and suspicion and enable the states to devote the tremendous resources released from military budgets to peaceful purposes.


Imbued with concern for the vital interests of humanity, the Peace Programme included a special point on combating all forms of national inequality, discrimination, and oppression: "The UN decisions on eliminating the surviving colonial regimes must be put into effect in their entirety. Racism and apartheid should be met with universal condemnation and boycott."


The programme also provided for the development of peaceful co-operation with other countries in important specific fields.


The Soviet Union, it said, "is prepared to deepen relations of mu tually beneficial co-operation in all fields with countries that so wish. Our country is prepared to participate jointly with the other interested states in resolving such problems as environmental protection, development of energy and other natural resources, expansion of transportation and communications, prevention and elimination of the more dangerous and widespread diseases, and exploration and development of outer space and the World Ocean."


The force and effectiveness of the Peace Programme derived from a set of interconnected factors: it expressed the real needs that grow out of the state of international relations in the present epoch, that these needs were embodied in concrete and realistic aims of practical policy, and that the Soviet Union, in close co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries, had mou nted consistent and pu rposeful actions to put this foreign policy programme into effect.


Brezhnev stressed that Soviet policy in relation to the capitalist countries is centred on consistent and full "implementation in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, development of mu tually beneficial ties, and, with countries prepared for this, on co-operation in consolidating peace, making relations with them as stable as possible". Brezhnev stressed the necessity of determining in each case whether the Soviet Union was dealing with those who really wanted to settle problems at the negotiating table or with those trying to cond uct a policy "from positions of strength".


The Programme of the 24th Congress was taken a step further at the 25th Congress (1976) , which adopted the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Co-operation and for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples.


With many of the objectives of the Peace Programme successfully achieved, Brezhnev developed and extended the provisions formulated at the previous Congress and came forward with new important initiatives in world affairs. The two programmes blended into one foreign policy complex, as it were, determining the Soviet Union's steady policy of \emph{detente} and its realisation and of its struggle against the arms race.


As noted by Brezhnev, the main objectives req uired in the present conditions in the interests of peace, international security and the progress of mankind are the following:


-To increase the active joint contribu tion of the fraternal socialist states to the consolidation of peace, while steadily strengthening their unity and developing their all-round co-operation in building the new society.


-To work for an end to the growing arms race, which is endangering peace, and for going on to a reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of arms and to disarmament. For this purpose:


• Do everything to complete the preparation of a new Soviet-American agreement on limiting and red ucing strategic armaments and to conclude international treaties on universal and complete termination of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons, on banning development of new types and systems of mass annihilation weapons, as well as on banning modification of the natural environment for military or other hostile purposes.


• Launch new efforts to activate negotiations on the red uction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Following agreement on the first concrete steps in this direction, continue in the years ahead to promote military \emph{detente} in the region.


• Work for a change from the present continuous growth of the military budgets of many of the states to their systematic reduction.


•Take all measures to ensure the earliest possible convocation of the World Disarmament Conference.


-To concentrate the efforts of the peace-loving states on eliminating the remaining seats of war and, first of all, on implementing a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. In connection with such a settlement the states concerned should examine the question of helping end the arms race in the Middle East.


-To do everything to deepen international \emph{detente} and to embody it in concrete forms of mu tually beneficial co-operation between states. Work vigorously for the full implementation of the Final Act of the European Conference and for greater peaceful co-operation in Europe. In accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence, continue consistently to promote relations of long-term mu tually beneficial co-operation in various fields-political, economic, scientific and cultural-with the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan and other capitalist countries.


To work for ensuring security in Asia on the basis ofjoint efforts by the states of that continent.


To work for a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.


To consider as crucial the international task of completely eliminating all vestiges of the system of colonial oppression, infringements on the equality and independence of peoples, and all seats of colonialism and racism.


To work for eliminating discrimination and all artificial barriers in international trade and all manifestations of inequality, diktat, and exploitation in international economic relations.


The implementation of the Peace Programme had its results. For the first time in the postwar decades mankind shook off the burden of the cold war.


\emph{Detente} began to acquire realistic outlines.


How does Brezhnev interpret the political content of the word


\emph{"detente"?}


By \emph{detente,} he says, we mean a state of international relations opposite to the state usually described as the cold war and characterised by constant tensions which at any time threatened to explode into open conflict. In other words, \emph{detente} means overcoming the cold war and going over to normal and balanced relations between states. \emph{Detente} means readiness to settle differences and dispu tes not by force, not by threats and sabre rattling, bu t by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. \emph{Detente} means definite trust and the ability to reckon with one another's legitimate interests. This, in short, is what \emph{detente} means.


For our part, we are actively pu rsuing a course that would strengthen \emph{detente} in every way and spread it to all regions, including, of course, both Africa and the Middle East. Brezhnev continues. "But it would be unjust and unrealistic to expect the peoples of these or some other regions to give up the struggle for their lawful rights in the name of some falsely interpreted concept of \emph{detente."}


\emph{Detente} is a policy of fruitful co-operation of all states in the name of solving peaceful constructive tasks facing each nation and all of mankind. It has become possible because in the 1970s the policy of peaceful coexistence, mapped out years ago by Lenin, increasingly shaped international relations.


Co-operation is no futile utopia, Brezhnev says. Its first signs-be they ever so small so far-are already in evidence in our time. They should be noted, cherished and developed.


Useful co-operation is now under way, also within the framework of international organisations, between a considerable number of states in such fields as peaceful uses of atomic energy, combating epidemic diseases, elimination of illiteracy, protection of historical and cultural monuments, and weather forecasting. Our country is taking an active part in all this. Inshort, Brezhnev says, there already exists a valid basis for the further extension of practical peaceful co-operation among states. As Brezhnev says, our party's consistent and creative policy of peace, \emph{detente} and disarmament, a policy aimed at implementing the Peace Programme advanced by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, has enabled us to achieve a great deal. In broad terms, the most important thing we have accomplished is that we have broken the tragic cycle: a world war-a short breathing spell of peace-again, a world war. We the Soviet people, our friends-the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries, and all those who have been fighting for peace, \emph{detente} and peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, have the right to take pride in this historic accomplishment.


At the juncture of the 1970s and 1980s the forces of war and reaction launched an offensive against the policy of \emph{detente.} They are striving to undermine it, to spur the arms race, to pursue a policy of threats and interference in the internal affairs of other peoples, to suppress the liberation struggle.


In these circumstances, Brezhnev spoke firmly and confidently from the rostrum of the 26th Congress of the CPSU ( February 23-March 3, 1981) . He called on all the sound and reasonable forces, countries dedicated to peace, the realistically minded quarters in the West to safeguard \emph{detente,} solve a truly global problem of preserving peace, and secure the foremost right of any man-the right to life.


Brezhnev described the drive to lessen the danger of war and to curb the arms race as the central direction of the foreign policy efforts by the party and the Soviet government. At the present time this objective has become one of special importance and urgency because rapid and profound changes are under way in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, above all weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These are weapons of a type that may make control over them, and therefore also their agreed limitation, extremely difficult if not impossible. Brezhnev emphasised that a new round of the arms race will upset international stability, and greatly increase the danger of another war. The situation is made graver still by the fact that the policy of the aggressive imperialist forces has already considerably heightened international tensions with all the dangerous consequences that this entails.


As Brezhnev said, "There is probably no other country that has in recent years put forward before the world such a wide spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on the most crucial problems of international relations as the Soviet Union has done."


He reported to the Congress that, guided by the party's Central Committee, Soviet diplomats and all those working in the foreign policy sector are pressing for the implementation of these initiatives.


We are carrying on the fight for a radical improvement of the international situation, he added. "The trustworthy compass here is, as i t has been, the Peace Programme of the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU. Today the state of world affairs req uires new, additional efforts to remove the threat of war, and buttress international security."


Instead of merely extinguishing flashpoints of military conflict, which often threaten to grow into a major conflagration, Brezhnev called for preventive measures, for forestalling their emergence.


The report outlined clear-cut, constructive proposals which would make it possible -given goodwill from the Western side-to settle many complex international issues, to strengthen and safeguard peace.


The set of initiatives advanced by Brezhnev envisages that the Soviet Union


is prepared to extend confidence-building measures to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the Western states, too, extend the confidence zone accordingly;


is prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries;


does not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed together with the questions of Persian Gulf security;


is prepared to continue withou t delay the negotiations on limiting and red ucing strategic armaments with the United States, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area;


is prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines-the Ohio type by the USA, and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree to banning modernisation of existing and development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines;


suggests coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be set on the deploy ment in Europe of new medium-range nuclearmissile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, to freeze the existing quantitative and qualitative levels of these weapons, natu rally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region;


suggests that a competent international committee should be set up, which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe;


considers it useful to call a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its member states in order to look for keys to improving the international situation and preventing war. If they so wish, leaders of other states could evidently also take part in the session.


In sum, Brezhnev said, the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. They concern conventional as well as nuclearmissile armaments, land forces, naval and air forces. They touch on the situation in Europe, in the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East. They deal with measures of a military as well as a political nature. All of them pursue a single aim, our one common aspiration-to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the danger of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace.


The delegates welcomed with prolonged applause Leonid Brezhnev's remarkable words to the effect that no task is more important now on the international plane for our party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world than to safeguard peace. Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but consolidation of peace---that is the clue to the future.


A few days after the forum of Soviet Communists completed its work, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev addressed messages to heads of state and government of a number of countries. These messages pointed out the major foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union advanced at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.


In these messages, Brezhnev expressed the hope that these new major initiatives by the Soviet Union in the sphere of foreign policy, aimed at strengthening peace, deepening \emph{detente} and curbing the arms race would be duly examined by the governments of the countries concerned.


The Soviet Union pursues these initiatives, as well as its entire foreign policy, in close co-operation ahd contact with the fraternal socialist countries.

\chapter{4. Together with the Other Socialist States}


Brezhnev participates in person in the bilateral and multilateral meetings and negotiations between leaders of the socialist countries working out a common position in world affairs.


He stresses the special nature of the relations with the fraternal socialist states and describes the socialist community as "a new social and historical community of states and peoples." These relations are keynoted by trust and solidarity, equality and unity. They rest on the community of not only national but also class interests and on identity of a social and economic system and ideology. And since the interests are those of socialist nations and labou ring classes, they are of especial endurance and constancy and are directed to a common aim-the building of the new society. The emergence of these relations opened an important chapter in world history and heralded the shaping of international relations of the new socialist type.


Analysing the development of the socialist community, Brezhnev said, "The emergence and development of this alliance took time and considerable collective effort. We had to find the answer to many fundamentally new questions of theory and practice and to react intelligently and promptly to various turns of events. And the facts have confirmed convincingly that given the correct Marxist-Leninist approach, we resolved and can resolve even the most complicated of problems in a way that contributes to the strengthening of each socialist country and the socialist community as a whole."


In none of the now existing socialist countries, Brezhnev said, were the ways, forms and methods of socialist revolution a mechanical repetition of another country's experience. The German Democratic Repu blic, Poland, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia and Yugoslaviaall the socialist countries, in fact, carried out the revolution in their own way, and in a form prompted by the relation of class forces inside the country, by its national make-up and the external circu mstances.


The principles of socialist internationalism encompass all the aspects of relations between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries. These relations are based on fraternal co-operation, complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. These principles are practised, first of all, by the ruling Communist and workers' parties of the socialist states, which are united by their common Marxist-Leninist ideology and act in constant and close contact with one another. Their co-operation enriches the parties with mutual experience and enables them join tly to work out the fundamental problems of building socialism and communism, to find the most rational economic ties, collectively to chart a common line in foreign affairs, and to exchange opinion on work in the ideological and cultural fields.


It is highly important to co-ordinate the activity of the fraternal socialist parties and states on the international scene.


Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev informed its delegates that there had been thirty-seven friendly meetings at summit level in the Crimea in 1976-80. Protocol formalities were dispensed with, and the outlook for their relations, the key problems of world politics, and the tasks of the future were discussed in a comradely atmosphere. Each meeting yielded something new and useful. There were regular exchanges of party and government delegations. Conferences of Central Committee secretaries to discuss international relations and party ideological and organisational work became common practice.


In his report, Brezhnev emphasised the highly influential and beneficial role played by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and notably its Political Consultative Committee, in European affairs and, for that matter, in world affairs as a whole.


Leonid Brezhnev takes an immediate part in the work of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) as head of the Soviet delegation. Such documents of the PCC as the 1966 Bucharest Declaration, the 1969 Budapest Appeal, the 1970 Berlin Statement, the Prague Declaration of 1972 and the Warsaw Communique of 1974 contained important initiatives in furtherance of world peace and security. The proposals of the November 1976 Conference of the PCC in Bucharest, too, contribu ted to the development of \emph{detente} and co-operation and the battle against the arms race.


Seeing that the crucial problem of present-day international affairs is to secure a resolute turn towards halting the arms race, the Conference of the PCC held in Moscow in 1978 advanced a large set of proposals aimed at its successful solution. The Declaration of the Conference stressed the determination of the fraternal socialist countries to consolidate all-round co-operation with each other and to seek broader interaction with all progressive, democratic forces of our time.


The May 1980 Conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw examined new tasks in the fight for \emph{detente} and security in Europe, and for more solid world peace, and reasserted the unshakeable dedication of its participants to the policy of peace, to European and international security, and advanced important and relevant proposals. Economic co-operation, extending and diversifying economic ties, holds an important place in the relations between socialist countries. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is playing an ever bigger role in the economic development of both its permanent members and the countries that systematically participate in some areas of its work. The CMEA has never been a closed body and affords ample opportu nities for all countries that wish to take part in its activity and, at the same time, for extending its own ties and accords with all the other countries of the world.


Co-operation in the CMEA framework rests on the principle of mutual advantage. The problems that arise in the course of co-operation, Brezhnev said, are solved jointly. The CMEA members seek the best ways of harmonising the interests of each fraternal country with the common interest. This applies, for example, to the fixing of preferential prices on the oil, gas, other primary goods and manufactured commodities that the CMEA countries supply to each other.


The Soviet Union receives many types of machinery and equipment, vehicles, consumer goods and some raw materials from the fraternal countries. For its part, it supplies the socialist market with oil, gas, ore, cotton, timber and, of course, a variety of industrial items. In 1976-80 the USSR received 90,000 million roubles' worth of goods from the other CMEA countries, while Soviet deliveries added up to 98,000 million.


For the first time in history there has been a genuine democratisation of international economic relations, Brezhnev stressed, and this in the framework of the CMEA. Acting on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the CMEA countries oppose any and all discrimination in commerce and in economic, scientific and technical co-operation. This is no time-serving policy. It has its roots in the natu re of the socialist system and the common orientation of socialist foreign policy.


From separate and simple elements of mutual assistance, the economic co-operation of the socialist states has gradually progressed to increasingly complex and comprehensive forms.


A socialist type of international division oflabour, as Brezhnev noted, is shaping and gaining ground in the CMEA framework. Brezhnev took a direct part in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for the further deepening and improvement of co-operation and the development of the socialist economic integration of the CMEA member countries.


Socialist integration is practised in the interests both of each separate country and of the community as a whole on the basis of complete equality and mu tual interest and advantage. It is aimed at facilitating the all-round development of the socialist community as a whole and of each participating country, complementing their national effort of building a peaceful and prosperous economy.


Integration, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "is gathering momentum. The fruits of specialisation in prod uction are visible in practically all branches of economy, science and technology. We now have some 120 multilateral and more than 1000 bilateral agreements to this effect. Co-ordination of the economic plans of the CMEA countries for 1981-85 is nearing completion."


He referred with pride to such joint achievements as the nearly 3000kilometre-long Soyuz gas pipeline, the Mir power grid, to which new transmission lines have been added, the Ust-Ilimsk pulp and paper plant, the Erdenet ore-dressing works in Mongolia, the nickel plants in Cuba and many other newly completed projects. In the 1970s the economic growth rates of the CMEA countries were twice as high as those of developed states with a market economy. In those 10 years the CMEA countries were the most dynamically developing group of countries in the world.


Life is setting the CMEA countries the task of supplementing co-ordination of plans with co-ordination of economic policy as a whole, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress. Also on the order of the day are such issues as aligning the structures of the economic mechanisms, extending the direct ties between ministries, amalgamations and enterprises participating in co-operation, and establishing joint firms. Other ways of combining efforts and resources, he added, are also possible.


The member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, as Brezhnev emphasised, "are advocates of equal, mutually beneficial economic co-operation of countries belonging to different social systems. This fundamental approach flows from their devotion to peace, and is an indissoluble element of the policy of \emph{detente."}


Time and again, Leonid Brezhnev has been received as a dear guest in the socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Their people know and appreciate his tireless work for peace, strengthening the socialist community and improving the life of the mass of the people.


During his visits to the fraternal countries Brezhnev meets and talks not only with their leaders bu t with the general publicworkers and farmers, people in science and the arts, engineers and doctors. All of them carry away warm recollection of these meetings. Sometimes, in connection with some event or some question they later address themselves to Brezhnev as the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, at the same time, as an old and trusted friend.


During one of his visits to the Hungarian People's Republic Brezhnev spoke to the gifted folk writer Marton Paine, a peasant woman and narrator of folk tales, at a meeting of the HungarianSoviet Friendship


\textbf{PFHL} J


Society in Budapest. A few years later she sent a letter to him in Moscow, saying that a museum of folk art and history had been organised on her initiative in her native village. Among the many exhibits in this museum-domestic u tensils, clothes, artefacts, ancient instruments, historical documents and pictures-were many depicting the hardships of old-time village life in Hungary and the grim days of the fascist regime in that country.


The heroic soldiers of the Red Army brought us freedom, wrote 60-year-old Marton Palne to Brezhnev. "I address you as a representative of the nation to which we owe our good life."


I was happy to learn, Brezhnev wrote to Marton Palne, "that you have opened a museum in your native village. Socialism inherits all the best elements created in the long history of national and world culture and pu ts this wealth at the disposal of the people. Mastering the cultural heritage is a very important, necessary and useful thing."


Meeting working people in the fraternal socialist countries, addressing them at meetings, Brezhnev always finds heartfelt words that evoke a warm response in his audience. He stands before them as their contemporary, as a man whose life is linked with theirs, with their past and present .


. . . Czechoslovakia. Speaking at the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev said: "I can say for myself that coming to Czechoslovakia is always a great pleasure for me. I have somehow grown attached with all my soul to your fine country. I first came here nearly 40 years ago with units of our army, alongside the men of Ludvik Svoboda's corps. And this is already the fourth congress of the CPC at which I have been assigned to head the delegation of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union. And I cherish the opportunity to be with you, dear friends, on this momentous day."


Brezhnev has visited all the countries of the socialist community, some of them several times.


In recent years, the socialist countries have had to deal with their constructive tasks in more complicated conditions, Brezhnev observed at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.


In this connection, he made special mention of the situation in Poland, where subversive imperialist activity was compounded with mistakes and miscalculations in home policy. In fraternal Poland, Brezhnev continued, opponents of socialism supported by outside forces are seeking to channel events along a counter-revolu tionary course by stirring up anarchy. As noted at a recent plenary meeting of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, the pillars of the socialist state in Poland are injeopardy. "The Polish comrades," Brezhnev said, "are engaged in red ressing the critical situation. They are striving to enhance the party's capacity for action and to tighten links with the working class and other working people, and are preparing a concrete programme to restore a sound Polish economy.


Last December's meeting ofleaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries in Moscow has rendered socialist Poland important political support. It showed clearly that the Polish Communists, the Polish working class and the working people of that country can firmly rely on their friends and allies; we will not abandon fraternal socialist Poland in its hour of need, we will stand by it.


At a [riendly meeting of Soviet and Polish leaders following the 26th Congress of the CPSU, it was stressed that the socialist community is indissoluble and that its defence is a cause not only of each state, bu t also of the socialist coalition as a whole.


Pursuing its peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet Union takes account of the interests of all the fraternal socialist countries, whatever part of the globe they may belong to; it consults and co-operates with them actively.


In 1978 the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. Brezhnev noted on this score that the force of the friendship and solidarity of the countries of the socialist community is of special significance at the present complicated time when the policy of the Chinese leadership has created new and considerable difficulties for socialist construction on Vietnamese soil. By their Treaty the Soviet Union and Vietnam reaffirmed the peaceful orientation of their foreign policy.


We appreciate the active, peaceful foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam oriented on good-neighbourly relations and co-operation in Southeast Asia, and on turning that region into a zone of peace and stability, Brezhnev said at his friendly meeting with Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam's Central Committee, who headed the CPV delegation to the 26th Congress of the CPSU.


Bonds of friendship obtain between Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro and other leaders of socialist Cuba. The CC CPSU General Secretary's visit to Cuba in january-February 1974 was tremendously important not only for the further consolidation of the socialist countries' common positions on the world scene, bu t also for the further progress of peace.


Brezhnev and Castro met many times in the years that followed, and once more in 1981 at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

\chapter{5. The USSR and the Third World}


The good progress of Soviet relations with the Asian, African and Latin American countries is an important contributing factor to international \emph{detente} and its realisation. Brezhnev devotes considerable attention to these questions. "Supporting the struggle of the peoples for their national liberation and social progress," he pointed out, "is a principle ofour foreign policy secured in the Constitution of the USSR. I t is being carried into effect consistently."


Soviet relations with the developing countries are expanding steadily. "The Soviet Union's ties with countries that have flung off colonial dependence or, as they are also called, the developing countries have expanded and grown stronger," Brezhnev said. In saying so, he took note that these countries were very different. After liberation, some of them opted for the revolutionary-democratic path, while in others capitalist relations took root. Some of them are following a truly independent policy, while others are taking their lead from imperialist policy.


Between 1976 and 1980 the Soviet Union concluded treaties of friendship and co-operation with Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Syria.


Brezhnev describes these treaties as an important sign of the times, saying they are "not military alliances, not coalitions directed against anyone, but precisely documents of friendship and co-operation with those who have embarked on a path of construction devoid of oppression and exploitation."


We are developing wide-ranging mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical co-operation with the newly free countries, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The building oflarge projects there with some form of Soviet participation, he added, figures prominently in our relations.


Among the projects completed in recent years, as he said, are many large ones, some even vital for the economy of the country concerned. These include the Al-Thawrah hydro-power complex in Syria, which accounts for more than 70 percent of the electricity generated in that country; the second stage of the steel mill in Algeria, which has raised its capacity to 2 million tons; a bauxite plant in Guinea, and others.


Our country, Brezhnev added, does everything it can to help many of the newly free countries in training personnel-engineers, technicians, skilled workers, doctors and teachers.


Tens of thousands of Soviet specialists are working on building sites in Asian and African countries, in industry and agricultu re, and in hospitals and educational institu tions.


The interests of the socialist and the developing countries coincide or are very close on a wide range of current international problems.


The socialist countries and many of the developing states act in unison in efforts to restrain the arms race and promote disarmament, to further the establishment of atom-free zones and the winding down of military blocs and foreign bases, to red uce military expenditures and transfer part of the thus released resources to peaceful economic needs.


The Soviet Union, Brezhnev said at the Central Committee plenary meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1976, actively supports the legitimate demands of the developing Asian, African and Latin American countries that international economic relations should be reconstructed on a basis of equality, ending all forms of exploitation by the capitalist countries of their weaker partners in the Third World. In this field, as in many others, the interests of the socialist and developing countries coincide. In an interview with the editor-inchief of the Japanese newspaper \emph{Asahi} in June 1977, Brezhnev said, "Our standpoint is clear on this score. The Soviet Union supports the developing countries' demands for recasting international economic relations alongjust and democratic lines. This means, first of all, that the process of extirpating colonialism must be spread to the economic sphere, that an end must be pu t to the multinational imperialist monopolies' oppression and the developed capitalist countries' exploitation of the natural resources and manpower of the developing states." In 1981, speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev described restructuring international economic relations on a democratic basis, on the principles of equality, as "natural from the point of view of history".


Much can and must be done in this respect, he went on to say. "And, certainly, the issue must not be reduced, as this is sometimes done, simply to distinctions between 'rich North' and 'poor South'. We are prepared to contribu te, and are indeed contribu ting, to the establishment of equitable international economic relations."


The Soviet Union has high praise for the non-aligned movement. "The non-aligned movement, which will have its twentieth anniversary this year," Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress, "has been and remains an important factor in international relations. Its strength stems from the stand it takes against imperialism and colonialism, and against war and aggression. We are convinced that the key to any further heightening of its role in world politics-and this we would welcome-is its dedication to these basic principles."


Referring to Soviet foreign policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Brezhnev has repeated time and again that the Soviet Union does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples, that it seeks no advantages for itself, hunts for no concessions, covets no political domination and no military bases.


The United States, on the other hand, has declared the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean a sphere of its "vital interests". The US military machine is thrusting into these regions and intends to install itself there for a long time to come. Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt-where next? Brezhnev exclaimed at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.


The Soviet Union opposes export of revolution, and by the same token it cannot accept export of counter-revolu tion.


To the long applause of delegates and guests at the Congress, among them many representatives of Asian, African and Latin American countries, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "No one should have any doubts that the CPSU will consistently continue the policy of promoting co-operation between the USSR and the newly free countries, and consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement."

\section{For Peace in Asia}


The Soviet Union unwaveringly strives to establish a climate of peace and co-operation in Asia, to ensure peaceful settlement of all complex international issues in this region.


Drawing on the experience oflong struggle of the peace-loving Asian countries, the Soviet Union, whose own territory extends across both Europe and Asia, has thoroughly substantiated the concept of Asian peace and security. It was pu t forward by Brezhnev as far back as the 1960s. Peaceful relations, Brezhnev said, must repose "on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and for the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, and broad economic and other co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage. We advocate and will continue to advocate such collective security in Asia and are prepared to co-operate in furthering it with all other states."


The idea of ensuring peace and security in Asia and the Middle East is embodied in the treaties of friendship concluded by the Soviet Union with India and Iraq, the Declaration on the Principles of Relations with Turkey, and a number of important documents signed with other Asian countries.


Many of these documents formalise the commitment of states to work for the maintenance of peace in Asia and the rest of the world, to promote \emph{detente} and disarmament, to further a lasting and just peace, to prevent the use or threat of force, to refuse the use of their territories for acts of aggression or subversion against other countries and the like.


In his interview with the editor-in-chief of \emph{Asahi} in June 1977, Brezhnev dwelt on Soviet policy in Asia at the present stage. He said, "Our country was and continues to be indissolubly connected with the Asian continent historically, economically and geographically. It is natural, therefore, that we are seriously interested in consolidating peace in this region of the world. We hold that \emph{detente,} which has become the dominant trend in world affairs, must not bypass the Asian continent, the home of more than half of hu mankind. Following the historic victory of the people of Vietnam and the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, that large peace-loving state, following the settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the withdrawal of United States troops from Indochina as a whole, more favourable conditions have appeared, as we see it, for ensuring lasting peace and security in Asia through thejoint efforts ofall the states of this continent. The Soviet U nion favours precisely this course of events in Asia." Brezhnev reaffirmed this course in December 1978: "The Soviet Union would like \emph{detente} to deepen and spread, to reach out to Asia, the world's most densely populated continent."


The Soviet poposals advanced by Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU were an important contribution to peace in Asia. "There is a region where elaboration and use of confidence-building measuresnaturally, with due consideration for its specific features-could not only defuse the situation locally, but also make a very useful contribution to strengthening the foundations of universal peace," Brezhnev said. "That region is the Far East, where such powers as the Soviet Union, China and Japan border on each other. There are also US military bases there. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries."


We have already stressed the attention Brezhnev pays to the Middle East problem. He notes that "there is no aspect of world politics where our Party and the Soviet state would not support the cause of justice, progress and peace . . . . This also determines our approach to the problems of a settlement in the Middle East. Here, as in other regions of the world, we look for no selfish gain, and lay no claim to the natu ral wealth of other countries. We are for durable peace, and side firmly with the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, with their struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression, and against imperialist diktat, against capitulationist deals and any sell-out of vital Arab interests."


Brezhnev also dwelt on the Middle East problem in his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, saying that "in its bid for dominance in the Middle East, the United States has taken the path of the Camp David policy, of dividing the Arab world and organising a separate deal between Israel and Egypt. US diplomacy has failed to turn this separate anti-Arab deal into a broader agreement of the capitulationist type. But it has succeeded in another way: a new deterioration of the situation has occurred in the region. A Middle East settlement was cast back."


Brezhnev suggested constructive ideas about getting matters off the ground. "It is time to go back to honest collective search of an all-embracing just and realistic settlement. In the circu mstances, this could be done, say, in the framework of a specially convened international conference," he said.


Brezhnev added that "the Soviet Union is prepared to participate in such work in a constructive spirit and with goodwill. We are prepared to do so jointly with the other interested partiesthe Arabs (naturally including the Palestine Liberation Organisation) and Israel. We are prepared for such search jointly with the United States-and I may remind you that we had some experience in this regard some years ago. We are prepared to co-operate with the European countries and with all those who are showing a sincere striving to secure a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The UN, too, could evidently continue to play a useful role in all this.


As for the substance of the matter, we are still convinced that if there is to be real peace in the Middle East, the Israeli occupation of all Arab territories captured in 1967 must be ended. The inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be secured, up to and including the right of establishing their own state. It is essential to ensure the security and sovereignty ofall the states of the region, including those oflsrael. Those are the basic principles. As for the details, they could naturally be considered at the negotiations.


Leonid Brezhnev has repeatedly elucidated the Soviet position on the problem of Afghanistan. In his \emph{Pravda} interview injanuary 1980 he said the following:


There was a revolu tion in Afghanistan in April 1978. The people took their destiny into their own hands, and set out on the path of independence and freedom. As always in history, the forces of the past opposed the revolu tion. The people of Afghanistan would, of course, have coped with them on their own. But from the first days of the revolu tion they were faced with outside aggression and gross outside interference in their internal affairs.


Tens of thousands of rebels trained and armed abroad, even whole armed units, were deployed into Afghan territory. Imperialism and its henchmen had, in effect, launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan.


Afghanistan insistently demanded that the aggression should be stopped and it should be allowed to build its new life in peace. Combating outside aggression, the Afghan leadership-when still under President Taraki, and later as well-repeatedly asked the Soviet Union for aid. "We, for our part," Brezhnev said, "warned the quarters concerned that if the aggression did not stop, we would not abandon the Afghans in their hour of need. And, as everybody knows, we always match our words with deeds."


The continuing armed intervention and the far-reaching conspiracy of outside reactionary forces created a visible danger of Afghanistan's losing its independence and of its conversion into an imperialist military bridgehead on the southern border of our country. "In other words," Leonid Brezhnev said, "the time had come when we could no longer fail to respond to the request of the government of friendly Afghanistan. Failure to do so would mean abandoning Afghanistan to the tender mercies of imperialism and letting the aggressive forces repeat what they succeeded in doing in, say, Chile where the freedom of the nation was drowned in blood. Failure to do so would mean looking on passively while a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet Union arose on our southern border."


Asking us for aid, Brezhnev continued, Afghanistan proceeded from the clear provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Co-operation concluded by Afghanistan with the Soviet Union in December 1978, and on the right of every state, under the UN Charter, to individual or collective self-defence-a right that other countries had invoked on many previous occasions.


It was no simple decision for us, Brezhnev went on to say, to send Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan. But the party's Central Committee and the Soviet government acted in full awareness of their responsibility, and took all the general circumstances into account. The sole task set to the Soviet contingents was to help the Afghans repulse outside aggr.e'ssion. They will all be withdrawn from Afghanistan the moment the reasons that had prompted the Afghan leadership to req uest their help drop away.


Speaking at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev stressed that "the plans of Afghanistan's enemies have collapsed. The considered policy of the People's Democratic Party and the government of Afghanistan headed by Comrade Babrak Karmal, which is in keeping with the national interests, has strengthened the people's power. As for the Soviet military contingent, we will be prepared to withdraw it with the agreement of the Afghan government. Before this is done, the infiltration of counter-revolu tionary gangs into Afghanistan must be completely stopped. This must be secured in accords between Afghanistan and its neighbou rs. Dependable guarantees are required that there will be no new intervention. Such is the fundamental position of the Soviet U nion, and we adhere to it firmly."


The contention about any Soviet expansionist plans in relation to Pakistan, Iran or any other country of the region is absolutely false, Leonid Brezhnev declared. "The policy and psychology of the colonialists is foreign to us. We want no foreign land, and seek no foreign wealth. It is the colonialists who are enticed by the smell of oil."


The Soviet U nion welcomed the revolu tion in Iran. In his address to the electorate in March 1979 Brezhnev said: "Like all sincere champions of peace, progress and the independence of nations, we welcome the victory of this revolu tion, which has pu t an end to the despotic and oppressive regime that had made the country an object of exploitation and a support base for foreign imperialism. We wish success and prosperity to the new, revolutionary Iran, and we hope that in the new conditions the relations of good-neighbourliness between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Iran will flourish fruitfully on the dependable basis of mu tual respect, goodwill and non-interference in one another's internal affairs."


Brezhnev described the revolution in Iran as an important development in the international life of the past few years. He noted its complex and contradictory character, and stressed that it is essentially antiimperialist, though internal and external reaction is trying to change its orientation.


The people of Iran are looking for their own road to freedom and prosperity. We sincerely wish them success in this, and are prepared to develop good relations with Iran on the principles of equality and, of course, reciprocity, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.


He observed that oflate Islamic slogans were being actively promoted in some countries of the East. "We Communists have every respect for the religious convictions of people professing Islam or any other religion," he said. "The main thing is what aims are pursued by the forces proclaiming various slogans. The banner oflslam may lead into battle for liberation. This is borne out by history, including very recent history. But history shows that reaction, too, manipulates Islamic slogans to incite counter-revolu tionary mu tinies. Consequently, the whole thing hinges on the actual content of any movement.


The Soviet Persian Gulf proposals are important for reducing tensions in Asia. As we know, in December 1980 the Soviet Union suggested that the United States, other Western powers, China,Japan and all countries that show an interest in the matter should come to terms on a set of mutual obligations aimed at normalising the situation in that region. These would be commitments not to establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf area and the adjoining islands; not to deploy nuclear or any other mass destruction weapons there; not to use or threaten to use force against Persian Gulf countries, not to interfere in their internal affairs, to respect the non-aligned status of Persian Gulf states; not to involve them in military alliances that include nuclear powers; to respect the sovereign right of the countries of the region to their natural resources; in no way to impede or imperil normal commerce and use of sea lines connecting the countries of the region with the rest of the world. These Soviet proposals show a reasonable, just and realistic way to a durable peace in this explosive part of the world."


They were taken further in Brezhnev's speech at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. "It is sometimes said about our Persian Gulf proposals that they should not be divorced from the question of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan," Brezhnev observed. "What could be said on this score? The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss the Persian Gulf as an independent problem. It is also prepared, of course, as I have already said, to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. But we do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed together with the questions of Persian Gulf security. Naturally, this applies only to the international aspects of the Afghan problem, and not to internal Afghan affairs. Afghanistan's sovereignty, like its non-aligned status, must be fully protected."


Co-operation with India holds a prominent place in the Soviet Union's relations with newly independent countries. "We welcome the increasing role played by that state in international affairs," Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "Our ties with it are continuing to expand. In both our countries, Soviet-Indian friendship has become a deep-rooted popular tradition . . . . Joint action with peaceful and independent India will continue to be one of the important areas of Soviet foreign policy."


In December 1980 Leonid Brezhnev paid an official friendly visit to India. The visit was marked by an atmosphere of friendship, sincerity and complete understanding. India warmly welcomed the distinguished Soviet visitor.


The Indian capital was beautifully decorated with flowers to mark Brezhnev's arrival. His portraits were displayed in streets and squares. \emph{Hindu,} one of the largest Indian newspapers, wrote on the eve of the visit that the nationwide reception Leonid Brezhnev would get during his stay would reflect the great prestige enjoyed by the Soviet Union in India.


Leonid Brezhnev's name is known to millions oflndians. Many of his pu blished works are popular in India. His trilogy, \emph{Little Land, Rebirth} and \emph{The Virgin Lands,} was reprinted there during his visit in Hindi and U rdu, as were \emph{Leonid I. Brezhnev. Pages f rom His Life} and \emph{Envoy} ef \emph{Goodwill and Friendship.} All in all, Brezhnev's works have been pu blished in fourteen languages of India.


The traditionally friendly relations and close economic co-operation between India and the Soviet Union, like the general course of events in Asia and the world, generated great interest in Brezhnev's visit to the Repu blic of India among the Indian public.


We are privileged to have in our midst today the great leader of a great country, a world statesman, and a trusted friend oflndia, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said at a rally in Delhi. "And we regard this visit as an important and significant event. Itwill add a new dimension to the traditional friendship between the Soviet Union and India and also contribute to peace."


One can well say that the distinguished Soviet guest was welcomed by all the many millions of Indians. On the initiative of the Inda-Soviet Cultural Society, a special month of Soviet-Indian friendship was held to mark Brezhnev's visit. Prominent statesmen and public figures, leaders of practically all large political parties, hailed the visit at rallies and meetings throughout the country, in the Indian press, on radio and television. The atmosphere in India during Brezhnev's stay there, at his meetings and talks with Indian leaders, may be described as cordial, sincere and full of understanding.


The Indian public took a deep interest in the talks between Leonid Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi. They discussed a wide range of topics related to the further development and consolidation of Soviet-Indian friendship and co-operation, and topical international problems. The popular Indian columnist Chalapathi Rau wrote in the weekly \emph{Link ,} "The Soviet Union and India are together a greater force for peace than either of them can be alone. Peace is in their interest. This common aim brings Soviet leaders to India and takes Indian leaders to the Soviet Union."


The Indian press emphasised the great importance of summit meetings and talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union, a powerful socialist state, and India, the largest non-aligned country.


The Soviet-Indian summit meeting again graphically demonstrated the strong bonds of friendship and co-operation between the USSR and India, and reaffirmed the fundamental policy offurthering the friendly relations that prevail between the two countries on a basis of equality, mutual respect and trust, respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interferende in each other's internal affairs. It was stressed during the talks in Delhi that the good Soviet-Indian relations had prevailed in different political situations, that these relations had always been comprehensive, diverse, highly stable and dynamic.


It was noted that considerable progress had been achieved in Soviet-Indian economic, commercial, scientific, technological and cultural co-operation on a planned and long-term basis. This cooperation was in keeping with the national interests of the two countries and contributed visibly to the solution of problems that faced the two countries.


The results of the talks were reflected in the Joint Soviet-Indian Declaration and other documents signed during the visit-an agreement on economic and technical co-operation, a trade agreement for 1981-85, a programme of exchanges in culture, science and education for 1981-82, and an agreement on co-operation in film-making. These documents open new vistas in Soviet-Indian relations for the good of the two nations.


As a result of the Delhi talks, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "the entire range of Soviet-Indian relations has been advanced substantially further." The visit of the Soviet leader contributed considerably to universal peace and international security.

\section{The USSR and Africa}


Brezhnev is well acquainted with problems that trouble Africa. Back in the early sixties, as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme


Soviet, he visited the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Ghana and some other African countries.


That was an eventful period in Africa's history. The national liberation movement was redou bling its assault on the imperialist colonial system, and the African nations had already passed the historic "Africa Year" of 1960, keynoted by the birth of seventeen independent states.


It was also a time of stress, for imperialism and internal reaction were pu tting up bitter resistance to the liberation movement. There was a colonial war in Algeria. An armed intervention was under way in the Republic of the Congo, and the world was shocked by the murder of Patrice Lumu mba, the hero of all Africans. The Portuguese colonialists were escalating the repression ofliberation forces in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The African peoples had yet to travel a long and arduous path to liberty.


In those days, in his discussions with working people in Conakry and Labe, Boke and Kankan in Guinea, with the construction workers and longshoremen of Terna and the students of Legon and Achimota in Ghana, Leonid Brezhnev expressed his profound conviction that the period of colonial domination had come to an end and the day was not far distant when Lenin's brilliant prevision of the inevitable collapse of the disgraceful colonial system would come true. As he learned about the first successes of independent Africa in building a new life, Leonid Brezhnev invariably emphasised the Soviet people's willingness to co-operate with the African peoples in strengthening their national independence and to support their struggle against colonialism.


In his political activity on the international scene in later years and today, Brezhnev has invariably devoted close attention to the problems of Africa, the policies of its states, and the struggle of its peoples.


The Soviet Union's stand in relation to Africa's newly independent states is clear and definite, he says. "It is doing everything to develop friendly and fruitful co-operation with them, supporting their efforts to consolidate their political and economic independence, and to have international economic relations restructured on the principles ofjustice and equality.


In so doing, the Soviet Union seeks no gains for itself, does not hunt for concessions, does not covet political supremacy or press for military bases. We follow the bidding of our revolu tionary conscience, our communist convictions.


The Soviet Union's political and economic co-operation and trade relations with the young African states have made good progress during the last few years. The USSR has helped build dozens of industrial and agricultural projects in many of them. Many African students are enrolled in Soviet institu tions of higher learning.


The growing co-operation between the Soviet Union and the African states may be illustrated by the nu merous visits of top-level African delegations to Moscow. Between 1976 and 1980 the Soviet Union was visited by such outstanding leaders as the late President of the People's Republic of Angola, Antonio Agostinho Neto, and the incumbent PRA President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos; the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Machel; the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam; the President of the Democratic Repu blic of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, and other statesmen.


We are doing and will do everything to develop and strengthen friendship with those who really desire it, Brezhnev emphasises.


The conclusion by the Soviet Union of treaties of friendship and co-operation with Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia was an effective step to strengthen the ties between the socialist world and the young states. These treaties secured the relations between the Soviet Union and these countries on a basis of equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They consolidated the relations of friendship and co-operation, and gave impulse to their further development. They also have great international weight, because they contribu te to peace, \emph{detente,} mu tual understanding among nations, to the development of international co-operation on a basis of equality, and to the consolidation of unity between the anti-imperialist, anticolonial forces.


The Soviet Union's relations with such friendly independent African states as the United Republic of Tanzania, the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and the People's Republic of the Congo are growing stronger.


The colonialists left the African states with a large backlog of problems that are making themselves felt to this day. The imperialists have a vested interest in the conflicts that keep flaring up in Africa. They are trying to take advantage of these conflicts to achieve their aims, fomenting strife among African countries and playing them off against one another.


Africa today is an object of very close and, I would say, morbid interest on the part of the imperialist forces, Brezhnev said in June 1978. "Just as in the unlamented times of colonialism, conferences on African problems follow one another in the Western countries. It is unclear, however, who authorised them to speak and decide for the Africans, to include Africa, ignoring geography, in the sphere of operations of the North Atlantic Pact. Who requested their crude armed intervention in the events in Zaire and who asked them to form the so-called 'inter-African forces', the purpose of which is to make Africans kill Africans? . . . In short, the imperialist designs in relation to Africa are dangerous. They are dangerous to the African nations, to their aspira tions for a free and better life. They are dangerous to the cause of peace and \emph{detente."}


Experience shows that dependable guarantees of the independence and progress of the African countries should include action against the intrigues of imperialism and its stooges, against those who are fomenting discord by the "divide and rule" method. "If African statesmen prove capable of settling disputes not by force of arms but at the negotiating table on the principles of mutual respect for independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of existing national frontiers, this will be in the interests of their peoples, in the interests of the progress of all Africa and world peace," Brezhnev says.


The Organisation of African Unity has done a great deal to promote the unity of the African states on an anti-imperialist and anticolonial basis. I ts activities in this direction meet with full Soviet u nderstanding and support. The principles laid down in the Charter and the decisions of the OAU concerning renu nciation of the use of force, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of national borders, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs pave the way for a sound political climate in Africa.


The situation in southern Africa remains a burning international issue. Racial and national oppression, denial of elementary hu man rights to millions of Africans and the bru ta! exploitation of the African population in the Republic of South Africa and in Namibia are a flagrant violation of the United Nations principles and a crime against humanity, and have aroused the anger and indignation of all progressive, truly democratic forces in the world. In an effort to prolong its existence, the racist regime of Pretoria has unleashed a reign of terror and repression against the native population, and is committing acts of armed aggression against the neighbouring sovereign states. Now that Africa has shown its ability to do away with the remnants of colonialism and racism on its own, attempts are being made to substitute a fictitious for the genuine liberation of southern Africa under the pretence of expediting this process.


The Soviet Union has always stood for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the RSA from Namibia and the transfer of power to SWAPO, the genuine representative of the Namibian people, and for ending apartheid in the RSA.


We are sure, Brezhnev has said, "that if all African nations, all oppressed peoples withou t exception, gain freedom and independence, peace and international security will only benefit from it."


The Soviet Union is on the side of the national liberation movements in Africa, as it is in other regions of the world. It has feelings of solidarity with the just liberation struggle of the peoples. "This does not mean, however," Leonid Brezhnev emphasises, "that the Soviet Union is opposed to efforts, diplomatic in particular, to settle problems by peaceful means if this meets the legitimate interests of the peoples. We stand for the right of any people to choose its own path of development." Since colonialism and neocolonialism have not yet resigned themselves to defeat, it is increasingly important to achieve unity of action by the socialist countries, the national liberation movement and the developing countries-which are natural allies both in the struggle for the freedom and independence of all nations and in the struggle for equitable co-operation among all states, and for world peace.


The facts show that the stronger the unity and solidarity of the peoples of the young states and their friendship with the world's socialist nations, on whose support they can count in their just cause, the greater is their success in defending and upholding their independence and vital interests.


The examples of this are many. I t was the solidarity of the progressive forces that helped to thwart the attempts of imperialism and its stooges to overthrow the people's government in Angola. The same is true of the attempts to dismember revolu tionary Ethiopia. "The developments in Angola have reaffirmed this great reality of today: a people's determination to defend its freedom multiplied by international solidarity is an invincible force," Brezhnev said. "Anyone who is really willing to learn from revolutionary experience is bound to draw precisely this conclusion from these developments."


Seeking to misrepresent the meaning and objectives of Soviet foreign policy, imperialist propaganda alleges that there is a contradiction between the country's policy of \emph{detente,} of peaceful coexistence and its relations with states that have liberated themselves from colonial bondage. There are voices that accuse the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of interfering in the affairs of young states. Some go so far as to charge it with "expansionism" and "stepping up tensions"; what is more, the imperialists seek to portray the peoples' liberation


\textbf{PFHL} K struggle as "international terrorism".


No slander, however, can disprove the hard facts. It is a fact that the socialist countries have invariably sided with the peoples facing imperialist aggression, diktat and coercion. It is a fact that the socialist countries are developing equitable relations with the young states and contribute to their economic progress as much as they can. Finally, it is a fact that the policy of the socialist countries holds at bay the forces of reaction seeking to preserve outdated systems and to sow seeds of enmity and discord between young states.


We have repeatedly stated and want to reiterate, Brezhnev emphasises, "that we have not and cannot have any 'special interests' either in the South or in the North, or in any other part of Africa for that matter, and we seek no gains for ourselves there. What we want is recognition of the sacred right of every people to shape its destiny, to choose its own way of development. This is our immu table principle, on which our Party and all Soviet people will never renege."


Brezhnev notes that Africa is sometimes depicted as a region of "violent unrest" which is harming \emph{detente} and destabilising international relations. Actually, however, the situation there is quite different.


The African peoples are waging an active struggle for freedom and independence, for the right to choose their own road of development. It is perfectly natural for these peoples, who have experienced so much suffering and humiliation in the period of imperialist domination, to leave the capitalist road and adopt a socialist orientation. They are fighting against the disgraceful practices of racism and apartheid. Theirs is a just struggle, one that our country has always supported and will continue to support.


The instability in Africa is generated by different factors. It is caused by the imperialist forces, which are trying to prevent the African nations from taking a path of their own choice. I t is this policy that runs counter to the needs of \emph{detente,} to the principles of peaceful coexistence, and that may lead to the emergence of new hotbeds of international tension.


For its part, the Soviet Union is taking active steps to promote the process of \emph{detente} and extend it to all regions of the world, including Africa. However, it would be unrealistic and unfair to expect the nations of this continent to give up their struggle for their lawful rights in the name of a misinterpreted concept of \emph{detente.}


Speaking about the situation in southern Africa, Brezhnev said in January 1979 in an interview with \emph{Time:} "The source of the threat to the relaxation of international tension is to be found in the policy directed against the peoples struggling there for liberation from colonial and racist domination, against neocolonialism, for independence and social progress and not in the struggle, as such, of the peoples for their rights." The deep-going process of eliminating the legacy of the colonial past, the vestiges of national oppression and inequality, and relations which are exploitative in their very essence, is gaining momentum. "Radical changes will certainly continue in the future," Leonid Brezhnev says. "Why am I so sure of that? Because they are based on the irresistible aspiration of the peoples for independent development, for national and social progress."


He believes in the victory of the peoples of Africa: "The birth of the Republic of Zimbabwe, the mounting intensity of the liberation struggle in Namibia, and now also in the Republic of South Africa," Brezhnev said from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress, "are graphic evidence that the rule of 'classic' colonialists and racists is approaching its end."

\section{The Soviet Union and Latin America}


As Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "the role in world affairs of Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru, has grown considerably. We are pleased to note the expansion of the Soviet Union's mutually beneficial ties with countries of Latin America and are prepared to go on expanding them." The Soviet leader has always devoted much of his foreign policy efforts to the issues of Latin America, the policies of its countries, its peoples' struggle for peace, democracy and social progressto everything connected with what Brezhnev graphically describes as a "remarkable, colourful and unique continent, with its difficult and heroic past, stormy present and-I am confident-great future."


The struggle of the Latin American peoples for freedom has been going on for over a century now. The names of Emiliano Zapata, Augusto Sandino, Che Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, Salvador Allende and many other prominent fighters for the popular cause are forever inscribed in history's roll of honour, Brezhnev declares. "The name of our comrade-in-arms, leader of the Cuban socialist revolution Comrade Fidel Castro is familiar to the peoples not only of Latin America bu t of other continents too."


Brezhnev values highly the heroic struggle of the Chilean people and sees it as an outstanding example ofloyalty to the ideals of freedom and progress: "The revolution in Chile was a striking expression of her people's ardent desire to liberate themselves from the oppression and exploitation of their own bourgeoisie and foreign monopolies. It was headed by people of great integrity and humanity. It rallied the masses for building a new life. But the conspiracy of Chilean reaction, planned and paid for-as is now well known-by foreign imperialism, caught the revolu tion unawares. The fascist military dictatorship drenched the country in blood. Tens of thousands of the working people's finest and most loyal sons and daughters were killed, tortured to death, or imprisoned. A dark night of terror descended upon the country. But the temporary defeat of the Chilean revolution does not detract from its historic achievements, from the significance of its experience."


You may rest assured, Leonid Brezhnev stresses, that together with all progressive mankind we will unwaveringly be on the side of the democratic antifascist forces of Chile.


Acu te political and social contradictions are typical of this continent today. The sway of US imperialism and obsolete semifeudal structures gave Latin American capitalism a particularly ugly twist and affected its development. Still largely in control of the economy and resources of many Latin American countries, the international capitalist monopolies go on plu ndering them ru thlessly, Brezhnev observes.


In response, anti-imperialist, liberation movements have intensified. "Latin America has known remarkable upsurges of the liberation struggle, heroic deeds and victories," Brezhnev stresses. "But it has also witnessed defeat, the blood bath of pu rges against patriots and revolutionaries. Experience convinces us: where the positions of imperialism and its lackeys are threatened, the bourgeoisie becomes totally oblivious of its propaganda claptrap about 'democracy' and the 'free world', it stoops to any violence, to any brutality."


The Soviet U nion supports liberation, anti-imperialist movements, including those in Latin America. It acts in solidarity with the just struggle of national liberation.


Revolution matures on the distinctive soil of this or that country. How and when it emerges, what forms and methods it uses-these questions concern the people of that country themselves. As regards Latin America, we are confident that its future is inseparable from the development of mankind as a whole; it is a future of freedom, independence and social progress. The Soviet Union would like to see the countries of Latin America participate rn.ore actively in international life, to hear them raise their independent voice with greater confidence on the world scene. We are sure that this would benefit the cause of peace and equitable international co-operation.


The turn from the cold war to \emph{detente} contributed to positive changes in the policies of a number of Latin American countries. They have taken or are taking steps to restrict the plunder by foreign monopolies and carry out u rgent :reforms in their political, economic, social and cultural life.


Relations between the USSR and Latin America have changed significantly. We support these countries' striving towards stronger political independence and welcome their greater role in international life, Brezhnev says. We also consider it important to take new steps to strengthen friendly ties with Latin American countries, especially with those engaged in a vigorous drive for peace and national liberation.


Latin American pu blic opinion welcomed the signing by the Soviet Union of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in May 1978. "Assuming the obligation to respect the status of Latin America as a nuclear-free zone," Brezhnev notes, "we expect the other nuclear powers, too, to strictly observe this status, and the parties to the treaty to ensure a truly nuclear-free regime in the region to which it applies. Generally, we believe that this step of ours will serve to consolidate and develop friendly relations with the countries of Latin America."


The expansion of diplomatic, economic, scientific and cultural contacts of Latin American countries with the USSR and other socialist countries enhances the international prestige of Latin American countries and their role in world politics.


In his March 1981 message to the visitors of the USSR National Exhibition in Mexico, Brezhnev reaffirmed the Soviet people's solidarity with the nations of Latin America and other continents striving for greater sovereignty, for genuine economic independence and for the right to be masters of their own natu ral resources.

\chapter{6. May Europe Be a Peace Zone}


Brezhnev works for the solution of the most complicated international problems with his usual energy and perseverance. This applies, among others, to the problem of European security and co-operation and turning Europe into a peace zone.


At different times-before and after the Second World War-the Soviet Union's means of struggle for European security changed to suit the changing opportu nities. But the persistent striving to strengthen peace on the continent and to extend business relations with the European states of the other system has been consistent.


Our Party, Brezhnev says, "has always devoted paramount attention to ensuring European security. And the reasons for this are entirely understandable if you consider Europe's importance in world affairs."


Who can forget that it was Europe where the two World Wars originated, causing the continent frightful devastation? The Second World War, which was the most destructive of all wars, claimed, as we have mentioned, more than 20 million Soviet lives and destroyed nearly a third of the country's national wealth. Other European nations, too, suffered tremendous losses. And it is in Europe that the biggest forces of the two different groupings-NATO and the Warsaw Treaty-confront each other today; a vast number of missiles and of nuclear and conventional arms is concentrated there.


Europe is a treasure house of incalculable material and spiritual wealth-magnificent cities, the most up-to-date industrial enterprises, centres of scientific and technical thought, unique and precious works of art, and monuments of culture and antiquity.


Besides, Europe is the most densely populated continent. Some 700 million people are crowded there into a relatively small area. More than half of them belong to the working class, the chief productive force of society and the leading class of the present epoch.


This concentration in a limited area presages for Europe especially heavy losses in the event of a nuclear war. In sum, Europe needs a new type of relations, based on genuine \emph{detente} and mu tual confidence.


All activities related to the establishment of an effective system of European security and co-operation are these days associated most directly with Brezhnev's name.


It was with his active involvement that the initial outlines of a European model of peace were worked out at the Conference of Warsaw Treaty countries in Bucharest in July 1966 and the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in Karlovy Vary in April 1967. The contours of European peace, as conceived by the participants in these conferences, included the following points: inviolability of European frontiers, renunciation of the use or threat of force and settlement of international dispu tes exclusively by peaceful means, development of mu tually beneficial good-neighbourly relations on the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, convocation of a European conference to discuss security and peaceful co-operation in Europe, and lessening of military tension, including dissolution of military alliances.


The central question of European security, Brezhnev said in


Karlovy Vary, "is that of the inviolability of European frontiers as they took shape as a result of and following the Second World War."


At present, these proposals formulated by Brezhnev have been formalised in treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.


Soviet leadership attached great importance to the convocation of the European conference. The socialist countries worked tirelessly to have the idea of the conference put into practice, leaning for support on the peace forces in Europe. And these efforts were crowned with a major success: the several years' long preparations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were completed by the summer of 1975. The leaders of thirty-three European countries, the United States and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sum up the results and affix their signatures to the Final Act of the Conference.


I recall with emotion the afternoon of August 1, 1975, Brezhnev says. "That day, in the Finlandia House, the leaders of thirty-three European countries, the United States and Canada sat down side by side at the conference table and signed the Final Act. That was a day of great hopes for the peoples. It was also a day ofrealistic assessment of the future, not untouched by the concern over what the world would be like 5 years or a decade later."


There has been no more representative or more important conference for European peace in history, and it is universally acknowledged that Brezhnev made a tremendous contribu tion to its success-from advancing the idea for it right up to its culmination at summit level. The Soviet leader said in his Helsinki speech, "Expectations and hopes that no other collective action since the well-known Allied decisions of the postwar period can equal are associated with the results of this Conference. The historic significance of the Conference is especially clear to people who belong to the generation that experienced the horrors of the Second World War. Its aims are also dear to the hearts and minds of the generation of Europeans who grew up and are living in conditions of peace and who rightly consider that this is as it should be."


Everything must be done to prevent these expectations and hopes from being disappointed, Brezhnev said, and he called for "joint efforts to ensure Europe's conversion into a continent that would never see any more military upheavals". He noted that "the results of the Conference are a carefully considered balance of the interests of all the participating states. Ifthere are compromises, these compromises are justified, of the kind that benefit peace without obliterating the distinctions in ideology and social system."


While commending the Final Act and the results of the Conference, Brezhnev was already looking to the future and urging that its provisions should not be turned into a scrap of paper bu t should be pu t into effect: He stressed that \emph{detente} must be increasingly filled with material content. "Precisely the realisation of \emph{detente} is the substance of the matter . . ." he said. "It is very important to proclaim the correct and just principles of relations between states. And it is no less important to consolidate these principles in present-day international relations, to translate them into practice and make them a law of international life that no one is allowed to violate."


The Helsinki Conference influenced the entire course of events in Europe and many other regions of the world. Summing up the past and proceeding from the prevailing conditions of the present, it was directed to the future. "The results achieved," Brezhnev says, "are worth the expended effort. The participants in the Conference have collectively confirmed the inviolability of the existing frontiers. A body of principles has been elaborated for guiding interstate relations; they are entirely consonant-in letter and spirit-with the req uirements of peaceful coexistence . . . . The perspectives of peaceful co-operation have been outlined in a number of fields-the economy, science and technology, culture and information, and contacts between people. Some other measures have also been defined to build confidence between states, including in the military sphere."


With the same tireless energy, consistency, and initiative that he display in calling for the convocation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Brezhnev is now working for the complete and all-round implementation of the Final Act. He urges stepped-u p efforts in this area, denounces the enemies of \emph{detente} and has authored new concrete initiatives.


Brezhnev takes advantage of every public appearance to attract the attention of the world pu blic to q uestions of European security and co-operation.


Soon after the Helsinki Conference, speaking at the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw, he said, "We arc in favour of consistently fulfilling the specific provisions of the Final Act. In saying so, we would like to stress that it is very important to see and u nderstand the significance of this document as a whole, and of all its parts, and not to succumb to the temptation of taking separate pieces from it out of context just because someone considers them tactically more advantageous for himself."


Setting an example of the constructive approach to the Helsinki accords, Brezhnev has made the proposal of convening European congresses or intergovernmental conferences on co-operation in such fields as environmental protection and the development of transportation and energy, which could, among other things, discuss the idea of united transportation and power systems.


Speaking at the Conference of Twenty-nine Commu nist and Workers' Parties of Europe, Brezhnev presented the Soviet Union's extensive programme for implementing the Helsinki accords in spirit and letter. In the same terms and with the same sense of conviction as at official negotiations with Western leaders, he referred at this European Communist forum to the importance of ensuring lasting peace in Europe and creating the "material fabric of peaceful coexistence".


Brezhnev hailed the progress of \emph{detente} on the European continent but called attention to obstacles and to attempts at using the Helsinki document for interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. "The socialist countries," he said, "are not a 'closed society". We are open to everything that is truthful and honest and are prepared to multiply contacts, making the most of the favourable conditions created by \emph{detente.} But our doors will always be closed to publications propagating war, violence, racism and hatred, and doubly so to emissaries of foreign secret services and the anti-Soviet emigre organisations sponsored by them . . . . I feel that since the recent scandalous exposures of CIA activities everyone will agree that, mildly speaking, there are valid reasons for our approach.


As we see it, cultural exchange and the mass media must serve humane ideals and peace and friendship among nations. Yet subversive radio stations that have usurped names such as 'Liberty' and 'Free Europe' are operating in the territory of some European countries. Their very existence is a wanton challenge to the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accords.


Unlike some Western countries, the Soviet Union published the full text of the Final Act in about 20 million copies-in \emph{Pravda} and \emph{Izvestia} and in the languages of the Union Republics. Since then there were two more printings of the Final Act.


Acting on the provisions of the Helsinki accords, the Soviet Ministry of Defence has made a practice of preliminary notification about major military manoeuvres, and observers from other countries, including members of NATO, have been present at a number of them. Together with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union has come forward with new constructive proposals that substantially take into account the Western powers' position at the talks on red ucing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, with drafts of an agreement on principles of relations between the Council for Mu tual Economic Assistance and European Economic Commu nity, on organising European cooperation in the field of energy, on enlivening cultural exchange (in UNESCO) and the like. The Soviet Union has begun, on a reciprocal basis, to grant multiple exit visas to permanently accredited journalists, has extended their range of movement in the country and has done a great deal in humanitarian spheres.


On the whole, Brezhnev points out, "the work ofimplementing the Helsinki accords has now been parcelled into tens, even hund reds, of practical measures. They may not always be conspicuous, bu t they amount to party and government work of the utmost importance. And we Soviet people appreciate the efforts of those who are working in the same direction."


Answering questions pu t by \emph{Le M onde,} Brezhnev said, "Today, I think, no one will contest the fact that the Helsinki accords contain a great potential of positive influence on relations between states and on the situation in Europe and beyond its borders. More, the Final Act signed in Helsinki has already become a weighty political reality of international life and is being pu t into effect quite actively. Much has already been done, though the degree of progress is naturally different in different areas. After all, and the participants in the European Conference agree on this point, the Final Act is a broad and long-term programme of action by states to strengthen European peace. I would like to emphasise that this programme will be all the more successfully implemented in future if there are fewer attempts to poison the climate of relations between states."


The conferences of the Political Consultative Committee in November 1978 and May 1980 made a conspicuous contribution to the fight for European security and co-operation. The Soviet delegation, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, took an active part in drawing up the conference documents, which reaffirmed the determination of the Warsaw Treaty countries to work for the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.


Proposals covering all aspects of military \emph{detente} in Europe, including nuclear and conventional arms reduction and confidence-building measu res, were made by Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin at the festivities on the 30th anniversary of the German Democratic Repu blic in October 1979. They abounded in new initiatives and added up to a programme of action for \emph{detente} and European security, to a platform for the consolidation of European peace.


In Europe, as in all other regions of the world, Brezhnev said, we want lasting peace. That is the core, the backbone of our foreign policy, and we follow it consistently, withou t deviation.


He described the Final Act of the European Conference in Helsinki as a kind of charter of security for the peoples of Europe, a charter of a peaceful life and of peaceful relations between states. It is the earnest wish of the Soviet Union, he stressed, that this charter be carried out in full.


Judging by their words, Western statesmen want the same," Brezhnev added. "Unfortunately, the deeds of our partners are too often headed in a different direction. We can't help seeing the facts: supporters of the arms race use all pretexts, even non-existent and far-fetched ones, to stoke up the situation and accelerate military preparations. In Europe they are planning to lay a mine under the very foundation of the edifice of peace."


The dangerous plans for the deployment of new types of US nuclear missiles in Western Europe are causing serious alarm, Brezhnev noted. The purpose here is to upset the balance of forces that has taken shape in Europe and to try and win military superiority for the NATO bloc. Brezhnev warned that implementation of the NATO plans would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and in many respects also the international atmosphere.


The Soviet leader declared that his country is prepared to red uce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR from their present level, provided no additional medium-range nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe. In his speech, Brezhnev advanced new initiatives concerning confidence building, issued a call to countries that participated in the European Conference to renounce first use of nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapons against one another, and announced the decision of the Warsaw Treaty countries unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe, and so on.


It will be recalled that the United States and NATO turned down the constructive Soviet proposals, including the offer to begin negotiations forthwith. Under US pressure, the December 1979 session of the NATO Council went along with the American plan of stationing new US missiles in Western Europe. This did untold damage to \emph{detente} and European security.


Washington's moves to complicate the international situation, as Brezhnev said, are aimed at bending the European states, and first of all its own allies, to its will.


The vital interests of the European nations require Europe to follow a different path-the path blazed in Helsinki, Brezhnev said at the 26th Party Congress. "We believe that the process begun by the European Conference should be a continuous one. All forms of negotiations--multilateral and bilateral-should be used to settle the problems that are trou bling Europe."


The 26th Congress made a signal new contribution to political and mili tary \emph{detente} in Europe, advancing a comprehensive plan for the implementation of the key provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.


Recalling that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries had already made a series of concrete proposals on military \emph{detente} in Europe, Brezhnev referred specifically to the appeal to the participants of the European Conference to undertake not to use either nuclear or conventional armaments against one another first. He also referred to the proposal not to extend the existing or create any new military blocs in Europe and other continents.


Referring to nuclear-missile weapons in Europe, Leonid Brezhnev again emphasised that the December 1979 decision of the NATO Council "is no 'response' to any imagined Soviet challenge. Neither is it an ordinary 'modernisation' of the arsenal, as the West would have us believe. It speaks of the obvious intention to tilt the existing military balance in Europe in NATO's favour."


The report leads up to the conclusion that deployment in the FRG, I taly, Britain, the Netherlands or Belgiu m of new US missiles trained on the USSR and its allies was bound to affect Soviet relations with these countries, to say nothing of how it would prejudice their own security. There was a kind of vicious circle over the question of nuclear-missile weapons in Europe, Brezhnev observed, with the measures of one side precipitating counter-measures by the other.


How to break it? Brezhnev suggested a moratorium at once on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, the freezing of the existing quantitative and qualitative levels of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in the region. The moratorium, he said, could enter into force the moment negotiations began on the subject, and could remain in force until a permanent treaty was concluded on limiting or, still better, red ucing such nuclear weapons in Europe. In making this proposal, the Soviet Union expects the two sides to halt all preparations for the deployment of any additional weapons of this type, including US Pershing-2 missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles.


The moratorium proposal is not an aim in itself. It was made with the intention of creating a more favourable climate for negotiations. Speaking on April 7, 198l , in Prague, Leonid Brezhnev specially emphasised, "As we see it, the aim in the matter-as I have said before and say again-is for the sides to reduce the quantity of nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe. This can be done perfectly well without prejudicing the security of either East or West."


The confidence-building proposal was also of fundamental importance. Confidence-building measures, as we know, provide for advance notices of military exercises of ground troops and invitations to observers from other countries. This has become common practice and is applied to the territory of European states, including the western regions of the Soviet Union. The USSR has repeatedly suggested going further and notifying each other of naval and air exercises as well, and oflarge troop movements.


And now, Brezhnev said at the Congress, "we want to propose that the zone for these measures should be substantially extended. We are prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the Western states also extend the confidence zone accordingly."


This was a demonstration of genuine Soviet wishes to further military \emph{detente} in Europe. That, indeed, was how the action was received by the peace-loving public in other countries. Brezhnev also touched on the situation at the Vienna negotiations on red ucing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. "Here," he said, "the socialist countries have gone more than halfway to meet the Western partners. But we've got to say blu ntly that if the Western countries continue to drag out these talks while increasing their military potential in Europe, we will have to take this fact into account."


As Leonid Brezhnev sees it, the vital interests of the European nations are indissolubly associated with \emph{detente.} Europeans have learned of its beneficial effects from their own experience. "They, the people of a continent that has time and again been scorched by destructive wars, are not at all ready, we are sure, to become involved in reckless ventures at the will of overseas politicians," Brezhnev said. "It is quite inconceivable that any country in Europe should agree to fling the fruits of \emph{detente} beneath the boots of those who want to crush them. \emph{Detente} in Europe is something the Western countries and, for that matter, the United States need no less than the socialist countries, than the Soviet Union."


Brezhnev notes that in Europe a lot of constructive things can be done for peace, particularly in connection with the Madrid meeting and the proposal made by the Warsaw Treaty countries to hold a conference on military \emph{detente} and disarmament in Europe. "We are resolu te supporters of strengthening and multiplying everything positive that has been achieved on the European continent over the years thanks to the collective efforts of states big and small," Brezhnev says. "We shall continue, as before, to pursue a policy of peace and friendship among nations."


L. I.Brezhnev believes, and he reaffirmed that at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, that despite the efforts of enemies of \emph{detente,} peaceful co-operation between countries of the two systems is, by and large, making good headway on the European continent. Political contacts have become broader and more meaningful. "Frequently, we manage to find a common language on some major problems of foreign policy." Economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties are expanding, and are taking on new qualities. Multilateral conferences have been held on various aspects of European co-operation.

\section{The Soviet Union and France}


As Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "And though we do not agree with all that France is doing on the international scene, our relations remain a major factor of \emph{detente,} and we are for their future dynamic development."


Brezhnev's first visit to France was in the autumn of 1971.


Significant events took place in Soviet-French relations precisely since Leonid Brezhnev became General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. President Charles de Gaulle of France paid an official visit to the Soviet Union on june 20-July 1, 1966. This summit meeting was an extremely important landmark in the further advancement of Soviet-French co-operation. The joint declaration stated, "General de Gaulle's visit to the USSR and the talks held during it are a fundamental contribu tion to the development of concord between the Soviet Union and France, between the Soviet people and the people of France."


After an exchange of visits by the heads of the Soviet and French governments, Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders received President Georges Pompidou of France in October 1970. This summit meeting resulted in the signing of the Soviet-French protocol on political consultations, a document of exceptional, fundamental importance. It said that in situations which both sides think are fraught with a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or causing international tension, the governments of the Soviet Union and France would at once make contact in order to agree positions and measures to cope with such situations.


The protocol also said that the Soviet Union and France would extend and deepen political consultations on important internatio\_nal problems of mutual interest. These consultations would be of a regular nature.


These were the most conspicuous events in Soviet-French relations preceding Leonid Brezhnev's first visit to France. That visit left a profound and benign trace in the history of Soviet-French co-operation and, for that matter, also in the chronicles of contemporary international relations.


As stressed in the Soviet-French declaration, "the visit of L. I. Brezhnev helped to reaffirm the continuous expansion and deepening of the co-operation between the two countries, and the special character of the relations of friendship and mutual respect prevailing between the peoples of the USSR and France. This visit gives new scope to the Soviet-French concord and co-operation, which have been placed in the service of peace."


The negotiations culminated in the signing of an agreement on the development of economic, technical and industrial co-operation between the governments of the Soviet Union and France.


Of special significance were the Principles of Co-operation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France adopted as a result of


L. I. Brezhnev's visit. This document is of so much importance that we will examine it at greater length.


To begin with, the document stresses that Soviet-French cooperation accords with the common aspirations and mutual interests of the Soviet and French peoples and must repose on reciprocity of benefits and commitments.


The third principle, in particular, attracted the attention of observers. It says: "The policy of concord and co-operation between the USSR and France will be followed in future as well: it is to become a permanent policy in their relations and a permanent factor in international affairs." The fifth and sixth principles say that political consultations between the two governments will take on a new dimension with the use of special meetings between their representatives, as well as the usual diplomatic channels.


If there should be situations that both sides think are fraught with a threat to peace, a breach of peace or are causing international tension, the Soviet Union and France would act in accordance with the Soviet-French protocol of October 13, 1970.


Public attention was also drawn to the seventh provision: "Great significance is attached to the close co-operation of the USSR and France in Europe jointly with interested states in safeguarding peace and continuing the line towards \emph{detente,} in strengthening security, peaceful relations and co-operation among all European states on the condition of undeviating observance of the following principles:


-the inviolability of present frontiers; -non-interference in internal affairs; "-equality;


"-independence;


-renunciation of the use or threat of force."""


In the concluding paragraphs both sides expressed the resolve to continue developing the economic, commercial, scientific, technical and cultural ties between the Soviet and French peoples in the light of their tradition and friendship.


As rightly noted by many international observers, this was the first time the principles of peaceful coexistence were so fully expressed in a document adopted by the Soviet Union with a large Western state, such as France. Subsequently, many of them were reflected in bilateral documents signed by the Soviet Union with other Western countries. These principles were also widely invoked during the work on the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This shows the tremendous international significance of the principles governing Soviet--French co-operation adopted as a result of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Paris.


Following this visit there were a few more Soviet-French summit meetings. In January 1973 in Zaslavl, near Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, working talks were held by Brezhnev and Pompidou, who came to the Soviet Union on an unofficial visit. The joint communique published after the meeting stressed that the policy of concord and co-operation continued to prevail in Soviet-French relations and was gaining increasing weight in international affairs. It was also noted that Brezhnev and Pompidou had devoted prime attention to the developments in Europe, notably the preparations for the European Conference on Security and Co-operation. They also reaffirmed the special significance they attached to the further extension of bilateral SovietFrench relations.


Towards the end of June that year, at Rambouillet, near Paris, another working meeting took place between Brezhnev and Pompidou.


The last meeting that Brezhnev had with Pompidou was in Pitsunda, on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, in mid-March of 1974.


In early December 1974 Brezhnev paid his next working visit to France. Addressing him, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said: "Your visit is evidence of the continuity and durability of the relations prevailing between France and the USSR-of their continuity because they conform with the tradition which I, for my part, intend to continue, a tradition of frequent and regular meetings between the highest-ranking leaders of France and the Soviet Union; and of their endurance because the change of your French collocutor following the demise of President Pompidou has in no way affected, or slowed down, the development of these relations."


These words found confirmation in the documents adopted as a result of the Rambouillet meeting: a Soviet-French communique and an agreement on the two countries' economic co-operation in 1975-79. The agreement specially stressed the need for carrying out large-scale projects of mu tual interest, the importance of industrial co-operation, including joint production, and the significance of credits on maximally favourable terms. Other measures of expanding economic co-operation were also mentioned.


In these 5 years, the two countries decided to double trade in comparison with the previous 5-year period and to do what they could to treble it and, besides, to secure a balanced development of commercial exchange.


Bilateral business ties expanded visibly in diverse spheres. As a result of French Premier Jacques Chirac's official visit to the Soviet Union in March 1975 agreements were signed on bilateral co-operation in environmental protection and agriculture.


Important documents were adopted during President Giscard d'Estaing's official visit to the Soviet Union in October 1975, a few months after the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. "The USSR and France," the Declaration said, "regard the European Conference as an event of tremendous importance. They note that the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference create new opportunities for the consolidation of European security and the development of co-operation between the participating states."


Speaking at a dinner in honour of the French President, Brezhnev took special note of the responsibility devolving on the participating states for the implementation of the Helsinki accords.


In addition to the Declaration on the Further Development of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and France,


\textbf{PFHL - L} bilateral agreements were signed on co-operation m tourism and energetics.


Following up these talks between Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and France exchanged letters (in July 1976) on the prevention of accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. This move was consonant with the special responsibility devolving on the two countries as nuclear powers.


Another important milestone in Soviet-French co-operation was the official visit of Leonid Brezhnev to France in June 1977. This visit coincided in time with the anniversary of the perfidious nazi attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Recalling the tragic events, Brezhnev, a veteran of the war, said that he was deeply moved when laying a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier beside the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in homage to the memory of the Frenchmen who had laid down their lives for the independence and honour of France, and for the common victory over fascism. "How many are they, these memorials, in the towns and villages of the different countries of our continent," the Soviet leader observed. "They stand as symbols of the heroism and sorrow of the peoples, as a reminder that until recently peace in Europe was no more than an interval between wars."


In this context, Brezhnev again stressed the imperative of halting the arms race and going on to effective disarmament measures. He spoke of the specially grave danger presented by the prospect of a further spread of nuclear weapons across the world, and by the development of new, still more terrifying and still more destructive types and systems of mass annihilation weapons. "Our country," the Soviet leader said, "has been doing and will continue to do everything it can to avert this course of events."


These and other vital problems were reflected in documents signed at Rambouillet as a result of Brezhnev's visit: a Soviet-French declaration, ajoint statement on \emph{detente,} and a declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The joint statement said, in part:


"The Soviet Union and France consider it necessary that all states should continue and expand their efforts in favour of \emph{detente} through:


concrete implementation of the Final Act solemnly signed in Helsinki and active support of all efforts taken in this direction;"


" adoption of resolu te initiatives towards disarmament;


efforts to prevent the development of the spirit of \emph{detente} from being obstructed by considerations of bloc politics;"


" non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and respect for their sovereignty and independence;


consideration for the legitimate interests and viewpoints of other states;"


" maintenance of a favourable atmosphere in relations between states;


gearing actions towards other states and in all regions of the world to" the needs of \emph{detente;}


" promotion of mutual understanding between people by extending contacts between them and furthering knowledge of the culture and life of other nations;


encouragement of feelings of friendship and mu tual confidence among all nations."


The sides also reaffirm that respect for human rights and basic freedoms by all states are one of the foundations for a deep-going improvement in their mu tual relations.


Inaddition, Soviet-French agreements were signed by the respective government ministers on co-operation in transport and chemistry, as well as a protocol related to the 10-year programme of deepening Soviet-French co-operation in the economic and industrial fields.


Even the above recapitulation of the documents adopted as a result of this summit meeting shows the extraordinary fruitfulness of the Soviet leader's visit to France, as was indeed recorded with gratification by the Political Bureau of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers.


The official document they issued on the results of Brezhnev's visit said, in part: "After the meeting at Rambouillet, the co-operation between the USSR and France has acquired still greater stability and has risen to a higher level. This accords completely with the interests of the peoples of both countries and those of peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world."


The new tasks facing the initiators and makers of French-Soviet co-operation were described in Brezhnev's speech at a dinner in honour of the President of the French Repu blic during the latter's official visit to the Soviet Union in April 1979. ''At the turn of the seventies," the Soviet leader said, "the Soviet U nion and France facilitated the change of course towards the policy of \emph{detente.} A still greater task has arisen at the turn of the eighties: to see to it that \emph{detente} should triumph irreversibly and everywhere on the globe. Peace and \emph{detente} are political twins. If \emph{detente} takes root, peace will be more solid."


This brings us to the eighties. What new and useful elements will they introduce in the fruitful co-operation of the Soviet Union and France, the pioneers of international \emph{detente?} Clear guidelines for the new period in Soviet-French relations were defined in thejoint documents adopted as a result of the negotiations in April 1979.


To begin wi th, a few words about the Programme for the Further Development of Co-operation between the Soviet Union and France for \emph{Detente} and Peace, which presents a detailed exposition of the two countries' co-operation on the international scene to prevent war, and to further and deepen the policy of \emph{detente,} notably in Europe.


Among other things, the document stresses the importance of the Mad rid meeting of the states that participated in the European Conference on Security and Co-operation. A special place is accorded to problems of disarmament. Both sides reaffirmed their determination to do everything they can to secure real progress here, with the end goal of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear, under effective international control.


Considerable attention was devoted to economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation, to contacts in the mili tary field, and to co-operation on such global problems as environmental protection, the battle against diseases and hu nger, raising the social and economic level of the developing countries, exploration of the World Ocean and of outer space, discovery of new sources of energy and so on.


Tremendous significance attaches to the long-term programme of deepening Soviet-French economic, industrial and technical cooperation for 1980-90, adopted as a result of the negotiations. The sides agreed to encourage joint work in industry, agricultu re, commerce, transport and other fields. In so doing, they agreed to promote new directions and forms of co-operation making for fuller use of the technical, industrial and natural potentialities of the two countries. The sides re-emphasised the great benefit of co-operation in the construction of industrial projects in the USSR and France, in building enterprises in the Soviet Union on the principle of full or partial compensation, and the mutual advantages implicit in joint prod uction and in the development of industrial co-operation.


The two sides also signed a Soviet-French agreement on economic co-operation for 1980-85.


Furthermore, a set of agreements were concluded at ministerial level concerning various fields of bilateral co-operation.


All this gave Leonid Brezhnev cause to say that the Soviet-French summit meeting "culminated in very large-scale, landmark results".


The immense personal contribution of Leonid Brezhnev to SovietFrench co-operation has been noted time and again by leading French personalities. During the Soviet leader's visit to Paris in Decem ber 1974, Giscard d'Estaing emphasised Brezhnev's great personal contribution to the Soviet-French dialogue and concord. "I was simply astounded by the cordiality, informality and frankness that highlighted the talks with


M. Leonid Brezhnev," the French President said. "At these negotiations, I must say, he showed a very clear understanding of the issues, a very deep knowledge of the problems, and at the same time displayed extraordinary frankness in expounding them. I tried to reciprocate."


Addressing journalists at the Gold Salon of the Elysee Palace, Giscard d'Estaing said: "I really have the impression that I am dealing with a man guided by a genuine desire for peace . . . . Brezhnev cannot conceive Soviet foreign activity as something that could or can be accompanied by armed interference."


An effective mechanism of Soviet-French co-operation has emerged as a result of the many years' consistent and purposeful mutual efforts. In the political field it consists in regular meetings and negotiations between the leaders of the two countries, in systematic consultations between their foreign ministers and in bilateral contacts at other levels. The participants in these meetings and talks constantly keep crucial international problems and questions of bilateral co-operation within their field of vision.


A Mixed Soviet-French ("Big") Commission consisting of highranking representatives of the two countries and a Mixed "Small" Commission are operating successfully in the economic, scientific and technical spheres. A Mixed Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce has been set up to promote trade.


The Soviet Union exports to France certain machines and technical items, and such raw materials as sawn timber, pulpwood and cotton. French firms supply the Soviet Union with machines and equipment, rolled ferrous metals, piping, chemicals and other goods.


In recent years the two countries' economic, commercial, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation has been going beyond the traditional frameworks and acquiring new forms. Nowadays, bilateral ties have reached out to many new fields: the motor and tractor industry, shipbuilding, machine tools, power engineering, instrumentmaking, compu ter technology, ferrous metallu rgy, oil processing, the gas, coal and mining industries, chemicals, consumer industries, commu nications and so forth.


Another promising field is opening up: Soviet organisations are taking part in the construction of industrial complexes in France, while French firms are helping to build various enterprises in the Soviet Union.


The Soviet Union, for example, exported various technical equipment for an industrial complex in Fos-su r-Mer, near Marseilles; delivered and assembled a hydraulic press, the most powerful in Western Europe, at Issouire. For its part, Renault took part in building and modernising Soviet motorworks on the Kama (Kamaz), in Moscow, and in Izhevsk. A number of French firms supplied equipment for the Orenburg industrial gas complex and a few other industrial projects in the Soviet Union.


Soviet and French organisations and experts in peaceful uses of atomic energy and outer space are doing good work together. French researchers have developed a liquid hydrogen bubble chamber, Mirabelle, on the giant accelerator near the Soviet city of Serpukhov, and part of French natural uranium is dressed at Soviet plants. French instruments were used on the Soviet lunar vehicles and on the \emph{M ars} and \emph{Venera} space stations, while Soviet rockets placed French artificial satellites in orbit round the earth.


There are business ties between the two sides in the field of colour television ( the Soviet Union uses the French SECAM system), in environmental protection, medicine and other fields.


Both sides are pleased to note the good progress of their traditional ties in culture. The theatre, cinema, radio and television, education, sports, information, mutual study of French and Russian literatureindeed, it is hard to name any field of culture that is not involved in this co-operation. Take this example: Progress Publishers, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura Publishers, and many other Soviet publishing houses annually put out up to 200 books by French authors translated into Russian and other languages spoken in the Soviet Union.


A prominent part in the erection of this enduring edifice of Soviet-French co-operation is played by the parliaments of the two countries, which regularly exchange delegations headed by prominent political and public leaders.


Certainly, the shaping and development of Soviet-French relations has not always been smooth. There were, and still are, difficulties and obstacles. But the many-sided co-operation between the two countries still has potentialities that could be tapped for the good of the two nations and in the interests of world peace and security.


When Frarn;ois Mitterrand was elected President of France in May 1981, Brezhnev sent him a message of congratulation, which noted that the Soviet Union and France, the peoples of both countries were linked by traditional ties of friendship and co-operation. "We want these relations to develop in all fields and to remain a major factor for peace in the future." Brezhnev went on to express the hope that the Soviet Union and France would continue to promote mutual understanding between


East and West with the ailll of curbing the arms race, achieving disarmament, eliminating breeding grounds of armed conflict and strengthening security in Europe and the world.


The Soviet leader wished the new President success in his activities and the friendly people of France well-being and prosperity.

\section{Soviet-British Relations}


The relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain are developing sporadically, and not always smoothly. "As for Soviet-British relations," Leonid Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "we regret to say that here there is stagnation, bu t not through any fault of ours. I think that this is contrary to the interests of both the Soviet Union and Britain."


In the situation that has now developed the periods when these relations were good stand out all the more memorably. They are memorable mainly because they always benefited both countries and helped to strengthen peace. As most people know, co-operation between the Soviet Union and Great Britain has long-standing historical traditions. In 1921 London was the first to take the step of setting up trade relations with Soviet Russia; in 1924 diplomatic relations were established. This was of great benefit to both countries.


The Soviet Union and Britain were allies in the war against Hitler Germany and its satellites. Many years later Leonid Brezhnev was to recall that both countries had behind them massive experience of fighting shoulder to shoulder for a just cause.


People of our generation, Brezhnev said, are well aware that this was an alliance not only of governments; it was also a fighting partnership of our armies and peoples, an historical example of successful co-operation despite the difference in social systems. "The present day of the planet on which we live at increasingly close quarters is marked by the struggle for true remembrance of those who gave their lives in the fight against aggression and for the right to live in conditions of peace, independence and freedom."


Soviet people well remember the alliance of the peoples of the freedom-loving countries during the years of joint struggle against fascism. "In the war years," Brezhnev said, "we co-operated and co-operated quite well to end the war more quickly. Now we are tackling another, no less important and, perhaps, even more complex task-the task of arranging co-operation in such a way as to prevent a new disaster of global proportions."


These words were spoken in 1975, when the world was celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Second World War. The celebrations in the Soviet Union were attended by a British delegation, which included Group-Captain Miller ( retd.), who during the war, as commander of the 134th Squadron of the 15lst Air Regiment, had been awarded the highest Soviet order-the Order of Lenin. The delegation was led by Lord Mountbatten, the personal representative of Queen Elizabeth I I. At a big reception in the Kremlin Leonid Brezhnev met the heads of the delegations of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition: Lord Mou ntbatten, Averell Harriman ( USA) and General P. Billotte ( France) .


At that time a memorial in honou r of the Allied convoys that were so bravely manned by American, British and Soviet sailors was unveiled in the arctic city of Murmansk.


A fresh reminder of the wartime alliance came with the exchange of official visits of friendship by British and Soviet warships in May 1976. The Soviet destroyer \emph{Obraztsovy} visited Portsmouth and the British frigate \emph{Devonshire} came to Odessa. Soviet and British sailors paid tribute to the men who gave their lives in the war, visited places connected with wartime events and had many friendly meetings. The crew of the \emph{Obraztsovy} gave a concert in Portsmouth that attracted thousands of people; they also received about 10,000 British visitors on board. The British sailors competed with sailors in Odessa in various sports. All these meetings were reported by the Soviet newspaper \emph{Red Star} and many other Soviet and British papers. At a reception in honour of the Soviet sailors Mayor I. G. Gibson of Portsmouth expressed the general view that such visits help "to establish relations of goodwill and mutual u nderstanding".


However, memories of wartime co-operation cannot efface the knowledge of the lost opportunities for developing effective co-operation between the two countries in subsequent years.


The cold war brought neither advantage nor laurels to those who began it. On the contrary, it poisoned the international atmosphere and prevented the solution of many urgent problems facing the postwar world. There was growing understanding, however, not only of the senselessness of the cold war but also of the grave danger of its growing into a "hot war". In the spring of 1955 Winston Churchill came to the conclusion: "Thus we have only a short time in which to make peace with one another-or to make our peace with God."


More than once the Soviet leadership has made overtu res to the British government, showing its readiness to continue the constructive dialogue and co-operation between the two countries. The general view in the Soviet Union has been and still is that such an aim is entirely realistic. The Soviet leaders, and Leonid Brezhnev personally, are deeply convinced that relations between the USSR and Great Britain can become truly friendly if policies are deliberately pursued in this direction.


This view was formed by Soviet leaders long ago. It was expressed by Leonid Brezhnev as far back as November 6, 1964, in a speech in which he stressed that "there undoubtedly exist opportunities for further development of relations with Britain". At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 Brezhnev noted that activisation of Soviet-British relations would be beneficial.


A major landmark in the development of these relations was the Soviet-British summit in Moscow in February 1975, when the process of international \emph{detente} was gathering strength. The positive changes taking place in the world were in many ways linked with the healthier climate of relations between the Soviet Union and France, the FRG and the United States. Britain also joined in this process.


Speaking on February 14, 1975 at a Kremlin luncheon in honour of Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, Leonid Brezhnev drew the attention of his high-ranking British guests to the discernible trend of events towards long-term, fruitful and mu tually advantageous co-operation between states with different social systems. "On this path of strengthening peace and peaceful co-operation," he said, "Great Britain could be a good partner of ours. Her voice carries considerable weight in world affairs. Our positions have not always and not in all things coincided, bu t we have no right to forget the fruitful co-operation we have at times achieved."


In those February days, during the negotiations in the Kremlin, mu tual understanding was noted on a wide range of questions. The atmosphere was businesslike and friendly and infused with a spirit of mu tual respect. All this made it possible to consider in detail the questions of bilateral relations and the prospects for expanding them, and to conduct a broad exchange of opinions on urgent international problems that were of interest to both sides.


At the meeting it was agreed that the important positive changes in Europe and in international relations as a whole had substantially improved the prospects for deepening \emph{detente} in Europe. In view of this the leaders of the two countries expressed their firm intention to consistently broaden relations between the Soviet U nion and Great Britain in all spheres and to strive for better mu tual understanding, confidence and co-operation.


Assessing the significance of the Kremlin talks, Harold Wilson expressed the belief that they would be "a new stage in Anglo-Soviet relations", and would open up in these relations "a more positive and creative era", which "will not be overshadowed by the misfortunes of the past". "We all," the Prime Minister emphasised, "should play our role to extend and foster \emph{detente} so that what some still regard as a fragile plant can develop the vigour of your birch-tree and ultimately the massiveness of an English oak." On his retu rn to London he again stressed the importance of the negotiations in Moscow and called them a "turning point" in relations between the two countries.


The notable results of the Kremlin meeting were reflected in the Joint Statement and in the Soviet-United Kingdom Protocol on Consultations and Long-term Programmes for the Development of Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Co-operation.


In the Joint Soviet-British Statement the leaders of the two countries expressed their adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence and pointed out that this meant "long-term, fruitful and mu tually beneficial co-operation between states, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, on the basis of full equality and mu tual respect". They agreed to take practical steps for the further fruitful development of relations between the two countries and also to hold regular exchanges of opinion at various levels on important international problems and questions of bilateral relations.


The results of this Soviet-British summit were developed and strengthened in the course of the visit to London a year later by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the subseq uent visit to Moscow by the British Foreign Secretary David Owen. Trade relations and exchanges in various fields expanded.


The record therefore offers us examples of how the will of the political leaders of the two countries can guide international relations into the channel of fruitful co-operation and open up great reserves of mu tual understanding and common interest. At the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1976 Leonid Brezhnev set the aim of consistently continuing in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence the development ofrelations oflong-term mu tually beneficial co-operation in various fields with Western countries, including Britain.


During British Foreign Secretary David Owen's visit to Moscow in 1977 an agreement on averting accidental nuclear war was signed between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This agreement reflected the special responsibility of two nuclear powers for taking all possible measures to avert the danger of such a war.


When he received the British Foreign Secretary in the Kremlin, Leonid Brezhnev expressed satisfaction that agreement had been achieved on this question and drew his attention to certain current problems mainly concerning measu res for strengthening \emph{detente} in Europe and the rest of the world, stopping the arms race, and achieving disarmament. He stressed that the Soviet Union was consistently pursuing its Leninist policy of peace and working to establish the principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and to develop equal, mutually advantageous co-operation between states in all spheres.


This policy of the Soviet state was reaffirmed in Leonid Brezhnev's message to visitors to the Soviet Exhibition, which opened in London at the end of May 1979.


The message expressed the view that this exhibition, like the Days of Soviet Science and Technology that were being held in Britain at the same time, could be an important step in the work of strengthening mu tual understanding and further development of co-operation between our countries for the mutual benefit of the Soviet and British people and in the interests of European and world peace.


The message contained a clear statement of the Soviet position: "We are prepared to go even further along the road of expanding and deepening co-operation with Britain if, of course, a similar intention is shown by the British side."


The Soviet side cannot be held responsible for the fact that attitudes of estrangement, prejudice and even direct hostility towards the Soviet Union from time to time gain the upper hand in London.


The Soviet leadership has more than once made concrete proposals to Britain's leaders, including proposals on that urgent problem of modern times, the arms race. It has explained its motives and the component elements of these proposals.


In 1977 Leonid Brezhnev sent several messages to Western leaders, including the British Prime Minister, in connection with the NATO nuclear planning group's schemes to deploy American neutron weapons in Western Europe. This new inhuman weapon, he pointed out, is everywhere arousing increasing protests and confronts us with the choice: either all the countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act will continue to follow the path of strengthening security, \emph{detente} and co-operation in Europe or there will be fresh escalation of international tension, both military and political, with all the consequences that this must entail.


Explaining the Soviet people's attitude to the neutron weapon as a particularly antihu man means of mass extermination, Brezhnev expressed the extremely simple and clear position of the USSR on this issue: "Before it is too late, agreement must be achieved among the corresponding countries on renu nciation of the manufactu re of this weapon."


In the autumn of 1979, when the United States used the NATO machine to impose on its West European allies the decision to deploy American mediu m-range missiles on their territory with the aim of upsetting the existing balance of forces in Eu rope, Leonid Brezhnev sent personal messages on this question to the leaders of a number of Western countries, including Britain, and poi nted out that the realisation of such plans by NATO would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and in many ways poison the international atmosphere as a whole.


Ever since 1967, on the basis of a special intergovernmental agreement, there has been a direct line between the Kremlin and the British Prime Minister's residence in Downing Street. The Soviet-British Protocol on Consultations concluded in 1975 provides for the holding of bilateral consultations on a regular basis, and for meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries or their representatives. Every year, while the UN General Assembly is in session, meetings take place between Soviet and Bri tish ministers.


One sphere where the principle of mutual advantage is particularly striking is economic co-operation, which for Britain means new job opportunities for many thousands of working people in the British Isles and a further boost for the country's economic development.


Trade between the peoples of our two countries goes back as far as the sixteenth century, when the first British merchants from Captain Richard Chancellor's ship that was seeking a north-east passage to India landed on the shores of Russia in the neighbourhood of Arkhangelsk. These merchants became virtually the pioneers and founders of stable trade relations between the two countries and at the same time envoys of Queen Elizabeth I to Tsar Ivan the Terrible.


Ever since those days trade and communication have steadily grown and developed, and particularly after the Second World War. Britain was the first of the main West European countries to grant the USSR long-term bank credits. Over the years strong ties have been forged between firms and enterprises. Trade is growing into economic and industrial co-operation. British people have grown accustomed to seeing Soviet watches, radios, cameras and other goods in their shops; they are quite used to the idea that Soviet materials and products, such as machine tools and electric motors, are supplied to British industry. Similarly, no one in the Soviet Union is surprised to hear of enterprises built with the participation of British firms and companies going into operation in their country. In the 5 years since 1975 the total volume of trade has doubled and is worth more than 1,200 million pounds a year. In 1977, in an appraisal of the developing trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and some other Western countries, Leonid Brezhnev emphasised the great importance of the agreements concluded between them on the principles of economic co-operation, which had shown themselves to be thoroughly effective in practice.


The Long-term Programme of Development of Economic and Industrial Co-operation between the USSR and Great Britain, signed in Moscow in 1975, is indeed of great importance. At the same time the two sides signed a 10-year programme of co-operation in the sphere of science and technology, covering metallurgy, energetics, heavy engineering, machine-tool building, the aircraft, motor, electronics, chemical, medical and light industries, and agriculture. A credit agreement was also concluded.


The foundation of economic relations between the USSR and Great Britain which was laid in those days contained the great potential that was needed for making fuller use of the growing international division of labour. Important contracts involving leading British firms were concluded in the second half of the 1970s.


In the face of stiff competition from rival Western firms the British consortium Coberrow (with the participation of Rolls-Royce) won a Soviet order to the value of nearly 100 million pounds to supply pumping stations for the Tyumen-Chelyabinsk gas pipeline. An even bigger sum ( 147 million pounds) was involved in the agreement concluded by British chemical firms for the delivery of two methanol factories to the USSR.


In this period several British firms-General Electric, Shell, Lucas Aerospace Ltd. and Rolls-Royce-signed long-term agreements on scientific and technological co-operation with Soviet organisations. A number of firms and banks-IC!, ICL, John Brown, Rank Xerox, Morgan Grenfell, the National Westminster Bank, Lloyds International, Barclays, the Midland and others-opened offices or agencies in Moscow.


An important role in the British commercial world is today played by the well-known British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, which provides a forum for firms and organisations actively involved in business with the Soviet Union. A notable meeting of members of the Chamber was held on January 15, 1981, when it was addressed by the president of the John Brown company, which has long-standing commercial ties with the USSR.


By a coincidence on that very day the Soviet newspaper \emph{Pravda} pu blished Leonid Brezhnev's message of greetings to all participants in the building and commissioning of the Prikumsky plastics factory in Stavropol region. The equipment for this factory had been supplied by John Brown. The firm's president]. Mayhew-Sonders drew attention to this message of greetings, which he rightly treated as a positive appraisal by Leonid Brezhnev of, among other things, the effectiveness of SovietBritish co-operation. For his part, he expressed the belief that this co-operation, which was of vital importance for Britain herself, would continue to gather strength. The members of the Chamber expressed their unanimous support for his point of view and disapproval of the attempts of the Conservatives to impose restrictions on trade with the USSR and other socialist countries.


For several years Britain was a major and privileged trading partner of the USSR and trade between them rapidly increased. Seeing the advantages of such trade, the governments of other Western countries became more energetic in supporting and promoting the development of business contacts with the Soviet Union and Britain gradually fell back into seventh place among the Soviet Union's trading partners in the West.


In the Soviet Union due attention is paid to the activities of the Permanent Anglo-Soviet Inter-Governmental Commission set up in I 971, whose aim is to develop bilateral scientific, technological, trade and economic co-operation, the foundations of which date back to the first trade agreements of 192l , 1924 and 1934.


The Permanent Commission's sessions give a positive impulse to the activities of many joint working groups that have been set up under its aegis and are yielding good results.


Scientific contacts between our two countries go back a long way. In the last century and at the beginning of this the Royal Society had good grounds for electing such outstanding Russian scientists as D. I. Mendeleyev, who had discovered the periodic law of chemical elements,


I. F. Kruzenstern, who was famous for many geographical discoveries, I.


P. Pavlov, who developed a theory of the higher nervous activity. In our time this society has elected such eminent Soviet scientists as the astrophysicist V. A. Ambartsumyan, the biologist N. I. Vavilov, the physicist P. L. Kapitsa and the chemist A. N. Nesmeyanov and others. Michael Faraday and Charles Darwin were elected to the Russian


Academy of Sciences and in Soviet times the Academy of Sciences of the USSR elected Lord Rutherford, John Bernal, Cecil Powell, Lord Blackett, Dorothy Hodgkins and others.


This bestowing of honours is both acknowledgement of the services of outstanding scientists and a vital link between people engaged in scientific research in the name of progress and the general good of humanity.


A bilateral agreement on science and technology was signed in 1968 and this was followed in 1970 by an agreement on exchanges and co-operation between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Royal Society in London.


Many examples could be cited offruitful co-operation between Soviet and British scientists in various fields, including astronomy, oceanography, the problems of developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes or the problems of protecting the environment. A remark made by one British scientist during a meeting between representatives of Soviet atomic power engineering and the British nuclear forum has a symbolic ring : "In search of success we are working our way through a long, badly lit tunnel and, of course, it is better for us to go hand in hand."


Ithas become the practice to hold round-table meetings of public men and well-known figures in the scientific and cultural fields, the press and so on. Such meetings take place alternately in Moscow and in London. They make for better understanding of the Soviet and British positions and, wherever possible, point to ways of bringing them closer together.


Days of the USSR, days of Soviet science and technology, art exhibitions and festivals of Soviet films have been held in Britain and similar British days and festivals have taken place in the Soviet Union. All this helps to imbue Soviet-British relations with the "spirit of Helsinki". It is our belief, however, that by no means all the opportunities for developing communication and mutual understanding in this field have been used.


Living contacts between people of different countries are a natural process for mankind in general. The Soviet Union favours their further extension. This is why Soviet people warmly applauded the British athletes who, despite the attempts of the right-wing forces to organise a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, took part in the Moscow Games and won many victories for their country, including five gold medals.


The role and at the same time the responsibility of mem bers of parliament in developing an atmosphere of confidence and co-operation between our two countries should also be mentioned. Soviet and British members of parliament meet regularly at the forums of the Inter-Parliamen tary Union. Bilateral meetings are organised periodically in Moscow and London. In May 1975 a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR visited Britain and in April 1977 a British parliamentary delegation visited the Soviet U nion. Both parliaments have groups of members whose aim is to foster the development of Soviet-British contacts and mu tual u nderstanding.


Links between the Soviet and British trade unions are also of great importance, for these organisations represent living contact with the broad masses of the working people and the ordinary folk, who are always interested in friendship and peace.


Peace and Friendship is the title of a brochure containing the report of a visit to the USSR at the beginning of 1981 made by a delegation of forty-eight members of the Greater London Association of Trade Unions, which had been to the USSR at the invitation of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions.


The guests were impressed by many things: the vigorous pace of economic life in the USSR, the tremendous scale of housing construction, the low rents and charges for heating, lighting and water, the extensive medical and health care and educational facilities, and cheap fares on public transport.


The activists of the London trade union association took a particular interest in the activities of the Soviet trade unions.


For many members of the delegation, said Dennis Cowles, President of the Greater London Association of Trade Union Councils, this was their first visit to the USSR. The minds of many of them had been clu ttered with tales about the USSR. Bu t wherever we went, he emphasised, and whoever we talked to the conversation always turned to the need to ensure peace, curb the arms race and strengthen friendship and co-operation between the peoples.


Tourist travel is growing. Ever larger num bers of people are becoming involved in cultural and sporting contacts and in exchanges in the sphere of education and youth activities.


Visits by prominent figures in the cultural and artistic fields, theatre companies, orchestras and folk groups have become a common feature of Soviet-British relations. Exchanges of films, radio and television programmes are on the increase. The names of prominent Soviet musicians, opera singers, dancers, gymnasts and chess players are becoming well known in Britain; new Soviet films and circus shows have often won considerable popularity.


The Soviet-British agreement on relations in the sphere of science, education and culture, which is renewed every 2 years, encourages this process of exchange. The latest negotiations in Moscow in March 1981 outlined a broad range of exchanges, from which one may expect that they will further develop.


The Soviet public is deeply interested in British life, history, science and culture; in the Soviet Union information OR these subjects is very widely disseminated, much more widely than similar information about the Soviet Union in Britain. In one of his speeches Leonid Brezhnev noted that the number of books by Soviet authors published in Britain is one-sixth or one-seventh the number of books by British authors, including modern authors, published in the USSR.


As Brezhnev noted, the publication of books and articles by Soviet writers in the West allows a wide spectrum of readers to get to know at first hand about the life, work and history of the Soviet people, the home and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev expressed these thoughts when receiving in the Kremlin in April 1978 Robert Maxwell, the Chairman of Pergamon Press, who for several years has been publishing in Britain translations of the works of Soviet scientists, writers, statesmen and other public figures.


\textbf{Mr. Brezhnev receives the Leader of the British Labour Party and his Deputy at the Kremlin.} When a delegation of British Labour MPs visited the Soviet Union in September 1981, Leonid Brezhnev received the leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Michael Foot, and his deputy, Mr. Denis Healey.


They exchanged views on the world situation and the state of Anglo-Soviet relations. They expressed their common concern about the mounting international tension, bu t said the deteriation in international affairs could be reversed.


In the course of the talks, Leonid Brezhnev recalled the proposals of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, and said the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government were consistently working against the policy of confrontation, for \emph{detente,} for wide-ranging and fruitful international dialogue, and for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. He expressed the opinion that given good will, the problem of medium-range nuclear-missile systems in Europe could well be resolved. The Soviet Union, he said, is not going to insist on retaining the full number of missiles deployed in its western regions, and could agree to their reduction. This, of course, on the condition that the Americans take a sensible stand, and that the question of implementing the pertinent NATO decision is taken off the agenda.


Mr. Foot said the Labour Party wanted the negotiations on medium-range missiles to succeed, and hoped for progress based on the willingness of the two sides to modify their plans. He expressed Labour's strongly negative attitude to the manufacture of neutron bombs, and stressed that his party stood for international cooperation in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.


Leonid Brezhnev and Michael Foot favoured an improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations. This would benefit the peoples of both countries, and would also further European and world peace. Contacts and exchanges of opinion between representatives of the CPSU and the Labour Party of Great Britain, it was noted, would have a positive effect on the relations of the two countries and on broad international cooperation of democratic forces.


At the end of their stay in Moscow, the leaders of the Labour Party delegation held a press conference.


The most important question discussed in Moscow, Mr. Foot stressed, was how to end the arms race. Arms control, disarmament, and development of the \emph{detente} process were problems that deeply troubled British Labour as well. And they were discussed during the visit. Top priority here went to getting talks on arms red uction in Europe off the ground.


The talks in Moscow and above all the meeting with President Brezhnev showed that the Soviet Government was sincere in wanting these talks to start, and to yield positive results.


The readiness expressed by Leonid Brezhnev to reduce the number of medium-range missiles in the Western regions of the USSR if the United States took a sensible stand, Mr. Foot held, was a most important contribution to getting the negotiations started.


If there is action on Leonid Brezhnev's proposal, that would be the first big step towards ending the nuclear arms race. And Labour would be pleased if there was a positive response to it.


The views we express, Mr. Foot continued, are those of the party as a whole, not only of its leadership. Earlier, we have had talks with representatives of other Labour and Social Democratic parties in Europe, and I can say that we are also expressing broadly their point of view on this issue.


At the meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, where he gave a forceful and clear picture of the Soviet standpoint on crucial international problems, we were given relevant figures. This fact, Mr. Foot stressed, is highly important and should facilitate the state of negotiations on arms reduction.


The same was said by Mr. Denis Healey, deputy leader of the British Labour Party.


The Labour leaders noted that they had also discussed various other issues during their meetings in Moscow. But these should not obscure the main thing. And the main thing, Mr. Foot stressed, was to begin negotiations on arms reduction, including medium-range missiles. It is, therefore, necessary that negotiations should begin immediately. If we are not prepared to talk about the disarmament, then we are doomed. We must not shirk the cardinal tasks, and they mean doing one's bit to curb the arms race.


Mr. Foot said that during their stay in Moscow the Labour MPs also touched on the question of relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. We would certainly like the relations between our countries to be better, he emphasised, and said he hoped the visit of the delegation of Labour MPs would contribute to this.

\section{Relations Between the USSR and the FRG}


For a long time relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany were frozen. The ruling circles of the Federal Republic persistently refused to recognise the political and territorial realities that had taken shape in Europe after the defeat of fascism. They demanded adjustment of frontiers at the expense of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries. The Soviet public and the government of the USSR justifiably regarded the actions launched by the Federal Republic's ruling circles as revanchist and creating tension on the Continent. In the Soviet people's eyes the FRG was the main breeding ground of cold war in Europe, the chief obstacle to the achievement of lasting peace and security in Europe.


If one takes into account the fact that this was superimposed on the still fresh memories of the devastating war that had come to Russia from Germany, one can well understand that the main feeling the Soviet people then had about the Federal Republic was distrust.


But even at the most difficult times our country's leaders and Brezhnev himself believed that this situation should be changed. The interests of peace and security in Europe demanded not confrontation and cold war, but good-neighbour relations and co-operation. And the Soviet side did everything possible to steer relations between the USSR and the FRG onto a basis of peaceful coexistence, development of mu tually advantageous trade and wide-ranging contacts.


Leonid Brezhnev followed the development of the situation in the Federal Repu blic with close attention. In the autumn of 1969 the Brand t-Scheel coalition government was formed in Bonn. The CDU \Slash{}CSU parties, which have been pu rsuing a policy of confrontation towards the Soviet U nion, the GDR and other socialist countries, were forced into opposition.


Appraising the new situation in Bonn and its possible effect on European development, Brezhnev said:


As a result of the recent elections, as you know, noticeable changes in the line-up of political forces have taken place in the FRG. The Christian Democra tic Union, the party of big monopoly capital, which for 20 years was in power and bears direct responsibility for the resurgence of revanchism and militarism in West Germany, has been driven out of office. A new governmental coalition has been set up with the Social Democrats playing the main role. This coalition has issued a number of statements that stress its desire to adopt a more realistic position in international affairs . . . . It is not difficult to understand how much significance there would be, for example, in official recognition by the West German government of the existing borders in Europe, including the border between the FRG and GDR, recognition of the Mu nich agreement as invalid from the start, renu nciation of the CDU government's unjustified claim to speak on behalfof the whole Germa n people, and so on. Such steps, and also FRG subscription to the treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its participation, along with other countries, in the creation of a system of collective security in Europe would undou btedly be a positive contribu tion to the solution of the problems on which lasting peace and security of the peoples mainly depend.


A treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Repu blic of Germany was concluded in Moscow on August 12, 1970. It ended the long period of strain between the two countries, created the necessary political and legal bases for the development of bilateral mutually beneficial relations between the USSR and FRG and did much to improve the general atmosphere in Europe. "The conclusion of a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany that contained a clear and u nam biguous acknowledgement of the inviolability of the existing borders in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line, which is the western border of the Polish People's Republic, and the borders between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic," Brezhnev said at that time, "is undou btedly a serious contribu tion to \emph{detente} in Europe, to peaceful coexistence and fruitful co-operation between all European countries."


The Moscow Treaty was followed by treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic, between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Repu blic of Germany, and a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, and a treaty on the foundations of relations between the GDR and the FRG.


As most people know, there was quite a lot of opposition in the FRG to the Moscow Treaty and normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union on the only possible basis---renunciation of territorial and other claims upon the USSR and its allies. The opponents of the treaty alleged that it gave certain unilateral advantages to the Soviet Union and was of little use to the Federal Republic. In reply to such statements Brezhnev said: "It must be said that the talk that is to be heard in some quarters about which side 'gained more' from the treaty or which side gained 'less' is, in our view, entirely unfou nded. Everyone-the socialist countries, the FRG and everybody who is interested in strengthening peace in Europe and international \emph{detente-gained} equally."


Ratification of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was for some time the object of acute political struggle between various forces in the Federal Republic. In the Soviet Union the struggle was followed with close attention. Soviet people were by no means indifferent to who would win. After all, the questiOn was being decided as to what road Soviet relations with one of the largest countries of Western Europe, and European development in general, would take in the future.


Brezhnev devoted considerable attention to Soviet-West German relations in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in March 1971. "New prospects are opening up in Europe as a result of the substantial shift in our relations with the FRG . . . . As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to fulfil the obligations it has undertaken in connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty. We are ready to travel our part of the road towards normalisation and improvement of relations between the FRG and the socialist part of Europe if, of course, the other side acts in accordance with the letter and spirit of this treaty." A few months later Brezhnev returned once more to this subject. He again emphasised the importance of the shift in the relations between the USSR and the FRG in a speech at the 8th Congress of the SUPG in Berlin. "The treaty with the FRG, when it comes into force, can and should open a new page in the relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, and provide scope for broad , mutually beneficial co-operation in the economic and other fields. But this is not all. The coming into force of the treaties between the Soviet Union and Poland and the FRG will create a largely new political atmosphere in Europe. This, one may assume, will considerably improve the preconditions for normal relations between West Germany and the European socialist countries, for the development of fruitful co-operation in general between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and for solving important problems of European security."


After the Moscow Treaty had been ratified by the FRG parliament and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Soviet-West German relations received a new impetus. The whole political atmosphere in Europe also improved. At the end of 1972 Brezhnev stated: "Our relations with the FRG look different from what they were a few years ago. A good deal of work has been done to develop them. Economic co-operation, which has a potentially big future, has surged ahead. We already have a margin of major and extremely promising schemes that offer considerable benefits for both sides. Consultations on international questions are getting under way and, one must say, are proving their worth. In short, there are preconditions for Soviet-West German relations to develop for the better."


Systematic meetings at summit level have become a major form of co-operation between the two countries. In 1970 and 1971 Chancellor Willy Brand t visited the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev had several meetings with him in Moscow and Oreanda in the Crimea. They discussed fundamental international problems, the issues involved in deepening the processes of \emph{detente} and, of course, the road for further development of mu tually beneficial bilateral relations.


Noting the significance of such meetings, Brezhnev said: "Experience shows that when top political leaders join competent experts in various fields in developing relations between two countries, this acts as a stimulant for all concerned to work more attentively and promptly. But the main thing, I hold, is that the participation of political leaders vested with supreme responsibility makes for a broad long-term view of the whole complex of relations; that is, it ensures a greater range of vision and more certain progress."


In May 1973 Brezhnev visited the Federal Republic of Germany. His visit marked a major stage in the development of relations between the two countries. Before going to Bonn he granted an interview to the magazine \emph{Stern.}


I am going to Bonn, he said, "to continue the work that was begun in August 1970, when the Moscow Treaty was signed. Although not so very much time has passed since the moment of signing, one can already say with fulljustification that it has become a turning-point in the whole development of relations between the USSR and FRG.


I believe there is every ground for a substantial expansion of co-operation between the USSR and the FRG in the trade, economic, scientific and technological fields. Many West German firms are well known in our country as reliable trading partners.


During his visit to Bonn Brezhnev spoke on West German television. Millions of viewers in the Federal Republic were able to learn the Soviet Union's point of view on the main international issues directly from the top Soviet leader. Dealing with relations between the two countries, Brezhnev said: "We also approach relations with the Federal Republic of Germany from positions of goodwill and love of peace. We are honestly prepared for co-operation, which, so we believe, may be extremely beneficial to both sides and for security in general. We desire stable peace and believe that the Federal Republic of Germany would also be interested in and needs peace."


In September 1974 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Moscow for talks with Brezhnev. Speaking at a banquet in honour of the Chancellor, Brezhnev said: "Development of all-round co-operation with the FRG is a fundamental, long-term line in our policy. It stems organically from the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the Peace Programme which the Congress adopted . . . . We were free of illusions when we set out to reorganise relations between our countries. There have been and still are difficulties. But this is understandable. The shaping of new relations between the USSR and FRG is by no means a simple task."


Brezhnev noted that exchanges of opinion and consultations on a fairly wide range of questions had figured prominently in the negotiations. This was a useful practice. We are ready, he said, to develop and extend it to include more regular exchanges of opinion on general problems of \emph{detente} and co-operation in Europe and the world.


At the end of 1975, responding to a request by the weekly \emph{Vorwarts} to say a few words on the 5th anniversary of the Moscow Treaty and the 20th anniversary of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations, Brezhnev observed that "the normalisation of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most important developments in Europe's postwar history. . . . In a short time, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany have radically reconstructed and advanced their relations. Regular political consultations at different levels, broader economic and commercial ties, and intensive scientific, cultural and tourist exchanges-all this is concrete evidence of the favou rable changes in the relations between our two countries. . . . We see the future of our relations with the Federal Republic in the context of peaceful coexistence and co-operation. This policy, consonant with the vital interests of our peoples and states, has stood the test of time and proved its merits. The Soviet Union is resolved to continue following the same course."


Speaking at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev stressed that the normalisation of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany reposed "on the only possible basis of renou ncing claims to tearing down the existing European frontiers". Brezhnev noted at the same time that in the Federal Republic of Germany the policy of normalising relations with the socialist countries was being attacked by right-wing forces, which were in effect pu rsuing a revenge-seeking course. Their pressu re was evidently affecting certain aspects of Bonn government policy. The General Secretary noted in particular that not enough was being done as yet to ensure strict observance of the agreement on West Berlin and for its conversion from a source of disputes into a constructive element of peace and \emph{detente.}


Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May 1978 contributed greatly to the strengthening and further development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Repu blic of Germany. Commenting on the visit, the West German press noted the consistency of Soviet foreign policy and pointed out that Brezhnev was u nwavering in his support for a deepening of the processes of \emph{detente} and curbing the arms race.


Interviewed by \emph{Vorwarts,} Brezhnev gave an appraisal of relations between the USSR and the FRG: "I believe that relations between our countries are successfully developing in many directions. In our view, they have good prospects for the future if, of course, they do not run into artificially created barriers."


In the course of the interview Brezhnev focused attention on the growth of mutually beneficial trade between the two countries and pointed out that there had been a 5.5-fold increase in trade between 1970 and 1977.


In Bonn on May 6 Brezhnev and Chancellor Schmidt signed a Joint Declaration and an Agreement on Developing and Deepening of Long-term Co-operation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Repu blic of Germany in the Economic and Industrial Field. Appraising these documents, Brezhnev stressed: "They will play a tremendous role in developing our relations in the political, economic, cultural and other fields. These documents will still further reinforce the confidence our peoples have in each other."


TheJoint Declaration indicated practically all the basic directions in which the two countries intended to develop their relations. It recorded a most important principle: there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful co-operation between the USSR and the FRG. Both sides came out firmly in support of continued \emph{detente} and joint efforts to seek and find opportunities to deepen it.


The Agreement on economic and industrial co-operation is designed to cover a period of 25 years. This means that it extends beyond our century. This is the first time such a serious agreement with so long a period of validity has been concluded between the Soviet Union and a major West European country.


The Agreement clearly defined the specific direction in which the USSR and the FRG intended to develop trade, economic, scientific and technological links: joint building of industrial complexes, production of certain types of equipment, the extraction and processing of raw materials, co-operation in the energy sphere and so on.


Many West German newspapers expressed the view that after the signing of the Agreement business circles in the FRG had gained some excellent opportunities for developing trade on a long-term basis and thus Brezhnev's idea about long-term trade and economic co-operation between the two countries had been realised in practice.


In the course of Brezhnev's negotiations and talks in Bonn and also in his speeches it was pointed out that the processes of \emph{detente} had slowed down oflate, and that the arms race still had not been curbed. Brezhnev constantly emphasised that the USSR and the FRG could and should play a positive role in international relations. Speaking on West German television, he said: "We are now at a very responsible stage in the development of world events. The Soviet Union and the FRG are in a position to do a great deal to remove the difficulties that the process of \emph{detente} has encountered. I t depends largely on our countries whether the positive processes that began in international relations in the first half of the 1970s are reinforced and deepened."


Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic was a major international event. I i demonstrated the consistency of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy, its desire to further develop good-neighbour relations with the FRG, and its firm commitment to peace and relaxation of international tension.


The next meeting between Soviet and West German leaders took place on June 30 to July 1, 1980 in Moscow. It came at a time when the


US government was doing everything possible to whip up international tension, undermine \emph{detente} and aggravate relations between the European countries belonging to different social systems.


All the more important was the fact that, despite the strain in the international situation and the substantial differences on a number of questions, both countries were able as a result of the negotiations to declare that they considered \emph{detente} essential, possible and beneficial and express their will to do everything to make it the predominant trend in international relations.


During their talks Brezhnev and Schmidt exchanged views on practically all the most urgent international issues. The exchange of views was businesslike, constructive and candid. Both sides expressed the desire to continue developing relations between the USSR and the FRG on the basis of the documents signed in May 1978 during Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. While Chancellor Schmidt was in Moscow a long-term programme of main directions for co-operation between the USSR and the FRG in the economic and industrial fields was concluded. This document was a solid contribu tion to building up economic relations and thus strengthening the material basis of political relations.


Leonid Brezhnev gave a high appraisal of the development of relations between the two countries and their significance in all international life. Speaking at a Kremlin banquet in honour of Chancellor Schmidt, he said: ''Relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG have for long held an important place in international life. . . . New notions about each other have grown up through the sediment of the previous, grim years. They are built on understanding of the legitimate interests of the two sides and the obvious fact that good relations between the USSR and the FRG are good both for the peoples of our two countries and for Europe as a whole."


Brezhnev made a strong appeal to the West to pu t aside the various programmes for "upgrading" armaments and scrap the manufacture of new types and systems of weaponry. "One of the questions awaiting solution," he said, "is that of medium-range weapons."


Brezhnev's report at the 26th Congress of the CPSU contained a deep-going analysis of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany at the close of the 1970s.


He drew attention to the fact that relations with the Federal Repu blic were taking a favourable course on the basis of the 1970 treaty and subsequent agreements. The meetings with Chancellor Schmid t in 1978 and I 980, like previous meetings with Willy Brandt, had helped \emph{detente} in Europe and extended the horizons for mu tually beneficial relations between the two countries.


The report noted successes in the development of economic co-operation. Inthe past 5 years trade had nearly doubled. Big projects such as deliveries of equipment for Atommash, for the Oskol electro-metallurgical complex, for chemical works, and pipes and equipment for gas pipelines figure prominently in the economic link-up.


But there are areas, and not unimportant ones, where the positions of the USSR and the FRG differ substantially, Brezhnev has said. "Suffice it to mention Bonn's attempts from time to time to circumvent the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin and in a number of questions to ignore the sovereignty of the GDR. We stand for strict and complete observance of the agreements reached in the 1970s. This is important for mu tual understanding and co-operation between our two countries and for peace in Europe."


During their meeting in Moscow on June 30, 1981 Leonid Brezhnev and Willy Brand t concurred that controversial international problems can only be solved through talks conducted in good faith. Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union favoured all-round cooperation between the USSR and FRG on a long-term basis.

\section{The Soviet Union and Italy}


Definite progress has been achieved in our relations with Italy, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. "There are political contacts, economic co-operation is expanding, and so are the cultural exchanges between our nations."


Friendly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Italy go back a long way into the past.


The Soviet people followed with keen sympathy the struggle ofltalian patriots against fascism and wished them early victory. They remember well that the finest elements among the Italian people fought in the Resistance movement in the hard years of World War I I. Leonid Brezhnev has given a high appraisal of the feats of Italian antifascists and stressed that the valiant underground struggle behind enemy lines merged with the struggle of the Soviet people into a single powerful stream which washed the stain of fascism from the map of Europe.


In its desire to help Italy to take a more active part in the struggle against the vestiges of fascism in Europe, the Soviet Union was the first member of the antinazi coalition to announce resumption of its diplomatic relations with Italy as early as 1944.


The Soviet Union followed with enthusiasm the successes achieved by the Italian democrats in the postwar years and with concern the reactionary forces' attempts to encroach on the democratic gains made by the people.


Prospects for diverse co-operation between the two countries took definite shape in the 1960s, when the light of \emph{detente} became discernible on the international horizon. In 1966, observing that healthy trends dictated by the national interests of the peoples of Europe were increasingly making headway in Western Europe, Leonid Brezhnev pointed with satisfaction to the improvement in Soviet-Italian relations. Italy was one of the first countries to support the initiative for conveni ng a European conference on security.


The policy of peaceful coexistence consistently advocated by the Soviet Union expanded the prospects for developing relations among countries with different social systems. In 1970, stressing that the Soviet Union: supported the establishment of friendly relations with all countries on the basis of equality and respect for each other's lawful righ ts and interests, Brezhnev could indicate with satisfaction that Soviet-Italian relations had changed for the better.


In the years that have elapsed since then, Soviet-I talian ties have reached new dimensions and developed positively. This was largely the outcome of the European Conference on Security in Helsinki. As Brezhnev noted in March 1977, the Soviet U nion appreciated the fact that Italian leaders supported the policy of \emph{detente} and peaceful co-operation.


The positions of the two countries on the strengthening of peace and international security are close or coincide. Speaking in the summer of 1978 in Minsk, Brezhnev noted that Soviet ties with Italy were developing well in all directions. Both the Soviet and the Italian press spoke highly of Andrei Gromyko's visit to Italy in january 1979.


Progress in this field was borne out by Premier Andreotti's visit to Moscow, in June 1979, when the two sides noted with satisfaction the positive development of Soviet--Italian relations in all fields and expressed their readiness to continue deepening their mutually beneficial co-operation in the interests of their respective peoples. "I am confident that the development of mutually beneficial and stable co-operation between the USSR and Italy in various fields will continue to serve the interests of the peoples of both our countries, the cause of peace and better international relations," Brezhnev said in this connection.


Significantly, a considerable intensification in the trade and economic exchange between the Soviet Union and Italy was recorded du ring the Moscow talks.


Indeed, it was in the field of Soviet-Italian economic co-operation that one of the first extensive breaches in the cold war front between the West and the East was made. The first large-scale Soviet-Italian agreement on foreign trade was concluded as early as 1957.


The results achieved in this sphere are considerable. Italian industrialists were ahead of their foreign counterparts in large-scale co-operation-suffice it to recall the giant automobile plant in the city of Togliatti built jointly by Soviet specialists and Italy's FIAT, or ENI's involvement in the construction of power projects in the Soviet Union. In turn, the one-thousand-kilometre-long USSR-Italy pipeline has traversed the territories of Czechoslovakia and Austra, bringing thousands of millions of cubic metres of gas to Italy.


By the late 1970s, about a thousand large, medium-sized and small Italian companies were involved in trade with the Soviet Union. Soviet orders placed with these companies provide jobs for at least 100,000 Italian workers. It is important to note that this contribution to solving Italy's difficult problem of employment is stable and guaranteed for the immediate future.


Speaking before his constituents during the election campaign to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1979, Brezhnev advocated pu tting economic relations with Italy on the basis of long-term agreements. Joint work on a long-term agreement in this field for the 1980-85 period and on a programme of expanding close co-operation for an even longer period is a new step in the mutually beneficial economic ties between the Soviet Union and Italy.


Italy holds one of the first places in Europe as far as the scope and diversity of cultural ties with the USSR are concerned. The foundations of these ties were laid as early as 1960 by the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on cultural co-operation. Performer exchanges have become one of the most active forms of such co-operation. Over the past decades, dozens of prominent Soviet troupes have toured Italy: Moscow's Bolshoi Ballet, Leningrad's Kirov Ballet, folk dance ensembles, symphony orchestras, and other companies of professional and amateur performers. The influx of Italian performers was equally impressive: world-famous La Scala and Piccolo toured the Soviet Union, as did drama theatres, famed soloists and folk ensembles. The fine arts were represented by numerous exhibitions ofltaly's old masters and modern artists, while Italians saw exhibitions that displayed a culture ranging from the Scythian-Sarmatian period to contemporary art of Russia, Georgia and other Soviet repu blics.


It is now a tradition to hold mu tual festivals-Days of the Soviet Union in Italy and Days ofltaly in the USSR. Such Days are held in various cities and feature exchanges of delegations, exhibitions, lecturers and so on. In his message of greetings to the president of EmiliaRomagna on such a day, Brezhnev described these occasions as being of great importance, for, he said, they meet the people's desire for closer contacts and eschange of spiritual values.

\section{Soviet Co-operation with Some Other European Countries}


The Soviet leadership and Leonid Brezhnev personally pay great attention to improving the Soviet Union's relations with Europe's Nordic countries. The USSR and Finland enjoy especially friendly relations. They develop on the firm basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1948. Earlier, we have already mentioned the contacts between Brezhnev and President Kekkonen of Finland, continuously maintained for many years, as an important element in the advancement of good-neighbour relations between the two countries, a fact of great significance for the consolidation of peace in this region.


Soviet-Finnish relations are making good headway on a firm basis of friendship and good-neighbourliness, Brezhnev said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. "We give due credit to the contribution made by Finland and President Kekkonen personally to the consolidation of European security. We are also pleased that our economic ties are steadily expanding, and that joint building oflarge industrial projects is making good progress."


Praising the development of the Soviet Union's relations with several Western countries in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev also singled out Sweden.


In recent years, the Soviet Union and Sweden have signed and are implementing important agreements on economic, scientific and technological co-operation; on co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy; on maritime shipping; on co-operation in radio and television broadcasting and other agreements.


Much is being done to acquaint the peoples of the Soviet Union and Sweden with each other's cultural accomplishments. Contacts between the Supreme Soviet and the Riksdag and between ministers of the two countries have become regular. In June 1978, for the first time in the history of Soviet-Swedish relations, King Charles XVI Gustav of Sweden came to the Soviet Union on an official visit.


The resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Spain also strengthened the spirit of \emph{detente} and co-operation in Europe. In welcoming this step, Leonid Brezhnev said: "The recent resumption of relations between the USSR and Spain was a noticeable development in the political life of Europe. In recent years, we have already established useful co-operation with that country, mostly in economic matters. It is to be hoped that now our relations will go on from strength to strength. We are following with interest the democratisation of political life in Spain and we wish the Spanish people further success on this road." In stressing the importance of developing the Soviet Union's ties with all European nations, large and small, Brezhnev states with satisfaction that today the geography of the USSR's peaceful co-operation extends to Spain too. At the 26th Congress of the CPSU he noted that "after a break of 40 years, our relations with Spain have entered a normal course".


No matter what the political relations between the two countries were in the past, the Soviet people invariably regarded the people of Spain with great respect and affection.


Spain became especially close to the Soviet people during the Civil War, when the republic was defending its gains in the struggle against fascism. It would not be an overstatement to say that every Soviet family, everyone in the Soviet Union lived and breathed Spain, its hopes and fears. Many Spaniards, forced to leave their country for many years, found their second home in the Soviet Union.


Balanced development of Soviet-Spanish co-operation and its rise to a level that corresponds to the international status of the two countries open new prospects before the Soviet Union and Spain and meet their mu tual interests.


Inhis speech at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to develop good relations with our neighbour Turkey and our traditional ties with Greece, and he welcomed the successful development of relations with Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and a number of other European countries.


Having advanced towards a more stable peace in a relatively short period, Europe is among the key factors affecting the development of international politics as a whole. When speaking of the need for extending \emph{detente} to cover the entire world, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is prompted by his profound belief in success, in the expansion and deepening of the policy of peaceful coexistence. He stresses that many complex tasks are yet to be solved if peaceful prospects are to become a reality.

\chapter{7. The Soviet Union and the United States}


The Soviet Union considers it possible and desirable to maintain normal relations, develop business co-operation and mu tually profitable ties with the United States. Naturally, this must not be secured by abandoning positions of principle, or at the expense of friendly and allied countries or of any other nation.


Brezhnev has always stood firm on this position. He closely follows the state and development of Soviet-US relations; he is always prepared to do whatever is needed to improve them, including correspondence, meetings and talks with top US leaders.


Neither economic nor military might, nor international prestige endows our countries with any additional rights but imposes on them a special responsibility for the future of universal peace, for preventing war. In its approach to relations and contacts with the United States, the Soviet Union is fully aware of this responsibility.


The Peace Programme advanced by the 24th Congress of the CPSU envisaged settlement of today's key international problems, including the improvement of Soviet-US relations.


The Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972 produced a number of important documents, above all the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the USA. In it the two sides declared that in the nuclear age there was no alternative to conducting Soviet-American relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.


The Moscow meeting graphically demonstrated the decisive fact that despite the profound differences between the social systems and ideologies of the two great powers, improved Soviet-American relations were possible and necessary both in their own interests and for universal peace.


The principles of peaceful coexistence were recorded and given enactment in terms of international law. Both sides undertook to settle disputed issues by negotiation and to refrain from the use or threat of force.


An important outcome of the Moscow summit was the signing of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems. Thus began the process of limiting the most destructive weapons that ever existed. The documents were an important step towards restraining the arms race. They testified to the intentions of the two parties to help ease international tensions and strengthen trust among nations. Soviet and US leaders proclaimed their intention to continue active negotiations on limiting strategic armaments in the spirit of goodwill, of respect for each other's legitimate interests and of the principle of equal security.


Brezhnev's visit to America in 1973 made a major contribu tion to the cause of peace and \emph{detente.} The visit greatly aided the process of changeover from the cold war to a normalisation and further development of Soviet-American relations.


At their meetings the leaders of the Soviet Union and the U nited States discussed many important problems of Soviet-American relations and world affairs. Nine new agreements were signed which covered a broad range of problems: co-operation in agriculture, transportation, the study of the World Ocean, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the extension of contacts and exchanges in science, technology, education, culture and other fields.


Of great significance was the document entitled Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limita tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, in which it was stated that these limitations could apply both to their quantitative aspects and to their qualitative improvement.


June 22 could be described as a history-making day for the Soviet and American peoples. Along with a number of other new Soviet-American documents, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed on that day. The Soviet Union and the United States, guided by the objective of strengthening world peace and international security and conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind, agreed that they would act in such a manner as to rule out an outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the sides and other countries.


The two powers undertook to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, or against allies of the other party, or against other countries in circumstances that might endanger international peace and security.


There was a worldwide welcome for the fact that political \emph{detente} in Soviet-American and international relations had begun to be supplemented with military \emph{detente.}


We see the improvement of Soviet-American relations not as an isolated phenomenon, Brezhnev said, "but as an organic-moreover, highly important-part of a broad process of fundamental normalisation of the international atmosphere. . . . We will welcome it ifour efforts to improve Soviet-American relations help draw more and more new countries, whether in Europe or Asia, in Africa or Latin America, in the


\textbf{PFHL} • N


Middle East or the Far East, into the process of \emph{detente."}


The leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States stated that it would be a good thing "if the relaxation of political tensions were accompanied by a red uction of military tensions in Central Europe", attaching great importance to the negotiations on the mu tual red uction of armed forces and armaments and associated measu res in Central Europe.


Brezhnev's visit to the USA and the talks held during the visit, the joint commu nique stated, was an expression of their mu tual determination to continue the course towards a major improvement in Soviet-US relations.


At the signing of the communiq ue the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the US President made speeches, which were televised. The whole of America watched them sign the document and heard them speak.


Leonid Brezhnev gave Americans a pictu re of the Soviet people's life, work, plans and hopes and spoke of their desire for peace and good relations with all peoples, the Americans included.


The Soviet people, perhaps better than any other people, Brezhnev said, "know what war is. In the Second World War we achieved a victory of worldwide historical importance. But more than 20 million Soviet citizens died in that war; 70,000 of our towns and villages were razed to the ground; one-third of our national wealth was destroyed . . . . "We have great plans for the future. We want to raise considerably the living standards of the Soviet people. We want to achieve further success in the spheres of education and medicine. We want to make our towns and villages more convenient for living in and more beau tiful.


And every Soviet person knows full well that the realisation of these plans requires peace above all."


The decision taken during Brezhnev's visit to the United States to place Soviet-American summits on a regular footing imparted stability and continuity to the dialogue between the two powers and paved the way for the next such meeting, which was held in Moscow and the Crimea in the summer of 1974.


We have every reason to say, Brezhnev pointed out in a speech at a dinner in the United States Embassy on July 2, 1974, that the results of the Moscow meeting "can be described as constructive and weighty". He explained that he was referring, first of all, "to the new steps in a field which may rightfully be called central in Soviet-American relationsthe field oflessening the risk ofwar and restraining the arms race".


The deep-rooted processes of strengthening Soviet-American cooperation and the objective concern of both nations to promote it made for continuity of this political course when the United States administration changed in 1974.


On becoming President of the United States, Gerald Ford said in one of his first foreign policy statements that he would remain true to the policy followed towards the Soviet Union in the preceding years.


With a view to the usefulness of continued contacts and in order to form a personal acquaintance, Brezhnev and Ford agreed to a new Soviet-American summit at the end of l 974 on Soviet territory-in the vicinity of Vladivostok.


Ford said that the Vladivostok meeting had given him an opportunity to become acquainted with Brezhnev as a leader and a person. And he went on to say that Brezhnev "is a person who can be alternately very jovial, very pleasant, he will kid a lot, and then he can get deadly serious and be extremely firm. . . . I was impressed with him. He is a strong person . . . . He was firm in what he wanted, and yet he could understand our point of view."


In their joint communique the Soviet Union and the United States "reaffirmed their determination to develop further their relations in the direction defined by the fundamental joint decisions and basic treaties and agreements concluded between the two states in recent years".


Special consideration was given in the course of the talks to a pivotal aspect of Soviet-American relations: measu res to eliminate the threat of war and to halt the arms race.


At Vladivostok General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford reached a new understanding of paramount importance on limiting strategic offensive arms. In their joint statement they reaffirmed their intention of holding further negotiations and concluding a new agreement in this field. An accord was reached that this agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning not later than 1980-81 on the question offurther limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.


Speaking in Vladivostok on November 24, Brezhnev said that their joint attention had been concentrated, in the first place, "on such a vitally important problem as reaching agreement on further restricting and then reducing arms, especially what it has now become customary to call strategic arms". This is essential, Brezhnev said, if we really want to help eliminate the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile war, with all its dire consequences. Brezhnev then added this point: "International \emph{detente} must be backed up by \emph{detente} in the military sphere if it is to become really stable. Further progress in this respect will have tremendous significance for world peace. I t seems to me we have done useful work in Vladivostok in this respect."


Further Soviet-US negotiations succeeded in arriving at joint solutions to a nu mber of problems of great importance for peace and \emph{detente.} On May 28, 1976, the Treaty of Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was signed at one and the same time in Moscow and Washington. "Taken in conjunction with previously achieved agreements," Brezhnev said, "the treaty is another link in the chain of measures to hold down the stockpiling of armaments, to achieve u niversal prohibition of nuclear weapons."


The expiration in 1977 of the 5-year interim agreement on the limitation of the levels of offensive strategic arms of the United States and the Soviet U nion lent special urgency to finalising the talks between the two powers on substituting another agreement for this one for a new term on the basis of the Vladivostok arrangements. The conclusion of this agreement would help prevent another round of the senseless race in nuclear-missile armaments and would red uce the danger of war.


The Soviet Union's clear and precise stand on this question was outlined by Brezhnev in his replies to the American political observer


J. Kingsbury-Smith.


Brezhnev said, "We are for completing as soon as possible the work on a Soviet-US agreement limiting strategic arms, on the basis of the understanding reached in Vladivostok in 1974.


"For our part there were, are and will be no obstacles to this mat ter, which is the concern of all mankind.


A Soviet-US agreement would now, undoubtedly, be a very important step towards bringing the arms race to an effective halt."


"Carrying out this task is most closely linked with the main goal of our timeto preven t nuclear war.


Conversely, any delay in reaching agreement, at a time when even more terrible varieties and systems of weapons continue to be developed, is filled with new threats to peace, international stabili ty and security."" Brezhnev explicitly reaffirmed that the Soviet Union did not threaten anyone and did not intend to attack anyone. Instead of scaring oneself with mythical threats, one should discuss the problems and possibilities existing in this field in a businesslike and constructive way, he said. He pointed out the great risk to universal security inherent in a passive" approach which permitted the arms race to continue unabated.


Du ring the 1976 election campaign in the United States and in the months that followed, certain difficulties in Soviet-US relations arose, and the improvement of the international climate slowed down. This was immediately felt in the approach to disarmament tissues. With regard to the problem of limiting strategic armaments, the US administration actually backed out of the obligations assumed in Vladivostok and during the diplomatic talks that followed. Having seriously impeded the conclusion of further strategic arms limitation agreements, the new administration embarked upon the road of spurring on the arms race.


The Soviet position on this issue was perfectly clear. The USSR continued to be guided by its desire to overcome, by means of new initiatives, the obstacles placed in the way of solving the problems of limiting strategic armaments and of disarmament.


In his speech in Tula, which attracted the close attention of the world public by its wealth of ideas on international issues, Brezhnev exposed the absurdity and groundlessness of the allegations that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority in armaments in order to deliver a "first strike". The Soviet Union always was and continues to be a convinced opponent of any such concept, Brezhnev emphasised. The efforts of the Soviet Union are directed precisely to averti ng any first or second strike, to averting nuclear war in general.


Later, Brezhnev repeatedly retu rned to this problem, stressing the Soviet Union's striving for peace and \emph{detente.} Receiving a delegation of US Senators in November 1978, he observed that an early concluion of Soviet-American negotiations and a new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic armaments would be an important step towards restraining and eventually ending the arms race, and would open up real possibilities for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union, the United States and other nations. The overall climate of Soviet-US relations would be improved, he said.


Brezhnev offered a comprehensive assessment of the state these negotiations had reached by early 1979 in his interview to \emph{Time} magazine: "Work on a new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic arms," he said, "is drawing to a close, although it will obviously take some more time for the positions to be finally agreed. We trust that the principle of equality and equal security, which the USSR and the USA recognise as the starting-point, will prompt correct decisions and that President Carter and I will be able in the near future to affix our signature to the accord. The task set by life itself-to pu t an end to the unrestrained arms race, to ensure the security for our nations and to consolidate international peace at a lower level of military confrontations-is worth the effort."


The approach to the issue reflected Brezhnev's well-known view that in the drive to implement \emph{detente,} priority should be accorded to "the task of ending the arms race, of achieving effective results in disarmament". With his typical realism and concern for peace, Brezhnev stresses more and more insistently that without important advances in restraining the arms race, the process of easing international tensions cannot become stable and irreversible. Disarmament is the foremost task in implementing \emph{detente} and strengthening world peace. Two opposite processespolitical \emph{detente} and the arms race-cannot develop parallel to each other indefinitely, Brezhnev observes. Sooner or later they are bound to collide, one inevitably stopping and even throwing back the other.


On Brezhnev's initiative, the Soviet Union has advanced a nu mber of important proposals on curbing the arms race and attaining disarmament. These proposals are addressed to all countries, including the United States, the leading military power in the capitalist world. Soviet diplomacy takes every opportunity to discuss and implement any steps towards disarmament based on the principles of parity and security of the parties concerned. Devoting tremendous attention to the bilateral Geneva negotiations with the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments, the Soviet Union had, at the same time, negotiated the limitation of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe at the Vienna talks with that country and a number of other states, and discussed relevant issues in the Disarmament Committee, the United Nations and so on.


One of the main directions followed in the foreign-political activity of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, as, indeed, the Peace Programme requires, Brezhnev stressed, "was and is the struggle to end the arms race, and promote disarmament. Today, this objective is more vital than ever. The world is tired of sitting on mountains of arms, yet the arms race spurred by aggressive imperialist elements is escalating.


The Soviet Communists, Brezhnev went on to say, "are proud to have undertaken the difficult but noble mission of fighting in the front ranks to relieve the people of the dangers that are implicit in the continuing arms race. Our Party calls on all the peoples, all countries, to join efforts and end this perilous process. Our end goal here has been, and remains, general and complete disarmament. At the same time, the USSR is doing all it can to secure progress along separate sections of the road leading to that goal."


A draft submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has led to the elaboration, signing and entry into force of an international convention on the prohibition and destruction of bacteriological weapons. This, in effect, is the first measure ofreal disarmament in the history of international relations. It envisages removal of a whole category of highly dangerous mass annihilation weapons from the military arsenals of states. A convention prohibiting modification of the environment for military purposes has entered into force. The basic provisions of a treaty banning radiological weapons had been tentatively agreed by the beginning of 1981. Negotiations on removing chemical weapons from the arsenals of states are continuing, though at an intolerably slow pace.


The scope of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has expanded. A number of large states have acceded to it.


Of fundamental importance are the repeated assurances made by Brezhnev that the Soviet Union does not and will not seek military superiority over the other side, and that it does not intend to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength prevailing between East and West in Central Europe, or between the Soviet Union and the United States. But in return the USSR demands that no other country should seek to upset that equilibrium in its own favour. Brezhnev stresses that it has never been the intention of the Soviet Union to threaten any state or group of states. The Soviet strategic doctrine is of an exclusively defensive nature.


A mere enumeration of recent Soviet proposals, specifically designed to curb the arms race, provides impressive evidence of the earnest Soviet commitment to disarmament.


At the UN General Assembly's special session on disarmament, the Soviet Union called on all countries to come to terms on a number of urgent steps that would help stop the arms race.


There was widespread support all over the world for the proposals designed to secure a complete halt to any further quantitative and qualitative increase in the armaments and armed forces of states with a large military potential. This constructive and clear programme envisages that the permanent members of the Security Council and countries linked to them by military agreements should stop manufacturing all types of nuclear weapons; stop manufacturing and prohibit all other types of mass annihilation weapons; stop developing new destructive types of conventional weapons, and renounce building up armies or conventional armaments.


Further measures include non-.deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of countries that have none at present; reduction of the military budgets of states; negotiations on limiting strategic offensive armaments, on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, on banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on destroying their stockpiles, on banning radiological weapons, on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments, first of all in Central Europe, on limiting international trade in and delivery of conventional armaments, and a number of other initiatives.


In recent years no other state, Brezhnev said, "has probably come forward with so wide a spectrum of concrete and realistic initiatives on crucial problems of international relations as the Soviet Union." ln june 1979 Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, met US President Jimmy Carter in Vienna. The meeting culminated in the signing of a Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a Protocol related to that Treaty, and of other documents, including a Soviet-American communique.


The new treaty is realistic and concrete, Brezhnev noted. "Its essence is to limit armaments in quantity and to restrict their qualitative improvement. It reposes on the principles of equality and equal security. That is the result of many years of effort, and a fair balance of interests. "By signing this treaty we are helping to protect the most sacred of all human rights, the right to life. For the Soviet Union it is a logical continuation of its foreign policy of peace defined by the congresses of our Party, a policy we intend to continue in future."


The content of the SALT-2 Treaty shows that it is a sensible compromise that takes account of the interests of both sides and provides for dependable verification of how the sides fulfil their commitments.


Full implementation of the documents signed in Vienna offered new opportunities for stopping the build-up of nuclear-missile arsenals, for securing their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation. This would have been a new phase in curbing the race of nuclear armaments and would have paved the way to a substantial reduction of armaments and to the ultimate aim-complete prohibition of the manufacture, and the destruction of nuclear arms stockpiles.


The meeting in Vienna and its results won a broad and positive response all over the world, the support of all nations, and ofrealistically thinking statesmen. The SALT-2 Treaty is in keeping with the interests of all nations because it is directed to easing tensions, to extending good relations among states and removing the danger of another war.


Brezhnev has noted time and again that the road to disarmament is not simple. There are influential forces in the world, notably in the United States, that have a stake in escalating the arms race, in new spirals of arming, in building up international tension.


The opponents of improving Soviet-American relations and of international \emph{detente} represent the interests of the military-industrial complex in the United States. They are well organised and active, exert visible pressure on the country's political scene and have broad access to the mass media.


On the eve of 1980, as a pretext for such a campaign, the enemies of \emph{detente} seized on the events in Afghanistan following the Afghan government's req uest for Soviet aid against outside aggression in accordance with the provisions of the concluded treaty.


The events in Afghanistan, as Brezhnev noted, were not the real reason for the deterioration of the international situation. If there had been no Afghanistan, the pertinent quarters in the United States and NATO would have been sure to find some other excuse for complicating the world situation.


Vital aspects of the international situation and Soviet-American relations were examined in Leonid Brezhnev's answer to a \emph{Pravda} correspondent in January 1980.


As Brezhnev noted, the international situation had deteriorated at the ju ncture of the seventies and eighties. The blame for this falls on "those who see \emph{detente} as an obstacle to their aggressive designs, to whipping up a militaristic psychosis, and to interference in the internal affairs of other nations. It falls on those who have an ingrained habit of behaving in a cavalier manner with other states, of acting in the international arena as if they were free to do anything they wish."


Of late, the militaristic tendencies in US policy find expression in an acceleration of new long-term arms programmes, in the creation of new military bases far away from the United States, including the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, and in the activation of the so-called rapid deployment force, an instrument of the policy of military interference.


Take such an important document as the SALT-2 Treaty, said Leonid Brezhnev. "Its implementation would have opened the way to far-reaching measures in the field of disarmament. This Treaty, as we know, received worldwide support, including that of America's NATO allies, and the support of broad sections of the world public. Bu t what did the Carter Administration do with it? The Treaty was barely signed when voices in the United States began discrediting it. The ratification procedure was, in substance, used by the opponents of the Treaty-not withou t the connivance of US government quartersto gravely complicate its ratification." By his decision to freeze indefinitely the debate on the SALT-2 Treaty in the Senate, President Carter added one more touch to this unseemly process.


As Brezhnev noted, Washington was again trying, as it did decades ago, to speak to the Soviet Union the language of cold war. In so doing, the Carter Administration showed contempt for important interstate documents, disrupting established ties in the fields of science, culture and human contacts.


It would be hard even to enumerate all the treaties, intergovernmental agreements, accords and understandings concluded by our two countries in various fields that have been arbitrarily and unilaterally violated in the recent period by President Carter's Administration, Brezhnev said.


The arrogation by Washington of a "right" to "reward" or "punish" independent sovereign states raises an important question of principle, Brezhnev added. In effect, these US government actions deal a blow at the entire orderly system of relations between states based on international law.


As a result of such behaviou r on the part of the Carter Administration, the world is getting an ever more distinct impression of the United States as a very unreliable partner in interstate tiesa country whose leadership, prompted by a whim, caprice or emotional outburst, or by some narrowly conceived immediate advantage, is liable at any moment to go against its international commitments and to tear up treaties and agreements bearing its signature. Need one explain the dangerous destabilising effect this has on the whole international situation, the more so since this concerns the behaviour of the leadership of a large and influential power from which the nations are entitled to expect a well-considered and responsible policy.


We cannot regard the actions of the US Administration as anything bu t an ill-considered attempt at using the events in Afghanistan to block the international efforts of reducing the danger of war, consolidating peace, and limiting the arms race, that is, to block everything in which humanity is so vitally interested, Leonid Brezhnev said.


But if all these sallies against our policy are intended to test us, the initiators have completely forgotten the lessons of history, Brezhnev went on to say. "When the world's first socialist state was born in 1917 our people did not ask for anybody's permission. Now, too, they decide for themselves what their way oflife is to be. Imperialism tried to pu t us to the test at the dawn of Soviet government and everybody remembers what came of it. The fascist aggressors tried to break us in the bloodiest war ever experienced by humanity. But they were defeated. We were subjected to grave trials in the years of the cold war when the world was pushed to the brink of the prec1p1ce, when one international cns1s followed another. But then, too, no one succeeded in shaking our resolve. It is very useful to remember this today."


Replying to the \emph{Pravda} correspondent, Brezhnev said in conclusion: "We look to the future with optimism. Itis a well-founded optimism. We are aware that the deliberate aggravation of the international situation by US imperialism is an expression of its displeasure at the consolidation of socialist positions, the upsurge of the national liberation movement, and the strengthening of the forces working for \emph{detente} and peace. We know that the will of the peoples has, despite all obstacles, cleared a way for the positive trend in world affairs aptly termed \emph{detente.} This policy has deep roots. It is supported by powerful forces and has every chance of remaining the basic trend in international relations."


The course of the Soviet Union combines consistent dedication to peace with firm rebuff to aggression. It has paid off in the past decades and, as Brezhnev said, the Soviet Union will continue to follow it. No one, he added, can divert it from this course.


Brezhnev returned to the question of Soviet relations with the United States in his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, which took place in Moscow from February 23 to March 3, 1981.


Stressing that all these years, as before, the Soviet Union had followed a constructive line of principle in its relations with the United States, Brezhnev noted that regrettably, the former administration in Washington had pu t its stakes on something other than developing relations or mutual understanding. Trying to exert pressure on the Soviet Union it set to destroying the positive achievements that had been made with no small effort in Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. As a result, bilateral Soviet-American relations suffered a setback in a number of fields. The entry into force of the SALT-2 Treaty was deferred. And negotiations on a number of arms limitation issues, such as reducing arms deliveries to third countries, were broken off unilaterally by the United States.


Unfortunately, Brezhnev said, "also since the change ofleadership in the White House candidly bellicose calls and statements have resounded from Washington, as if specially designed to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries. We would like to hope, however, that those who shape United States policy today will ultimately manage to see things in a more realistic light."


The Soviet leader again dealt with the myth that the Soviet Union was seeking "military superiority" which was being artificially fanned in the United States. Noting that the prevailing military and strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, objectively served to safeguard world peace, Brezhnev said: "We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the other side. That is not our policy. But neither will we permit the building of any such superiority over us. Attempts of that kind, and talking to us from a position of strength, are absolutely futile." These words of the top Soviet leader were met with vigorous expressions of approval by delegates at the Congress.


Elaborating on th approximate equilibrium between the two sides, Brezhnev noted that in respect of some weapons the West had a certain advantage, while the Soviet Union had an advantage in respect of others. For example, the Soviet Union had more tanks. But the NATO countries also had a large number. Besides, they had considerably more antitank weapons.


The tale of Soviet superiority in troop strength did not match the facts either. Combined with the other NATO countries, the United States had even slightly more troops than the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.


A war danger does exist for the United States, as it does for all the other countries of the world, Leonid Brezhnev went on to say. "But the source of the danger is not the Soviet Union, nor any mythical Soviet superiority. It is the arms race and the tension that still prevails in the world. We are prepared to combat this u nimagined and true danger hand in hand with the United States, with the countries of Europe, with all countries in the world. To try and outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war is dangerous mad ness."


Congress delegates, all Soviet people, and the peace-loving pu blic abroad hailed the clear call contained in Leonid Brezhnev's report to settle the acute problems of Soviet-American relations, because, as universally acknowledged, the international situation depended in so many ways on the policy of the two countries.


The Soviet leader spoke out for a dialogue with the United States at all levels, and urged that it should be an active dialogue. "We are prepared to have such a dialogue. Experience shows that the crucial factor here is meetings at summit level. This was true before, and is still true today. The USSR wants normal relations with the USA. There is simply no other sensible way from the point of view of the interests of our two nations, and of humanity as a whole."


Brezhnev called for restraint in strategic armaments and noted that limitation of such armaments was a paramount problem. The Soviet Union, he said, was ready to continue the relevant negotiations with the


United States withou t delay, preserving all the positive elements that had so far been achieved in this area. It goes withou t saying, he added, that the negotiations could be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that gives a unilateral advantage to the USA, he said. There must be no illusions on that score. In our opinion all the other nuclear powers should join these negotiations at the appropriate time.


Brezhnev also spoke in favour of negotiating the limitation of weapons of all types. "At one time," he said, "we offered to ban the development of the naval Trident missile system in the United States and of the corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result, the United States has built the new Ohio submarine armed with Trident-I missiles, while an analogous system, the Typhoon, was built in our country. So, who has gained anything?"


Furthermore, Brezhnev said, the Soviet Union was prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines-the Ohio type by the USA and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree, he added, to banning modernisation of existing and development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.


Restraint, balance and calm confidence distinguished Leonid Brezhnev's report, which opened the way to positive changes in Soviet-American relations. The world public took note that in the eighties the first step towards an understanding between the two mighty powers was made by the Soviet Union.


Those American politicians who want to torpedo \emph{detente} and progress in Soviet-American relations, like those who condone this or bend to their pressure for some time-serving reason, are taking a grave responsibility. They have obviously forgotten that the policy from strength pursued by the ruling elements in the United States during the cold war not only failed to yield the desired results, bu t also led US society into a succession of grave defeats and crises. Putting their narrow and transient inner-political or other interests before the true national interests of the United States, before the universal interests of security, peace and co-operation, taking anti-Soviet and militaristic action, they cannot offer any realistic alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence because no such alternative exists.

\chapter{8. Soviet-Japanese Relations}


The resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and


Japan on the basis of the joint declaration of October 19, 1956 brought the two countries closer to mu tual understanding and co-operation.


Leonid Brezhnev keeps the Soviet Union's relations with its Far Eastern neighbour constantly within his range of vision. He sees good potentialities for closer co-operation with Japan, and himself elaborates proposals to ensure stable and dynamic relations between the two neighbouring countries that play so important a role in world affairs.


Brezhnev has repeatedly expressed gratification over the growing contacts and co-operation with many capitalist countries, including Japan, and has emphasised time and again that this was in keeping with and a natural result of the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.


But Brezhnev is aware that not all people in these countries are prepared to accept the policy of peaceful coexistence and closer relations with the Soviet Union. This also applies to Japan.


When at the turn of the sixties and seventies certain quarters inJapan redoubled attempts to block any expansion of ties with the Soviet Union in the context of peaceful coexistence, Brezhnev demonstrated the fallacy of this stand in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971 ) .


We see good opportunities for further expansion of mu tually beneficial co-operation with Japan, though the attempts of certain Japanese quarters to exploit the so-called territorial question are certainly not benefiting Soviet-Japanese relations, he said. "Full normalisation on an appropriate contractual basis is also impeded by the presence of foreign military bases inJapan. Yet normalisation would be in the long-term interests of the two nations, and the interests of peace in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean."


In March 1972, speaking at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, Brezhnev again emphasised Soviet readiness to deepen and expand ties with Japan. He said:


Recently, the Soviet Union and Japan agreed to negotiate a peace treaty. We see this as an important and positive development. We are convinced that full normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations would work in the interests not only of our two nations, bu t also in those of peace and security in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. We are prepared to establish and develop wide-ranging and mutually beneficial co-operation with Japan on the political as well as economic planes with the view that such co-operation would benefit peace.


A little later, in December 1972, touching on the forthcoming Soviet-Japanese negotiations, Brezhnev said their purpose was to settle questions that were left over since the Second World War, and provide a contractual basis for the relations of our two countries. We aspire to a mu tually acceptable understanding on the entire range of questions put up for discussion. It is clear, however, that the negotiations will yield no positive results unless thejapanese side, too, shows the same desire. The Soviet Union, for its part, wants truly good-neighbour relations with Japan.


The importance that the Soviet Union attaches to good relations with Japan was also stressed in Leonid Brezhnev's speech at Alma-Ata in August 1973: "Our policy is directed to developing normal good-neighbour relations with all Asian countries that want the same thing. On this plane, we attach great significance to broad and diverse co-operation on a basis of mutual benefit with Japan, that large Asian country."


At that time, serious preparations were under way in the Soviet Union for negotiations with ajapanese government delegation. On September 24, 1973 Brezhnev set forth the Soviet attitude to the first visit of a Japanese Premier to Moscow since the resumption of diplomatic relations. "Given the goodwill and striving of both sides for mutual understanding, and respect for each other's interests," he said, "this visit, we believe, may become an important point of departure for fresh progress in the relations of our countries. And that will mean a general deepening of the process of political \emph{detente} in the whole world. As everybody knows, that is exactly what we want."


Speaking at a luncheon in honou r of the Japanese Prime Minister on October 8, 1973, Brezhnev set forth the Soviet position on the key problems of Soviet-]apanese relations:


"The people of the Soviet Union treat Japan, our neighbour in the Far East, with respect, interest and goodwill. The great economic, scientific, technical and cultural progress achieved by the Japanese people is well known in our country. We are aware of the importance of Japan in the world's economic potential and believe that it can and must play a big role in the joint effort of states and nations to consolidate world peace and expand peaceful co-operation among all nations. And we would welcome Soviet-Japanese co-operation in solving the many international problems in the interests of more solid peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.


The interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Japan, like the interests of international peace, would only benefit if the on-the-whole favourable development of Soviet-Japanese relations would be directed along a course of profound improvement. It goes without saying that conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan-and" exchanges of opinion on this score have already begun-would provide a still more dependable groundwork for our relations.


As we see it, the present task is to lay the foundations for good-neighbour relations between the Soviet Union and Japan for a really long period of history in order to create an endu ring tradition of friendly relations between the peoples of our countries, and between our states.


The Soviet -Japanese negotiations in Moscow paved the way for economic co-operation on the basis of long-term agreements, which increasingly supplemented the prevailing commercial ties between the USSR and Japan in the succeeding period. In addition to the earlier signed first general agreement on timber development in the Soviet Far East and Siberia for 1968-74, and the co-operation agreements on building the port of Vostochny and developing raw materials for the pulp-and-paper industry, new general agreements were concluded in 1974 and 1975-a second one on co-operation in developing timber resou rces, and co-operation agreements on developing South Yakut coking coal and on oil and gas prospecting and extraction in Sakhalin coastal waters.


Estimating the state of relations with Japan, Leonid Brezhnev said at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in February 1976:


The development of our relations with Japan follows a generally positive course. The Soviet Union is trading extensively with]apan. We have concluded a nu mber of mutually beneficial economic agreements. Contacts between political and pu blic personalities have become much more active. Our cultural ties are growing. But certain quarters inJapan are trying-sometimes with direct incitement from without-to present groundless and unlawful claims to the Soviet Union in connection with a peace settlement. That, of course, is no way to maintain good-neigh bour relations. As we see it, good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation should be the rule in Soviet-Japanese relations, ar-id that is what we are working for. I would like to express the hope that Japan will not be induced to take the road onto which those eager to profit from Soviet-Japanese differences would like to push it.


Speaking at a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1976 Brezhnev again took up the subject of relations with Japan. "I had an opportunity," he said, "to express certain ideas about the outlook for 10 to 15 year long-term economic co-operation between our two countries when I talked with a prestigious delegation of Japanese businessmen headed by Mr Doko, Chairman of the Federation of Japanese Economic Organisations, this August in the Crimea. The reaction of the Japanese delegates was a positive one, and so was the subsequent response to our talk in Japan. This shows once again that there is a solid basis for broad, lasting and mutually beneficial relations between our two countries (as, indeed, practice has already confirmed ) . But we are harbouring no illusions, for we know that it will still take a lot of hard effort to secure truly good Soviet-]apanese relations."


The understanding among the Japanese public of the need for a realistic approach to relations with the Soviet Union was doubtless furthered by Brezhnev's replies to the questions of Mr S. Hata, Editor-in-Chief of \emph{Asahi} (June 1977).


As you will recall, Brezhnev said, "the joint Soviet-Japanese statement of October 10, 1973, recorded an agreement to continue negotiations of a treaty of peace.


"The Soviet U nion is ready to carry the matter, important for our countries, to the end, provided, of course, the Japanese side sets no obviously unacceptable conditions. . . . Peace treaties, as we know, usually cover a wide range of questions, including the line of the border. This is also true of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of peace. But to say there is an 'unsettled territorial problem' between our countries is a one-sided and incorrect way of pu tting it.


We take it that japan is not yet ready to conclude a peace treaty. In view of this, we have made the proposal, withou t interrupting the peace-treaty negotiations, to discuss and sign a treaty of good-neighbourliness and co-operation that would encompass those areas of our relations that are already ripe to be pu t on an enduring contractual basis."


We called our proposal a treaty of good-neighbourliness and co-operation. In the final analysis, it is the substance that matters, not the name. We are prepared to examine possible Japanese initiatives in this context. The important thing is that such a bilateral document should help to establish truly good relations between our countries in the interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples, and those of peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world.


During the negotiations between the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers injanuary 1978, the Soviet side submitted the draft ofa treaty on good-neighbourliness and co-operation between the USSR and Japan. The Soviet draft contained the following commitments: to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from any threat or use of force; to prevent use of the territory of either country for actions that may prejudice the security of the other side; to refrain from actions encouraging any third side to commit acts of aggression against either of


\textbf{PFHL} - 0 the signatories; to hold regular political consultations, notably when situations endangering peace arise; to continue efforts aimed at halting the race in nuclear and conventional arming, and securing general and complete disarmament under effective international control; to further mutual economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation, and rational use of the biological resources of the World Ocean and so on.


The Soviet proposal of a treaty on good-neighbourliness and co-operation is not meant to abolish the question of a peace treaty. The Soviet Union is prepareq to put on record the intention of continuing peace-treaty negotiations. Far from pu tting off the issue, implementation of the Soviet proposal would, therefore, improve the climate for the peace-treaty negotiations.


To consolidate peace and security in the Far East and the Pacific, and in the rest of the world, the Soviet Union also suggested a provision to be put into the treaty that the USSR and Japan have no claim themselves and acknowledge no one else's claim to any special rights or privileges in world affairs, including any claim to domination in Asia and the region of the Far East.


Brezhnev keeps a close eye on the development of Soviet-Japanese economic ties, including the mutually beneficial co-operation in developing the natural wealth of the Soviet Far East and Siberia.


In the past 20 years, he said to the Editor-in-Chief of \emph{Asahi,} "trade between our countries increased more than 70-fold. In l 976 it climbed beyond the 2,000 million rouble mark. Japan is one of the three biggest trading partners of the USSR among the developed capitalist countries. "It is safe to expect a further growth of trade and it may be assumed that in the coming 5 years it will exceed 10,000 million roubles. This growth will be facilitated by the new 5-year agreement on trade and settlements signed recently in Tokyo."


Brezhnev recalled the proposals for a further extension of Soviet


\emph{]} apanese economic ties made by him in 1976 to a Japanese economic delegation in the Crimea.


In particular, Brezhnev said, "we touched on the question of a possible long-term economic co-operation programme for 10 to 15 years, applying chiefly to more intensive utilisation of the resou rces of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. We also discussed the usefulness of an agreement between our two countries on the principles of economic co-operation modelled on similar already operating agreements of the Soviet Union with Britain, France, Canada and a few other countries that have proved their worth in practice."


Fishing occupies an important place in Soviet-]apanese relations.


Brezhnev noted that "fishery has always been conspicuous in the general complex of Soviet-Japanese relations. And that is natural because our two countries engage in fishery in the same waters. Owing to the new situation in international fishery created by the establishment of 200-mile zones by many countries, it became necessary to bring Japanese fishing along the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union in line with the decision of the Presidium of the USS\_R Supreme Soviet on the introduction of temporary measures for the conservation of living resources and the regulation of fishery.


The Soviet fishing fleet, Brezhnev went on to say, "has an interest in taking the entire scientifically tolerable catch within the region of the Soviet coast in order to partly compensate for losses to our fishery inflicted by the restrictive measures of other countries.


Still, conscious of the vital importance of fishing to Japan and of its interest in continuing fishery in waters adjoining the Soviet coast, we have expressed our readiness to conclude a relevant agreement. The negotiations, though they took a long time, culminated in a mutually acceptable solution, and the agreement, as we know, was recently signed.


On the day of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution millions ofJapanese TV viewers heard Brezhnev's address to the people of Japan. Referring to Soviet foreign policy, Brezhnev emphasised the Soviet Union's fidelity to the behests of V. I. Lenin, founder of the Soviet state. We have always followed and will continue to follow a policy of peace and international security, a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, of furthering relations of equal and\_ mutually beneficial co-operation between them, Brezhnev said, as this has been unambiguously recorded in the new Constitu tion of the Soviet Union.


These principles, he added, also apply to our relations withJapan. We want us and the Japanese to be good neighbours, so that nothing should cloud our relations and an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and cooperation should reign between us.


There are good opportunities for this. They exist in all areas of Soviet-Japanese relations-political, commercial, economic, cultural, scientific, technical and so on.


In face of the growing international tension and the US Administration's offensive on \emph{detente,} the Soviet Union worked to preserve all the positive achievements of the \emph{detente} policy and to further peaceful coexistence and international co-operation among states with different social systems. This policy the Soviet Union also followed in relation to


Japan.


Speaking in Alma-Ata on August 29, 1980, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Our economic and other ties with our Japanese neighbour are still considerable and profi table for both sides. We are ready to continue expanding them. To what extent this succeeds will depend on the Japanese side. It will depend on how theJapanese leadership succeeds in preserving an independent and realistic policy in face of the outside influences that are pushing Japan onto the dangerous road of militarisation and hostile actions against the Soviet Union.


Peking and Washington, in unison, are pounding Japan with shabby inventions abou t a Soviet threat. But the statesmen ofJapan, we hope, will display good sense in assessing the situation and see things as they are, not as they are portrayed in America or China.

\chapter{9. The Soviet Union and China}


Speaking at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev said: "Special mention must be made of China. The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past 20 years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principle and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to. The present Chinese leaders themselves describe what happened in the period of the so-called cultural revolution in their country as 'a most cruel feudal-fascist dictatorship'. We have nothing to add to this assessment.''


At present, Brezhnev noted, changes are under way in China's internal policy. Time will show what they actually mean. It will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership manages to overcome the Maoist legacy.


But, unfortu nately, the Soviet leader added, there are no grounds yet to speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at aggravating the international situation, and is aligned with the policy of the imperialist powers. That, of course, will not bring China back to the sound road of development. Imperialists will Ii.ever be friends of socialism. "The simple reason behind the readiness of the United States,Japan and a number of NATO countries to expand their military and political ties with China," Brezhnev added, "is to use its hostility to the Soviet Union and the socialist commu nity in their own, imperialist interests. That is a hazardous game."


In 1964, addressing Japanese socialists, Mao Tse-tung served notice of China's claims to the Soviet Far East. In August 1965, at a meeting of the Politbureau of the Comm unist Party of China, he spoke to the following effect: ''We must on all accounts hold Southeast Asia in our hands, including South Vietnam as well as Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. The region is rich in mineral resources and is worth the effort."


Words were followed by deeds. Schoolbooks and other publications were revised in an aggressive spirit, and maps were pu blished showing large sections of the Soviet Union as Chinese. On some maps the border is so drawn that it pu ts into China's "possession" territories now inhabited by nearly all the peoples of Asia. In China these territories are called "temporarily lost" or "historic" territories.


In Asia, apart from Soviet territory, this includes a part oflndia and Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam and a few other countries and territories. The Chinese leaders endeavou red to appease their predatory appetite and to thrust into foreign territory. This, in fact, was the pu rpose of the attack on India. In April 1967, Leonid Brezhnev observed: "By now the whole world is aware of the true aims of the great-power chauvinist course" of Mao


Tse-tung's group.


Speaking at the 1969 International Meeting of Comm u nist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, Brezhnev levelled sharp criticism at the "great-power aspirations of the present Peking leadership with its claims to the territory of other countries." He added: "The idea that China has a messianic role to play is drummed into the heads of the Chinese workers and peasants." Brezhnev called attention to the fact that "Chinese propaganda openly proclaims the task of 'hoisting the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought over the globe'."


Seeing the Soviet U nion as the main obstacle to their hegemonic ambitions, the Peking leaders made anti-Sovietism the basis of their policy. Exposing the anti-Sovietism of the Peking leadership, Brezhnev said in 1969: "It is against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that Peking is now spearheading its activity on the international scene. From reducing economic ties with most of the socialist countries to the minimum, from renouncing political co-operation with them, the Chinese leaders have gone on to armed provocations on the Soviet border."


As China worsened relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, it gravitated more and more towards the imperialist forces and fell in step with their foreign policy.


In March 1967, Brezhnev observed: "It is now publicly acknowledged in the USA that the posture of the present leaders of the PRC on the Vietnam question is helping the conduct of the American war against the people of Vietnam." "A real find for the US imperialists," is how Brezhnev described the "rabidly anti-Soviet position of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage, and their line of dividing the forces that oppose aggression and, in effect, oflessening aid to embattled Vietnam." Referring to US President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, Brezhnev noted that "the resumption of contacts between the two countries and normalisation of their relations is by itself an entirely normal thing". But he added: "One must, however, take note of some of the pronouncements made by the participants in the Peking talks that give reason to think that the dialogue went beyond the framework of the bilaterl Sino-American relations. How else, for example, is one to interpret the statement made at a banq uet in Shanghai, namely, that 'today our two nations (that is, the Americans and the Chinese) hold in their hands the future of the whole world'?"


In addition to strengthening ties with imperialism, it was part of the Chinese leaders' hegemonic plans to prepare for war and to torpedo \emph{detente.} Brezhnev once recalled the pronouncement made by Mao Tse-tung in 1957: "He spoke with remarkable lightness and cynicism of the probable death of half of mankind in the event of an atomic war. The facts show that Maoism calls not for struggle against war bu t, on the contrary, for war, which it sees as a positive historical phenomenon."


The Peking leaders proclaimed a world-wide conflict inevitable, issued the militarist slogan of preparing for war, and viciously attacked the policy of easing international tensions. "Peking's feverish attempts to torpedo \emph{detente,} to prevent disarmament, to sow suspicion and hostility between countries, and its efforts to provoke a world war and to capitalise on it", as Brezhnev said, "are a great danger for all peace-loving nations."


Inthe United Nations Peking spokesmen invariably attack proposals directed to solving the problems of \emph{detente} and disarmament. As Brezhnev noted, China opposed the important proposals made by the Soviet Union "to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and to universally ban the development of new types and systems of mass destruction weapons (some of which may be still more frightening than nuclear weapons) ".


At the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1978, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua called for new spirals in the build-up of military potentials. Referring to the Peking leadership's standpoint on disarmament, Brezhnev noted: "It looks as though their spokesman has simply mixed up the forums. His warlike speech should be more properly delivered not before the United Nations, but at a session of the NATO bloc."


In January 1979 the American journal \emph{Time} put a number of questions to Leonid Brezhnev. They included the following: "Since the announcement of normalisation between Washington and Peking, there has been much talk in the US of 'playing the China card' and presumably some Chinese hope to play the American card. What do you think of such concepts, and what is the probable future of Soviet relations with China?"


Brezhnev answered this question as follows:


"There are some in the US and in other Western countries who have found the course hostile towards the Soviet Union followed by the present Chinese leadership so much to their liking that they are tempted to turn Peking into an instrument of pressure on the world of socialism. Such a policy appears to me to be adventurous and highly dangerous for the cause of universal peace.


The point is not at all the establishment of diplomatic relations. The point is that attempts are being made to encourage in every way and to stimulate with economic bait and now, gradually, also with deliveries of modern weapons, materiel and military technology those who, while heading one of the biggest countries in the world, have openly declared their hostility to the cause of \emph{detente,} disarmament and stability in the world, those who lay claims to the territories of many countries and stage provocations against them, those who have proclaimed war inevitable and mounted active preparations for war."


Is it really so difficult to understand that this means playing with fire?


The profound substance and realism of Leonid Brezhnev's warning about the danger of the Chinese leaders' militarist policy to international security is borne out by China's invasion of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.


And one must recall in this connection that the Chinese invasion was, in effect, launched with the encouragement of the United States, where Deng Xiaoping cynically declared a few days before the aggression that Vietnam "must be pu nished".


As Brezhnev said, "The present Chinese leaders' unprecedentedly brazen and piratical attack on a small neighbouring country, Socialist Vietnam, has shown the world once and for all the perfidious and aggressive essence of their great-power hegemonic policy. Now everybody is aware that precisely this policy is at present the gravest menace to world peace. The great danger of any form of connivance with this policy is now more apparent than ever before."


Showing goodwill and acting in the interests of peace, the Soviet Union has tried time and again to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. But on every occasion it encountered opposition on the part of the Chinese leadership.


This was the case in 1964, when a Chinese party-and-government delegation came to Moscow for the festivities of the 47th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Chinese side evaded a constructive discussion of important issues in Soviet-Chinese relations and chose to cause still greater strain.


All kinds of obstacles were raised by the Chinese leaders to the negotiation of border questions. "We are not blind to the fact," Brezhnev said in April 1970, "that the situation which is being artificially created in China over the current negotiations can in no way promote their success. Who can, indeed, say in earnest that incitement of an anti-Soviet war psychosis and exhortations for the Chinese population to prepare for 'war and hunger' are furthering success in the negotiations?"


In 1969 and again in 1970, 1971 and 1973 the Soviet side initiated moves to normalise the relations between the two countries.


The Chinese leadership rejected the proposal for high-level talks to work out a joint statement on the principles of relations between the USSR and PRC based on peaceful coexistence, equal rights, mu tual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. The proposal was made in an Address of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Permanent Committee of the National People's Assembly of China in February 1978.


In the begining of April 1979 the Chinese side announced that it did not intend to prolong the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in 1950. The note of the PRC Foreign Ministry on this score suggested bilateral negotiations "to regulate the unsettled questions between the two countries and to improve relations between the two countries". Brezhnev commented: "They don't seem to balancethis renu nciation of the treaty and the words about wanting to improve relations. Still, we are prepared to take a serious and positive approach to the organisation of Soviet-Chinese negotiations."


The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet described the Soviet approach to the negotiations in these clear terms: "We have long been in favour of such negotiations, of normalising relations with the PRC on the principles of peaceful coexistence. We would also be pleased if both sides undertook not to recognise anybody's claims to special rights and hegemony in world affairs. The future will show how serious the intentions of the PRC leadership are."


At the 26th Congress, Brezhnev expressed his conviction that the true interests of the people of China would be best served by a policy of peace and nothing bu t a policy of peace and normal relations with other countries.


If Soviet-Chinese relations are still frozen, the Soviet leader said, "the reason for this has nothing to do with our position. The Soviet Union has never sought, nor does it now seek any confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We follow the course set by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, and would like to build our ties with that country on a good-neighbour basis. Our proposals for normalising relations with China are still open, and our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed."

\part{Chapter 5. The Head of the State}


Previous chapters have given you an idea of the truly gigantic work being done by Brezhnev. This work is multifaceted and rich in content and extends into both internal and foreign politics.


It is safe to say that all current achievements of the Soviet Union are associated with Brezhnev: in economic progress; in the further improvement of the socialist state and of democracy; in the progress of culture; in raising the people's standard ofliving. Behind this there is the very real daily effort of a leader of such stature as Brezhnev.


Brezhnev is one of the most prominent international leaders. On many occasions he has represented the Soviet Union abroad at summit-level talks on fundamental questions of strengthening peace and ensuring the security of the people. His signature is affixed to many highly important documents of present-day international relations.


Thus, for many years, Brezhnev has in fact been acknowledged by the Soviet people and by the world to be the most influential representative of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. This reflects Brezhnev's personal qualities, his extensive merits and prestige, as well as the enhanced role of the Commu nist Party in the society of developed socialism in the Soviet Union.


Some time ago, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on May 24, 1977, unanimously recognised it as desirable for Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, concurrently to assume the office of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.


Three weeks later the Supreme Soviet of the USSR-the highest representative organ of the Soviet state--met in session.


At 10 a.m.,June 16, 1977, members of both chambers filled the Grand Kremlin Palace. The first item on the agenda was "Concerning the 222


Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."


Depu ty M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee, made a thoroughly substantiated statement in which he highly commended Brezhnev's work for the good of the party, the Soviet people, \emph{detente,} and international peace, and moved a draft decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:


"The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics


\emph{decrees:}


Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev shall be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."""


The decree was unanimously approved by the deputies.


Then Brezhnev went up to the rostrum. He thanked the deputies for the confidence they had in him, electing him for the second time to the office of Chairman of the Presidiu m of the Supreme Soviet. In his brief speech Brezhnev said in part, "I shall do all I can for our dear country to grow stronger and to prosper, for the life of Soviet people to improve more and more, for world peace to grow stronger, and for international co-operation to increase."


Brezhnev's election to the post of Head of State was acclaimed all over the world. This showed that Brezhnev's unrelenting struggle for international \emph{detente,} lasting peace and social progress has won him prestige and respect among all people of goodwill. Leaders, progressives, the press in many countries expressed profound satisfaction that the most prestigious representative of the Communist Party and the Soviet state has been elected to the highest office in the Soviet Union. The press in different countries stressed that the event was important both for the life of the Soviet people and internationally.


Congratulations addressed to Brezhnev came from all continents. The party and state leaders of the socialist countries referred to


Brezhnev in their messages as an individ ual who has played an exceptional part in furthering the friendship and co-operation of the socialist countries, in their joint struggle for socialist and communist construction, in strengthening socialist internationalism, in the struggle for peace.


Messages from developing countries stressed his intolerance to colonialism, racism and apartheid and his warm and friendly feelings for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.


Many congratulations came from Western countries. They referred to the deep respect enjoyed by Brezhnev and said that his election to the new office would further the relations of the Soviet state with the respective countries.


Irrespective of their political beliefs and ideological views, all those who congratulated Brezhnev noted his profou nd dedication to peace.


With his natural vigour and dynamism Brezhnev assumed the duties of his new office. The day following his election he chaired a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which discussed in concrete terms the measu res taken by the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics to promote the public discussion of the draft new Constitution of the Soviet Union.


As Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Brezhnev received the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow. Some of them he had known for a long time; others he was still to become acquainted with. The heads of diplomatic missions warmly congratulated Brezhnev on his election as Head of State.


The atmosphere of this reception is reflected specifically in the speech of Robert A. D. Ford, the ambassador of Canada to the Soviet Union, dean of the diplomatic corps. Ford said, ". . . I have followed with considerable awe the skilful way in which, as General Secretary, you lent your personal touch to the determination of the domestic policy of your country and, of even greater interest to us, its foreign policy. It is with great satisfaction that we now see this completed by your assumption of the post of Head of State."


Ford pointed out that Brezhnev's name is identified with \emph{detente} and expressed hope and confidence that this trend of Soviet foreign policy would continue.


In his reply, Brezhnev expressed his sincere gratitude to the heads of embassies for their congratulations. Stressing the important part ambassadors play in shaping an atmosphere of friendship, goodwill and greater or lesser confidence in the relations of their respective countries with the Soviet Union, Brezhnev said:


"The international life of today is very dynamic. The opportunities to strengthen peace are growing steadily. But the threats to peace are growing as well. Evidently one of the prime objectives of a far-sighted policy and diplomacy of reason is to expand in every way the range of opportunities and to red uce the magnitude of the threats. . . .


I take this opportunity to ask you to convey the following message to you r heads of state and leaders of your countries:"


"There is no coun try or people in the world, in fact, with which the Soviet Union would not like to have good relations.


There is no topical international problem to the solution of which the Soviet Union would not be willing to contribu te."


"There is no seat of military danger in the removal of which by peaceful means the Soviet U nion would not be interested.


There is no type of armaments and, first of all, of weapons of mass destruction which the Soviet Union would not be ready to limit, prohibit on a basis of reciprocity, in agreement with other states, and then remove from the arsenals."


"The Soviet Union will always be an active participant in any negotiations or any international action aimed at developing peaceful co-operation and strengthening the security of peoples.


It is our belief, our firm belief, that realism in politics and the will to \emph{detente} and progress will ultimately triumph, and mankind will step into the twenty-first century in the conditions of a peace more dependable than ever before. We shall do everything we can for this to come true."" The adoption in October 1977, a few weeks before the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolu tion, ofa new Constitution, which had been drafted and prepared by the Constitution Commission under the direction of Leonid Brezhnev, was an outstand" ing event in the life of the country.


We have every reason to say that the new fundamental law of the Soviet Union and the further development of socialist democracy will go down in history as events intrinsically linked with the name of Leonid Brezhnev.


Brezhnev's election to the office of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened a new chapter in the biography of this outstanding political leader and statesman of our time.


His entire life is witness to his great and exceptionally varied experienceexperience of personal participation and leadership in virtually all the economic and political spheres of one of the greatest powers of the world, the Soviet Union.


His approach to all the problems of the present day is filled with lofty ideological content and a high degree of creativity; his profound knowledge of politics, economy and social development is well known. His efficiency and integrity blend with profound modesty.


Brezhnev cannot think of himself apart from the country in which he was born and where he grew up, apart from the party in which he matu red as a political leader of world stature.


Brezhnev cherishes the trust of the people. He often meets with working people and corresponds extensively with workers, collective farmers, scientists, workers in culture and war veterans. He is always happy to congratulate those who have displayed constructive initiative or shown good results in their work. For many years Brezhnev has been the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR representing the people of the Bauman electoral district of Moscow, and he performs his duties of deputy with the utmost industry. Addressing his electors, he said, "I regard your trust as the highest honour and will do everything tojustify it, for a Communist puts the interests of the people above all else, and there is no greater reward for him than the people's trust." Time and again he has justified this confidence in full measure.


The warm words addressed to him, the acts of confidence and recognition expressed by the people Brezhnev relates to the Communist Party, which sees its supreme purpose in serving the people and "teaches all of us," as Brezhnev pu t it, "to fulfil this sacred duty." "Communists have no privileges," Brezhnev emphasises, "save the one privilege of giving more of themselves than others to the common cause and of fighting and working better than others for its triumph. Communists have no special rights, save the one right of always being in the forefront, of being where things are the hardest."


Brezhnev has often said that he would not have been able to accomplish all the useful things he has done for the people in his life without the constant support of his comrades in work and struggle, who, like himself, devote all their energies to the common cause. "Facing the tremendous and complicated tasks that are still to be accomplished," Brezhnev said, "I am inspired by the knowledge that we in the Politburo, the Secretariat, the entire Central Committee and government work as a close-knit, friendly collective, relying on one another's assistance."


Today there is every reason to speak of a modern style in the work of the top echelon of the party and state, shaped under the immediate influence of Brezhnev's own style and qualities as man and leader.


Characteristic of the work of the Central Committee is a scientific approach, collective spirit and efficiency in guiding Communist construction and conducting the home and foreign policy of the Soviet state. The entire work of the Central Committee is based on scientific theory-i.e. on the Marxist-Leninist view of the world and the problems of building socialism and communism. Engels made this remarkable observation: the moment socialism became a science it had to be treated as a science. All the work done by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its General Secretary is consonant with precisely this constructive, scientific attitude to questions of building socialism, based not on voluntaristic decisions bu t on a profound theoretical understanding of the phenomena and tendencies of life.


The late A. N. Kosygin, who was Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union for many years, emphasised that the outstanding progress made by the country had been "considerably predetermined by the climate of ideological unity, comradely confidence, high exactingness, and strict adherence to party principles which prevails in our party, in its Central Committee and Politburo led by Comrade Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."


M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee, said the following of Brezhnev's personal qualities: "Communist Brezhnev, in whom the party has shown the greatest confidence and who is shouldering a truly gigantic responsibility, is still a plain and modest person . . . . He is boundlessly dedicated to the interests of the people, loyal to his principles, considerate to people, and mindful of the opinion of his comrades. He shows truly communist exactingness, intolerance of complacency, and a lively interest in everything that is new and progressive."


Brezhnev devotes his wide-ranging experience to serving the people, the Communist Party, communist construction and strengthening world peace. His recent books \emph{Little Land, Rebirth} and \emph{Virgin Lands} contain vivid recollections and reflections of this remarkable man, who has been in the forefront of the Soviet people's struggle throughou t its history.


The success of these books is rooted in their content, in their colourful style, and above all in the fact that they are charged with great social impact and truth.


When Brezhnev's books were published, people talked about them with interest and enthusiasm. Industrial workers and intellectuals discussed them at their meetings, young and old alike read them and they continue to attract general interest. They were a vivid landmark in the intellectual and socio-political life of the Soviet Union; they produced a significant effect abroad too, and were translated into many languages.


The salient feature of Brezhnev's memoirs, and of all his speeches, articles and other works is that they reach out towards the future. The past appears as the starting-point for advancing to new accomplishments, as the firm basis for solving tomorrow tasks that will be more complex and greater in scope than those of the Soviet people were solving but yesterday or are solving today.


Leonid Brezhnev's broad ties to the people can be seen from the amount of his daily mail, the great number of letters he receives from every corner of the Soviet Union.


The letters addressed to Brezhnev by Soviet citizens of all generations convey words of gratitude for the fact that the Soviet country has had peace for many years, sparing people the still-remembered partings on going to war, the heart-rending death notices, the terrible blackou ts-the privations and suffering of war.


There has been no war for more than 30 years. Many thanks to the party, to you, Leonid Ilyich, for the joy of working in peace and seeing the laughter of our children. Man is made not for war, bu t for work, wrote bricklayer A. Alekhin of Polevskoi in the Sverdlovsk region, in a letter to Brezhnev.


And the following lines are from a letter by And rei Maidanov, a Riga schoolboy: "Of course, I have never been in a war, bu t I know that peace is happiness, and happiness has to be fought for. This is why our family will always stand by you, dear Leonid Ilyich, in your great mission-the struggle for peace."


Forward-looking and tireless, Brezhnev is always in the thick of life, with people, both at home and abroad. He always checks the considered conclusions of experts against other opinions and will draw no conclusions until he weighs them all. Once the conclusions are drawn, he works perseveringly to pu t them into effect.


For Brezhnev, leadership is, first of all, motion. Few people know our country in all its variety as well as he does. The Ukraine and the Soviet Far East, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, the Baltic repu blics and Central Asia, the Caucasus and the northern part of Russia-all these areas of the Soviet Union he knows not from maps bu t from personal impressions and from working there.


Brezhnev's many trips abroad were packed with activity. He did not spare his energy wherever he went. At the same time his every visit abroad yielded personal experiences and abundant first-hand information, so important for taking effective and competent decisions. And for Brezhnev that is what matters most.


But though his character is highly dynamic, Brezhnev, the leader, is remarkably poised and cautious. A popular proverb says, "Measure thy cloth thrice before cutting." To a certain extent this is true of Brezhnev, the political leader who shoulders a supreme responsibility. He makes his decisions on the basis of objective information and its proper evaluation. He deals with only those problems that are matu re in real life, notjust in the minds of imaginers. Ifthey are not ripe, he is prepared to wait; he has patience.


Such is Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.


Brezhnev's life is a life given to the service of peace. His thoughts are constantly directed towards preventing any new global disaster. His name is associated with the easing of international tension that took place in the 1970s. It is inseparable from the historic peace programmes proposed by the Soviet Union, including the Peace Programme for the 1980s.


May 9, 1981. In Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, a city that suffered greatly during the Second World War, Brezhnev made a vivid speech at the unveiling of the memorial and Ukrainian History Museum commemorating this difficult bu t heroic period in the life of the nation: "The war has long since ended. But the voices of those who died, of relatives and comrades-in-arms still sound in our memories. We see their faces, our hands feel their firm handshakes. We remember what they talked about, what we dreamed of together.


In that unforgettable victory spring of 1945 we, front-line soldiers, believed that this world war would be the last, Brezhnev recalls. "We believed that our children would never hear the crash of explosions and the scream of air-raid sirens, never see blood flowing and their homes wrapped in a blazing inferno. This belief gave us strength in the decisive struggle with the enemy. And it was shared by millions and millions of people in our country and on all continents. Their hopes cannot, must not be deceived. The Soviet land has done and is doing everything in its power to ensure this."


Leonid Brezhnev spoke of the Soviet Union's interest in peace and \emph{detente,} of the peaceful situation that is needed for the decisions of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU on the further building of communism in the USSR to be put into effect.


He reminded us that peace was threatened and seriously threatened.


Peace had to be fought for.


He noted that there are quite a few sober-minded people among the policy-makers in the capitalist world today. They realise that in this day and age banking on force, banking on war in relations with the socialist world is madness, that there is only one reasonable road-peaceful coexistence and mu tually beneficial co-operation.


But, he added, there are also statesmen in the capitalist world who, on all the evidence, have grown accustomed to thinking only in terms of force and diktat. The attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union has virtually become their main political credo. The solving of international problems through negotiations and mutually beneficial agreements appears to be way down their list of priorities, if they give the matter any serious thought at all.


Among such politicians there are some who say in so many words that peace is not the most important thing, that there are things more important than peace.


Can anyone imagine a more horrendous position, Brezhnev protested, "a more cynical disregard for the future of nations, including one's own, for the lives of hundreds of millions of people!"


Brezhnev is confident that war can be averted. His recipe for doing so is to overcome fear, prejudice, lies and hatred, the worst enemies of peace.


He declares that the Soviet Union, the Soviet people claim no monopoly in the work of strengthening peace. They advocate a wide-ranging dialogue, and any constructive idea will always find understanding on their part.


We shall work persistently to ease off tensions, to save \emph{detente,} and to ensure its further development. This is the key issue, these are the words of a man who knows the horrors of war and the true value of peace.


The tens of thousands of people who gathered on the banks of the ancient river Dnieper, and the millions of others following the ceremony on television or radio took as an expression of their deepest wishes and hopes the concluding phrase of Brezhnev's speech: "May peace triumph on earth!"


The thinking, character and style of work of this outstanding man are well expressed in the words with which in December 1976 he accepted that high award-the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal of Hero of the Soviet Union:


I take pride in the fact that no day in my life can be separated from the past and present causes of our Communist Party and of our Soviet land.


And then, on that auspicious occasion, he spoke these words addressed to the future, which sound as a pledge:


I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AND SHALL REMAIN THE PARTY'S LOYAL SOLDIER, A LOYAL FIGHTER FOR THE CAUSE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE, FOR THE HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY OF OUR MOTHERLAND, FOR PEACE AND COMMUNISM.''









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'The Academy of Sciences of the USSR' \& Leonid I. Brezhnev

Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life



1982


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