#title A response to the Wilderness Front article “Interconnectivity” #author Mbe #date 28-08-2025 #source <[[https://typst.app/project/rKSMKvyP2XQ8Uc8gDtSaP1][typst.app/project/rKSMKvyP2XQ8Uc8gDtSaP1]]> #lang en #pubdate 2025-09-01T10:28:29.308Z #topics anti-tech, philosophy, Anti-Tech Revolution, technique, systems theory, reformism, anachism, mutualism, original texts, As highlighted in “Why Reform Will Fail” the author explains interconnectivity by framing technology not merely as a tool to be controlled, but as an ensemble or aggregation of processes. Within this ensemble, multiple technologies exist and interact with themselves to form what is called “interconnectivity.” However, this explanation does not truly clarify its essential meaning.[1] We know that numerous conceptions of a “system” exist today. In sociology, most authors begin with an object and define the system in terms of that object. A similar approach is seen with Ted Kaczynski, who identifies an object and then labels the surrounding network as the system.[2] This approach is not new; as quoted by Hamon, a system is an “ensemble of parts or subsystems which interact in such a way that components tend to change slowly enough to be treated as constants.”[3] These can be called structures. Furthermore Bertalanffy’s concept of Fliessgleichgewicht or specifies a set of rational elements whose evolution is characterized mainly by feedback.[4] He emphasizes that this feedback operates from the whole onto the parts, thereby assuring the system’s autonomy within reality. Thus, a system is neither a simple collection of objects placed side by side nor a nonspecific aggregate. While many authors overemphasize “feedback” as the key to a system, Kaczynski—who also defines the system in relation to an object—puts forward the contestable idea that a system evolves purely according to its own internal logic.[5] We can now begin defining such a system with more precise, easily referenced propositions. My goal is not to provide a detailed account of a full system but to clarify certain foundational functions I deem important. This clarification is essential, as it will later enable us to sufficiently argue that the rational control and alteration of a system’s supposed “relations” is indeed possible. For instance, Parsons describes a system as “a set of elements interrelating in such a way that any evolution of one triggers a revolution of the whole, and any modification of the whole has repercussions on each element.”[6] This perspective confirms that we are dealing not with isolated objects but with a unified network of relations. This point is further demonstrated by recognizing that systems contain different types of objects, both quantitative and non-quantitative. Secondly, we quickly begin to notice something important: the elements within the ensemble that constitute the system have a tendency to combine among themselves rather than with outside factors. For example, an economic system must be in a state of flux with the overall tendencies of society, which involves a preferential relationship between its internal components. Here, I would like to direct the interested reader to François Perroux, who has extensively studied economic conditions are themselves based on investment theory[7] Furthermore, we can illustrate this by using a historical example: what happened in 2008. The financial system became a closed ensemble because complex financial instruments—CDOs and CDS were created and traded between massive institutions, forming a dense, internal web of preferential relationships. However, the system soon became decoupled from the outside factor of real-world asset value, which created a massive financial bubble.[8] Thirdly, we can see that such a system is dynamic. This means, in practice, that not all parts are similar in nature. Within a system, actions modify one another, which removes any repetitive nature and instead creates an evolution. For example, a living organism is not a mere collection of organs but is better understood as a complex whole, comprised of interdependent subsystems. These subsystems are fundamentally different in their structure and function; although they operate independently, they exist in a constant state of continuous and reciprocal interaction. If a change occurs in one such as the release of a hormone it immediately alters the activity of the others. The organism, therefore, is an emergent property of these dynamic relations. Furthermore, because the technological system is formed by the phenomenon of “technics” and by the advance of this phenomenon (here, I am using the term “phenomenon,” which is different from a concrete operation[9], it exhibits specific traits. As also highlighted in “Why Reform Will Fail,” the author focuses on the fact that no system can be rationally controlled because emergent properties will ultimately arise, a fact evident in chaos theory. However, this observation does not account for what truly forms the system in the first place. The origin is not the object itself (i.e., the nonexceptional) but the exceptional—the event that initiates the phenomenon. Furthermore, as defined above, any change to the relations among elements within such a system will lead to a change of the whole. As Jacques Ellul states: “Any modification of an element has repercussions on the ensemble and modifies it. Any modification of the ensemble likewise modifies the elements and their relationships”[10]. Moreover then how “is reform possible?” To explain this, we can use the following propositions: we know that the system exhibits a specific set of “relations” that does not function like an engine but drives its own distinct evolution, as pointed out in Kevin Carson’s The New Homebrew Industrial Revolution.[11] Carson argues that the phenomenon of large-scale, centralized industrial technics is not an inevitable outcome of technology itself but is shaped by state-enforced economic relations. These political and economic elements within the system’s ensemble artificially reinforce a specific set of “relations” (i.e., centralization, hierarchy, dependence). If we accept that the system is a malleable ensemble of relations, then reforming its key elements can fundamentally alter the phenomenon itself. Therefore, the goal is not one of total elimination. The system is simply not a set of standalone objects or a unified monolith, but rather a system composed, as we have shown above, of subsystems and relations that follow their own buffers for independent adaptation. Furthermore, an understanding of chaos theory supports this notion. Although we experience unpredictability in initial conditions in non-linear systems, we simply do not need to take all of them into account. Likewise, in statistics, there still exists a certain type of logic. For example, take the equation that demonstrates this unpredictability:
𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝐴𝑥𝑛(1 − 𝑥𝑛) where 0 < 𝐴 < 4,0 < 𝑥0 < 1
As we increase the parameter 𝐴 to approximately 3.57, the system period-doubles into chaos. At 𝐴 = 3.7, the sequence 𝑥𝑛 is highly chaotic. A famous result of chaos theory is that for a chaotic system, to predict the value of 𝑥𝑛 twice as far into the future, one requires an exponential improvement in the precision of the initial value 𝑥0. This is the celebrated “butterfly effect.” However, while the precise value of 𝑥𝑛 (the state) is unpredictable, the long-term statistical behavior of the system is entirely predictable and controlled by the parameter 𝐴. For a given 𝐴, we can calculate the probability density function 𝜌(𝑥) that describes how often 𝑥𝑛 visits different values. We move from predicting a single outcome to predicting the distribution of outcomes. This mathematical principle translates directly to social systems. Just as parameter A governs the behavior of the logistic map, the structure of a society its economic rules, power relations, and cultural incentives governs the distribution of possible social outcomes. A strong understanding of these relational subsystems (e.g., dependencies, hierarchies, economies), which are widely documented, enables a similar shift from precise prediction to logical forecasting and structural intervention. For example, if one argues, as Carson does, that centralization stems from a systemic error in these relational rules, the solution is not futilely trying to predict every event. Instead, it is to rationally alter the underlying parameters the 𝐴 of the system such as antitrust laws or ownership models. We know that certain “values” of these social parameters lead to undesirable outcomes (e.g., instability, inequality). While we might not be able to eliminate a parameter entirely, we can change its value, thereby fundamentally altering the system’s behavior and producing a new, more desirable distribution of outcomes. The goal is not to predict the future but to design it by reshaping the structures that make certain futures more probable. This does not lead to a catastrophe akin to what the author illustrates—the notion that doing away with big business would cause economic collapse. Such a flawed notion assumes that “the economy” is synonymous with “big business,” and that destroying the former would dismantle the entire ensemble altogether. Here, I would like to point to the 2008 financial crisis once again, with the emphasis that the crisis was not caused by a lack of big business but was arguably caused by its existence in a “too-big-tofail” form. The problem was that massive financial institutions—through a web of complex relations like derivatives trading—had become so enlarged and interconnected that their potential failure threatened to collapse the entire system. They did not represent the system; they represented a pathological and destabilizing configuration within it. The ensuing bubble and collapse demonstrated that the ensemble of “big business” can become decoupled from real-world value, creating profound systemic risk. Yet, the system did not vanish. It remerged and reorganized itself. New forms of trade, regulations (however insufficient), and market adaptations emerged from the crisis. This resilience proves that the ecosystem of economic life is not contingent on any single, fragile form of organization.[12]
[1] AlexanderTheWake, “Interconnectivity: Why Reform Will Fail.” Accessed: Oct. 25, 2023. [Online]. Available: <[[https://www.wildernessfront.com/blog/interconnectivity][www.wildernessfront.com/blog/interconnectivity]]> [2] T. J. Kaczynski, Anti-Tech Revolution: Why and How. Scottsdale, AZ: Fitch & Madison, 2016. [3] M. Hamon, Introduction à la Théorie des Systèmes, no. 22. in Collection SUP. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974. [4] L. v. Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. New York: George Braziller, 1968. [5] T. J. Kaczynski, Anti-Tech Revolution: Why and How. Scottsdale, AZ: Fitch & Madison, 2016. [6] T. Parsons, The Social System. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1951. [7] F. Perroux, L’Economie du XXème Siècle, 3rd ed. in Théorique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969. [8] Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. [Online]. Available: <[[https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf][www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf]]> [9] J. Ellul, The Technological System. New York: Continuum, 1980. [10] J. Ellul, “The Technological Order,” The Technological Order: An Anthology of Key Texts. University of Chicago Press, 2014. Accessed: Oct. 25, 2023. [Online]. Available: <[[https://ellul.org/themes/ellul-and-technique/][www.ellul.org/themes/ellul-and-technique]]> [11] K. A. Carson, The Homebrew Industrial Revolution: A Low-Overhead Manifesto. Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2010. [12] Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. [Online]. Available: <[[https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf][www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf]]>