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Governing the Commons
Series editors’ preface
Preface
1. Reflections on the commons
THREE INFLUENTIAL MODELS
The tragedy of the commons
The prisoner’s dilemma game
The logic of collective action
THE METAPHORICAL USE OF MODELS
CURRENT POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Leviathan as the “only” way
Privatization as the “only” way
An alternative solution
An empirical alternative
Policy prescriptions as metaphors
Policies based on metaphors can be harmful
A CHALLENGE
2. An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations
THE CPR SITUATION
CPRs and resource units
Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations
INTERDEPENDENCE, INDEPENDENT ACTION, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
The theory of the firm
The theory of the state
THREE PUZZLES: SUPPLY, COMMITMENT, AND MONITORING
The problem of supply
The problem of credible commitment
The problem of mutual monitoring
FRAMING INQUIRY
Appropriation and provision problems
Multiple levels of analysis
STUDYING INSTITUTIONS IN FIELD SETTINGS
3. Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs
COMMUNAL TENURE IN HIGH MOUNTAIN MEADOWS AND FORESTS[59]
Törbel, Switzerland
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan
HUERTA IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS
Valencia
Murcia and Orihuela
Alicante
ZANJERA IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
SIMILARITIES AMONG ENDURING, SELF-GOVERNING CPR INSTITUTIONS
Clearly defined boundaries
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Collective-choice arrangements
Monitoring
Graduated sanctions
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
Nested enterprises
4. Analyzing institutional change
THE COMPETITIVE PUMPING RACE
The setting
The logic of the water-rights game
THE LITIGATION GAME
The Raymond Basin negotiations[102]
The West Basin negotiations
The Central Basin litigation
Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements
THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP GAME
Reasons for forming a district to include both basins
Reasons against forming a district to include both basins
THE POLYCENTRIC PUBLIC-ENTERPRISE GAME
THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPLY
Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regime
Reformulating the analysis of institutional change
5. Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities
TWO TURKISH INSHORE FISHERIES WITH CONTINUING CPR PROBLEMS
CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER BASINS WITH CONTINUING CPR PROBLEMS
A SRI LANKAN FISHERY
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SRI LANKA
THE FRAGILITY OF NOVA SCOTIAN INSHORE FISHERIES
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM COMPARING THE CASES IN THIS STUDY
6. A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs
THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY, CREDIBLE COMMITMENT, AND MUTUAL MONITORING
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Evaluating benefits
Evaluating costs
Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities
The process of institutional change
Predicting institutional change
A CHALLENGE TO SCHOLARSHIP IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
References
Source, notes...